Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis, the South African legal system's attempt to address sexual violence is explored through the lens of the work of the French feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray. It will be argued that the South African equality jurisprudence lays the foundation for a strongly Irigarayan approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality can be interpreted as being underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. Our Constitution envisions equality as a value informed by difference rather than sameness and, in accordance with Irigaray’s work, it can be said that the implication of this is that the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations on the one hand, and an acknowledgment of sexual difference on the other, are not mutually exclusive, but that sex equality instead calls for a fundamental recognition of sexual difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. However, it will be argued that our newly reformed sexual violence legislation undermines the progress made on a constitutional level by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in the definition of the crime of rape. This is done through firstly, defining the crime of rape in gender-neutral terms and secondly, retaining the concept of consent as the distinguishing characteristic between sex and rape. I will argue that through these features, our sexual violence legislation reflects the most basic mistakes that Irigaray identifies with the law. It will be argued that the legislation, on the one hand, denies sexual difference in a way that is prejudicial to women through its gender-neutral language, while at the same time, through the concept of consent, (re-)introducing a hierarchical construction of masculine and feminine sexuality into the Act in terms of which femininity is construed as derivative of, and inferior to, masculinity. Furthermore, the combination of the gender neutrality of the definition and the concept of consent exacerbates the situation, in so far as the gender neutrality masks the harmful construal of sexual difference that is incorporated in the definition through the concept of consent. Accordingly, judged from an Irigarayan perspective, the South African sexual violence legislation is deeply problematic. In addition, the legislation undercuts important constitutional developments, in so far as it ignores the constitutional insights that, firstly, sexual violence is a problem of sex inequality, and that secondly, the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations is served, rather than undercut by a concern with particularities. On this basis, it is argued that the South African sexual violence legislation should be amended so that the concept of consent is removed and the crime of rape is defined in sex-specific language (while still allowing for male victims and female perpetrators) that facilitates judicial understanding of the complexities of the crime of rape. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis sal die Suid-Afrikaanse regsisteem se poging om seksuele geweld aan te spreek, deur die lens van die werk van Luce Irigaray, ‘n Franse feministiese filosoof, ondersoek word. Daar sal geargumenteer word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse gelykheidsjurisprudensie ‘n grondslag vir ‘n sterk Irigarayiese benadering tot die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge lê, in soverre ons reg op gelykheid geïnterpreteer kan word om in ‘n erkenning van beliggaming, seksuele spesifiekheid en verskil (“difference”) begrond te wees. Ons Grondwet stel gelykheid as ‘n waarde wat deur verskil eerder as eenvormigheid geïnformeer is, voor oë, en in lyn met die werk van Irigaray, kan daar gesê word dat die implikasie hiervan is dat die nastrewing van die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge aan die een kant, en die erkenning van geslagsonderskeid (“sexual difference”) aan die ander, nie wedersyds uitsluitlik is nie, maar dat geslagsgelykheid eerder juis ‘n fundamentele erkenning van geslagsonderskeid en ‘n outentieke reaksie op die eise daarvan, noop. Daar sal egter geargumenteer word dat ons nuuthervormde wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die vordering wat op ‘n grondwetlike vlak gemaak is, ondermyn deur ‘n problematiese benadering tot geslagsonderskeid in die definisie van die misdaad van verkragting te verskans. Dit word bewerkstellig deur eerstens, die misdaad van verkragting in geslagsneutrale taal te formuleer, en tweedens, om die begrip van toestemming as onderskeidende kenmerk tussen seks en verkragting, te behou. Ek sal argumenteer dat dit deur hierdie eienskappe is, wat ons wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die mees basiese probleme wat Irigaray in die reg identifiseer, weerspieël. Daar sal voorgehou word dat die wetgewing, aan die een kant, deur die geslagsneutrale taal, geslagsonderskeid ontken op ‘n manier wat vrouens benadeel, terwyl dit terselfdertyd, deur die begrip van toestemming, ‘n hiërargiese verhouding tussen die manlike en die vroulike in die wetgewing daarstel, in terme waarvan die vroulike as derivatief en minderwaardig tot die manlike verstaan word. Verder, die situasie word deur die kombinasie van die geslagsneutraliteit van die definisie en die begrip van toetsemming, vererger deurdat die geslagsneutraliteit van die taal die skadelike vertolking van geslagonderskeid wat deur die begrip van toestemming in die definisie ingesluit word, verberg. Dus, vanuit ‘n Irigarayiese perspektief is die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld diep problematies. Verder, die wetgewing ondermyn belangrike grondwetlike ontwikkelinge in soverre dit die volgende grondwetlike insigte ignoreer: eerstens, dat seksuele geweld ‘n probleem van geslagsongelykheid is en tweedens, dat die strewe na transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge gedien, eerder as ondermyn word deur ‘n besorgdheid met die partikuliere. Op hierdie gronde word daar geargumenteer dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld gewysig behoort te word, deur die begrip van toestemming te verwyder en die misdaad te definieer in geslagspesifieke taal (op ‘n manier waardeur manlike slagoffers en vroulike oortreders steeds ingesluit word) wat geregtiglike begrip van die kompleksiteite van die misdaad van verkragting bemiddel.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to determine what responsibilities democratic states have toward refugees. This problem is stated within the broader framework of the tension inherent in all democratic states: on the one hand, the sovereign right of a state over its territory and, on the other hand, the cosmopolitan or universal human rights norms upon which the state‟s constitution is founded. I argue that this tension is brought to the fore when refugees cross borders and enter into democratic territories, asking for protection and claiming their human rights. The sheer magnitude of the refugee crisis makes this an issue every state should address. My answer to the question of state responsibility is worked out in four phases. Firstly, I give a conceptual clarification of refugeehood, sovereignty, and cosmopolitanism. I show that neither absolute sovereignty (which implies closed borders) nor extreme cosmopolitanism (which implies no borders) is desirable. Secondly, I draw on Immanuel Kant‟s cosmopolitan theory as a possible solution. Kant proposes a world-federation of states in which right is realised on the civic, international, and cosmopolitan level. Kant also insists that every individual has the right to hospitality – a right which foreign states should recognise. Thirdly, I examine three prominent theories which could offer us a way to address the refugee crisis. I argue that the first two – multiculturalism and John Rawls‟ „law of peoples‟ – are not adequate responses to the refugee crisis, but that the third – Seyla Benhabib‟s cosmopolitan federalism – is more promising. Hospitality is the first responsibility states have toward refugees, and Benhabib proposes that it be institutionalised by (i) forming a federation of states founded on cosmopolitan principles, (ii) revising membership norms through the political process of democratic iterations, and (iii) extending some form of political membership to the state to refugees. Lastly, I justify the claim that political membership should be extended by referring to Hannah Arendt‟s argument that the ability to speak and act publicly is part of what it means to be human. If we deny refugees this ability, or if we deny them access to political processes, we deny their humanity. Benhabib proposes institutional measures to ensure that this does not happen, including allowing for political membership on sub-national, national, and supranational levels. Ultimately, I argue that democratic states have the responsibility to (i) allow entry to refugees, (ii) give refugees legal status and offer protection, and (ii) extend political membership to them on some level. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te bepaal wat die verantwoordelikhede van demokratiese state teenoor vlugtelinge is. Ek plaas hierdie probleem binne die breër raamwerk van die onderliggende spanning in demokratiese state: die soewereine reg van ‟n staat oor sy grondgebied, aan die een kant, en die kosmopolitiese of universele menseregte-norme waarop die staat se grondwet berus, aan die ander kant. Ek argumenteer dat hierdie spanning na vore gebring word wanneer vlugtelinge, op soek na beskerming, grense oorsteek, demokratiese state binnetree en aanspraak maak op hulle regte. Ek bespreek die vraagstuk in vier stappe. Eerstens verduidelik ek die begrippe van vlugtelingskap, soewereiniteit en kosmopolitisme. Ek toon aan dat nóg absolute soewereiniteit (wat geslote grense impliseer), nóg ekstreme kosmopolitisme (wat geen grense impliseer) ‟n wenslike ideaal is. Tweedens kyk ek na Immanuel Kant se kosmopolitiese teorie vir ‟n moontlike oplossing. Kant stel voor dat state saamkom in ‟n wêreld-federasie, om sodoende reg te laat geskied op die plaaslike, internasionale, en kosmopolitiese vlak. Kant dring ook aan daarop dat elke individu die reg tot gasvryheid besit, ‟n reg wat ook deur ander state buiten die individu se staat van herkoms erken behoort te word. Derdens ondersoek ek drie prominente teorieë wat moontlike oplossings bied vir die vlugteling-krisis. Ek argumenteer dat die eerste twee – multikulturalisme en John Rawls se „law of peoples‟ – nie voldoende is om die vlugteling-krisis die hoof te bied nie. Die derde teorie, Seyla Benhabib se kosmopolitiese federalisme, blyk meer belowend te wees. Benhabib stel voor dat die staat se verantwoordelikheid om gasvryheid te toon geïnstitusionaliseer kan word deur (i)‟n federasie van state gegrond op kosmopolitiese beginsels te vorm, (ii) lidmaatskap-norme te hersien deur ‟n politieke proses genaamd demokratiese iterasie, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap van een of ander aard aan vlugtelinge toe te ken. Laastens regverdig ek die aanspraak op lidmaatskap. Ek verwys na Hannah Arendt se argument dat die vermoë om in die publieke sfeer te praat en dade te kan uitvoer, deel uitmaak van wat dit beteken om ‟n mens te wees. As ons verhoed dat vlugtelinge hierdie twee vermoëns kan uitleef, ontken ons hulle menslikheid. Benhabib stel sekere institutionele maatreëls voor om dit te voorkom. Dit sluit politieke lidmaatskap op ‟n sub-nasionale, nasionale, en supra-nasionale vlak in. Uiteindelik argumenteer ek dat demokratiese state se verantwoordelikhede teenoor vlugtelinge uit die volgende bestaan: (i) toegang tot hierdie state se grondgebied, (ii) wetlike status en beskerming, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap op een of ander vlak.

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / This thesis sets out to uncover why environmental concerns are not being effectively addressed in economic decision-making. It investigates this by analyzing the key values underpinning neo-classical economics and ecological economics, and concludes that both approaches remain trapped in a form of moral monism and are thus unable to express the full range of environmental values that exist. This results in a form of reductionism in economic thinking where all environmental value is expressed in the form of exchange value. In order to escape from this reductionism, it is asserted that ecological economics needs to adopt a moral pluralist philosophy that can accommodate both exchange values and subjective intrinsic value. Mindful of the quagmires of moral relativism, the thesis seeks out an approach to economic decision-making that is able to justify courses of action amid seemingly competing economic and environmental values. Environmental pragmatism, a form of moral pluralism, that focuses on the contextual nature of truth and value, is found fitting for the task. It uses experience to reduce uncertainty and moves decision-makers towards courses of action that can support a plurality of values within a given context. Environmental pragmatist Bryan Norton’s philosophy of adaptive management, with its guidelines of experimentalism, multi-scalar analysis and localism, is found to be particularly helpful in achieving this. The second half of the thesis concentrates on demonstrating the value of environmental pragmatism in economic decision-making by using it to analyse the South African National Budget of 2005. Norton’s guidelines are first used as critical tools of analysis to show up the gaps and inconsistencies in the budget process and then, secondly, as creative tools to reconstruct the budget process. To demonstrate what this would mean in concrete terms, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Agriculture budget votes are analysed using the sustainability indicators of The City of Cape Town’s Sustainability Report of 2005 and the 2020 goals of The City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan of 2004/5.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The primary concern of this dissertation will be to understand under what conditions novelty arises within a system. In classical philosophy, the notion of novelty is usually said to arise out of an event. However, the notion of an event often carries with it metaphysical and conservative implications. Therefore, part of the concern of this dissertation is to begin to develop an approach to novelty which is not dependent upon the event. This approach is developed through the insights offered by Critical Complexity and post‐structuralist philosophy. In social science the model of the frame has dominated how to think about the limitations to the context specific nature of knowledge. Instead of the analogy of a frame, this dissertation argues that it is better to adopt the notion of an ‘economy’. This is due to the fact that the notion of an economy allows social scientists to better theorize the relationships which constitute the models they create. The argument for an economy is made by exploring the connections between the work of Jacques Derrida, the complexity theorist Edgar Morin and Georges Bataille. However, when using the notion of an economy, one must always take the excess of this economy into consideration. This excess always feeds back to disrupt the economy from which it is excluded. Using terms developed in complexity theory, this dissertation illustrates how a system adapts to the environment by using this excess. Due to this there can never be a comprehensively modelled complex system because there are always facets of this system which remain hidden to the observer. The work of Alain Badiou, whose central concern is the notion of novelty arising out of an event, is introduced. The implications of depending on the event for novelty to arise are drawn out by discussing the affinities between the work of Derrida and Badiou. In this regard, Derrida’s use of the term ‘event’ much more readily agrees with a complexity informed understanding of the term in contrast to the quasi‐religious definition which Badiou uses. This complexity‐informed understanding of the event illustrates that what the event reveals is simultaneously a dearth and wealth of possibilities yet to be realized. Therefore the event cannot be depended upon to produce novelty. However, the notion of the event must not be discarded too quickly; classical science has traditionally discarded this idea due to its reductive approach. The idea of process opens up an understanding of the radical novelties produced in history to the possibility of the event and to a new understanding of ontology. This dissertation proposes that one can begin to think about radical forms of novelty without the event through the notion of experimentation. This approach allows one to engage with what exists rather than relying upon an event to produce novelty. This argument is made by following Bataille, who argues that through an engagement with non‐utilitarian forms of action, by expending for the sake of expenditure, the world is opened up to possibilities which remain unrealized under the current hegemony. In this light, this dissertation begins to develop a definition of novelty as that which forces a rereading of the system’s history. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif onderneem hoofsaaklik om die omstandighede waaronder nuwigheid binne ʼn stelsel ontstaan te verstaan. Daar word in die klassieke filosofie voorgehou dat nuwigheid gewoonlik vanuit ʼn gebeurtenis ontstaan. Die idee van ʼn gebeurtenis hou egter dikwels ongewenste metafisiese en konserwatiewe implikasies in. Hierdie proefskrif onderneem dus om, deels, ʼn benadering tot nuwigheid te ontwikkel wat onafhanklik van die gebeurtenis staan. Hierdie benadering word verder uitgebrei met behulp van insigte vanuit die Kritiese Kompleksiteits‐ en Post‐Strukturalistiese filosofie. Tot onlangs het die model van die raamwerk die wyse waarop daar oor die beperkinge van die konteks‐spesifieke aard van kennis in die sosiale wetenskappe gedink word oorheers. In hierdie proefskrif word voorgehou dat die idee van ʼn ‘ekonomie’ in plaas van die analogie van ʼn raamwerk hier gebruik behoort te word, omdat dit ons sal toelaat om die verhoudings binne die modelle wat deur sosiale wetenskaplikes gebruik word beter te verken. Verder word die moontlike verbande tussen Jacques Derrida , die kompleksiteitsfilosoof Edgar Morin en Georges Bataille teen hierdie agtergrond verken. Wanneer daar van ʼn ekonomie gepraat word, moet die oormaat van die ekonomie altyd in ag geneem word. Hierdie oormaat ontwrig altyd die ekonomie waarby dit uitgesluit word. Om te wys hoe die stelsel van so ʼn oormaat gebruik maak om by sy omgewing aan te pas, sal terminologie wat in die konteks van kompleksiteitsteorie ontwikkel is gebruik word. As gevolg van die oorvloed binne ʼn stelsel sal daar nooit ʼn volledige model van die stelsel ontwikkel kan word nie ‐‐ fasette van die stelsel sal altyd vir die waarnemer verborge bly. Verder sal die werk van Alain Badiou, wie se filosofie rondom die idee van nuwigheid wat uit ʼn gebeurtenis ontstaan gesentreed is, in hierdie verhandeling bespreek word. Die implikasies van die idee dat nuwigheid van die gebeurtenis afhanklik is word uitgelig deur die verwantskappe tussen die werke van Derrida en Badiou te bespreek. Derrida se gebruik van die term ‘gebeurtenis’ dra ʼn noue verwantskap met kompleksiteitsteorie, en dit word teenoor Badiou se amper‐godsdienstige gebruik van die term gestel. Daar word aangevoer dat daar binne ʼn kompleksiteits‐ingeligte verstaan van ʼn gebeurtenis beide ʼn skaarste en ʼn oorvloed van moontlikhede bestaan wat vervul kan word. Daarom kan daar juis nié op die gebeurtenis staatgemaak word om nuwigheid te skep nie. Die idee van die gebeurtenis moet egter nie te gou verwerp word nie. As gevolg van die klassieke wetenskap se reduksionisme is die idee van ʼn gebeurtenis tradisioneel ontken. Daarteenoor ontsluit die idee van ʼn proses die moontlikheid van radikale nuwighede in die geskiedenis as gevolg van ʼn verstaan van die gebeurtenis wat tot ʼn nuwe verstaan van die ontologie lei. Hierdie proefskrif stel dus voor dat ons voortaan aan radikale nuwigheid dink in terme van die denkbeeld van eksperimentering eerder as in terme van die gebeurtenis. Eksperimentering laat ons toe om te werk met wat ons het, eerder as om op ʼn gebeurtenis te moet wag. Na aanleiding van Bataille is die voorstel dat daar deur om te gaan met nieutilitaristiese vorms van optrede nuwe geleenthede vir die wêreld oopgemaak word; geleenthede wat onder die huidige hegemonie ongerealiseerd sal bly. In hierdie verband stel die proefskrif ʼn definisie van nuwigheid voor as dít wat mens dwing om die geskiedenis van ʼn stelsel te herformuleer.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Autonomy and informed consent are two interrelated concepts given much prominence in contemporary biomedical discourse. The word autonomy, from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule), originally referred to the self-governance of independent Hellenic states, but was extended to individuals during the time of the Enlightenment, most notably through the work of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. In healthcare, the autonomy model is grounded in the idea of the dignity of persons and the claim people have on each other to privacy, self-direction, the establishment of their own values and life plans based on information and reasoning, and the freedom to act on the results of their contemplation. Autonomy thus finds expression in the ethical and legal requirement of informed consent. Feminists and multiculturalists have however argued that since autonomy rests on the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, objectivity and independence, unconstrained by emotional and spiritual qualities, it serves to isolate the individual and thus fails to rectify the dehumanisation and depersonalisation of modern scientific medical practice. It only serves to exacerbate the problematic power-differential between doctor and patient. Medicine is a unique profession since it operates in a space where religion, morality, metaphysics, science and culture come together. It is a privileged space because health care providers assume responsibility for the care of their patients outside the usual moral space defined by equality and autonomy. Patients necessarily relinquish some of their autonomy and power to experts and autonomy thus cannot account for the moral calling that epitomizes and defines medicine. Recognition of the dependence of patients need not be viewed negatively as a lack of autonomy or incompetence, but could rather reinforce the understanding of our shared human vulnerability and that we are all ultimately patients. There is however no need to abandon the concept of autonomy altogether. A world without autonomy is unconceivable. When we recognise how the concept functions in the modern world as a social construct, we can harness its positive properties to create a new form of identity. We can utilise the possibility of self-stylization embedded in autonomy to fashion ourselves into responsible moral agents that are responsive not only to ourselves, but also to others, whether in our own species or in that of another. Responsible agency depends on mature deliberators that are mindful of the necessary diversity of the moral life and the complex nature of the moral subject. I thus argue that the development of modern individualism should not be rejected altogether, since we cannot return to some pre-modern sense of community, or transcend it altogether in some postmodern deconstruction of the self. We also do not need to search for a different word to supplant the concept of autonomy in moral life. What we rather need is a different attitude of being in the world; an attitude that strives for holism, not only of the self, but also of the moral community. We can only be whole if we acknowledge and embrace our interdependence as social and moral beings, as Homo moralis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Outonomie en ingeligte toestemming is twee nou verwante konsepte wat beide prominensie in moderne bioetiese diskoers verwerf het. Die woord outonomie, van die Grieks autos (self) en nomos (reël), het oorspronklik verwys na die selfbestuur van onafhanklike Griekse state, maar is in die tyd van die Verligting uitgebrei om ook na individue te verwys, grotendeels deur die werk van Immanuel Kant en John Stuart Mill. In medisyne is die outonomie model gegrond op die idee van die waardigheid van die persoon en die beroep wat mense op mekaar het tot privaatheid, selfbepaling, die daarstelling van hulle eie waardesisteem en lewensplan, gebasseer op inligting en redenasie, en die vryheid om op die uitkoms van sulke redenasie te reageer. Outonomie word dus vergestalt in die etiese en wetlike bepaling van ingeligte toestemming. Feministe en multikulturele denkers beweer egter dat, siende outonomie gebasseer is op die Verligting ideale van rasionaliteit, objektiwiteit en onafhanklikheid, sonder die nodige begrensing deur emosionele en spirituele kwaliteite, dit die individu noodsaaklik isoleer en dus nie die dehumanisering en depersonalisering van moderne wetenskaplike mediese praktyk teenwerk nie. As sulks, vererger dit dus die problematiese magsverskil tussen die dokter en pasiënt. Die beroep van medisyne is ‘n unieke professie aangesien dit werksaam is in die sfeer waar geloof, moraliteit, metafisika, wetenskap en kultuur bymekaar kom. Dit is ‘n bevoorregde spasie aangesien gesondheidswerkers verantwoordelikheid vir die sorg van hulle pasiënte aanvaar buite die gewone morele spasie wat deur gelykheid en outonomie gedefinieer word. Pasiënte moet noodgedwonge van hulle outonomie en mag aan deskundiges afstaan en outonomie kan dus nie genoegsaam die morele roeping wat medisyne saamvat en definieer, vasvang nie. Bewustheid van die afhanklikheid van pasiënte hoef egter nie in ‘n negatiewe lig, as gebrek aan outonomie of onbevoegtheid, beskou te word nie, maar moet eerder die begrip van ons gedeelde menslike kwesbaarheid en die wete dat ons almal uiteindelik pasiënte is, versterk. Dit is verder nie nodig om die konsep van outonomie heeltemal te verwerp nie. ‘n Wêreld sonder outonomie is ondenkbaar. Wanneer ons bewus word van hoe die konsep in die moderne wêreld as ‘n sosiale konstruk funksioneer, kan ons die positiewe aspekte daarvan inspan om ‘n nuwe identiteit te bewerkstellig. Ons kan die moontlikheid van self-stilering, ingesluit in outonomie, gebruik om onsself in verantwoordelike morele agente te omskep sodat ons nie slegs teenoor onsself verantwoordelik is nie, maar ook teenoor ander, hetsy in ons eie spesie of in ‘n ander. Verantwoordelike agentskap is afhanklik van volwasse denkers wat gedagtig is aan die noodsaaklike diversiteit van die morele lewe en die komplekse aard van die morele subjek. Ek voer dus aan dat die ontwikkeling van moderne individualisme nie volstrek verwerp moet word nie, siende dat ons nie na ‘n tipe premoderne vorm van gemeenskap kan terugkeer, of dit oortref deur ‘n postmoderne dekonstruksie van die self nie. Ons het verder ook nie ‘n nuwe woord nodig om die konsep van outonomie in die morele lewe mee te vervang nie. Ons het eerder ‘n ander instelling van ons menswees in die wêreld nodig; ‘n instelling wat streef na volkomendheid, nie net van onsself nie, maar ook van die morele gemeenskap. Ons kan slegs volkome wees wanneer ons ons interafhanklikheid as sosiale en morele entiteite, as Homo moralis, erken en aangryp.

Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Utopie is dood. Daar is geen meer hoop dat die toekoms radikaal anders of moreel meerwaardig kan wees gemeet teen die hede nie. Om utopiese alternatiewe tot ons huidige samelewingsrangskikking te verbeel is onrealisties, en selfs gevaarlik. Daarom lewer die utopiese verbeelding vandag slegs distopieë – as ons vandag 'n andersoortige samelewing verbeel kan ons slegs dink dat dit 'n nagmerrie moet wees. Die resultaat is politieke apatie en 'n gewilligheid om onsself te versoen met die status quo. As teenvoeter vir die bogenoemde politieke apatie vra ek in hierdie proefskrif of dit vandag nog moontlik is om utopies te dink. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord ondersoek ek eers die sogenaamde "einde" of "dood" van utopie. Utopie is vandag dood omdat die metafisiese onderbou daaran verdag geraak het, en omdat 'n utopiese gees aktief onderdruk word via 'n verskeidenheid ideologiese strategieë. Ten spyte van hierdie probleme is 'n andersoortige en postmetafisiese utopisme wel vandag moontlik, en die kontoere van hierdie nuwe utopiese rasionaliteit word nagespoor in die werk van eietydse filosowe soos Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek en Jacques Derrida. In hulle werk herleef 'n utopiese gees wat nie meer gebonde is aan ons metafisiese filosofiese erfenis nie. Hierdie gees manifesteer ook nie (slegs) in die vorm van sketse van ideale samelewings nie, maar eerder as hermeneutiese praktyke wat die koms van sosiale alteriteit fasiliteer. Hierdie utopiese gees, in voeling met 'n postmetafisiese intellektuele klimaat, bied ek aan as 'n noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir sosiale hoop. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Utopia is dead. There is no hope today that the future will be radically different from, or ethically superior to the present. To dream up utopian alternatives to our society is unrealistic, even dangerous. It is no surprise, then, that the existing utopian imagination produces only dystopias – if we think at all of a radically different society, we can only imagine something nightmarish. The result: a political apathy and a willingness to reconcile ourselves with the status quo. To counter the abovementioned political apathy, I ask in this dissertation if it is still possible to think in a utopian fashion. In order to answer this question I start off by examining the so-called "end" or "death" of utopia. Utopia is dead today because of its questionable metaphysical foundations, and because of an active ideological repression of any utopian impulse. In spite of these problems a new and postmetaphysical utopianism is possible. The contours of this new utopianism can be extrapolated from the work of contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and Jacques Derrida. In their work a utopian spirit is revived – a spirit no longer constrained by our metaphysical philosophical heritage. This spirit is manifested, not (only) in sketches of ideal societies, but rather in hermeneutic practices that facilitate the arrival of social alterity. I present this utopian spirit, in touch with a postmetaphysical intellectual climate, as a necessary condition for social hope.

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given the fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by natural selection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield a particular, species-specific scope on the world that does not ‘correspond’ in any straightforward way to the external world. We are, however, not bound by these commonsense representations. This particular, species-specific view of the world can be transgressed. Nevertheless, our transgressing representations remain confined to the conceptual space defined by the combinatorial possibilities of the various representational tools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world is by means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we are endowed with a particular set of perceptual and cognitive resources and are guided by a particular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to the world. Therefore, an accurate representation for us is a particular fit (our epistemic orientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources). / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis handel oor die aard, omvang en limiete van kennis, gegewe dat ons perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns die resultaat van evolusie deur middel van natuurlike seleksie is. Eerstens, word daar geargumenteer dat die algemene voorstellings wat hierdie vermoëns aan ons bied ‘n partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld aan ons gee, wat nie op ‘n eenvoudige manier korrespondeer aan die werklikheid nie. Ons is egter nie gebonde aan hierdie voorstellings nie. Hierdie partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld kan oorskry word. Ons is egter wel beperk tot die konseptuele ruimte wat gedefinieër word deur die kombinatoriese moontlikhede van die voorstellingsmiddele tot ons beskikking. Verder word die manier waarop ons hierdie voorstellings aan die wêreld laat pas deur ons biologies gedetermineerde epistemiese oriëntasie bepaal. Dus, gegewe dat ons ‘n spesifieke stel perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns het en deur ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe epistemiese oriëntasie gelei word, staan ons in ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe verhouding tot die wêreld. ‘n Akkurate voorstelling (m.a.w. kennis vir ons) is om spesifieke vermoëns (perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns) op ‘n spesifieke manier (epsitemiese oriëntasie) aan die wêreld te laat pas.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: We live in a time of unprecedented wealth and ease, taking airplanes to exotic locales and enjoying a variety of foods from across the globe. Significant improvements in healthcare have increased life expectancy to three times that of Ancient Egypt, once considered the most advanced civilization of its time. Yet despite these advances, millions of children continue to suffer. Ninety-nine percent of the millions of child deaths before the age of five each year are preventable through low cost treatments. Poor children who live past age five usually experience a lifetime of intellectual, physical, and emotional setbacks because of their disadvantaged circumstances. What, if anything, is to be done? This dissertation argues we have strong moral obligations to help children by providing a substantive equality of opportunity so that any differences in socioeconomic or life circumstance result from individual choice, not poor moral luck. These obligations are grounded in the common morality, arise from cosmopolitan applications of beneficence, and include the provision of nutritious food, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, shelter, certain levels of healthcare and education, and love and guidance. Although the task before us is large, it is not impossible and thus incumbent upon us to fulfill it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ons lewe in ‘n tyd van ongekende rykdom en gemak, waar ons vlieg na eksotiese bestemmings en ‘n verskeidenheid van kos en ontspanning van regoor die wêreld geniet. Groot verbeterings in mediese sorg het ons lewensverwagting opgestoot tot drie keer die van Antieke Egipte, wat eens op ‘n tyd beskou is as die mees gevorderde samelewing op aarde. Ten spyte van hierdie vooruitgang is daar steeds miljoene kinders wat hulself in ellendige toestande bevind. Nege-en-negentig persent van die kinders onder vyf jaar oud wat jaarliks sterf kon gered word deur laekoste mediese sorg. Arm kinders wat wel langer as ouderdom vyf leef, ervaar gewoonlik ‘n leeftyd van intellektuele, fisiese en emosionele terugslae as gevolg van hulle benadeelde omstandighede. Wat, indien enigiets, kan gedoen word? Hierdie proefskrif argumenteer dat ons ‘n sterk morele plig het om kinders te help deur substantiewe gelykheid van geleenthede te skep sodat verskille in sosio-ekonomiese of lewensomstandighede die resultaat sal wees van individuele keuses, en nie morele geluk nie. Hierdie pligte word begrond deur ons gemeenskaplike moraliteit, spruit voort uit ‘n kosmopolitaanse toepassing van goedwilligheid (‘beneficence’), en sluit die voorsiening van veilige drinkwater, voldoende sanitasie, skuiling, sekere vlakke van mediese sorg en opvoeding, en liefde en voorligting in. Alhoewel die taak wat wat voor ons staan ‘n groot een is, is dit nie onmoontlik nie en dus is dit ons plig om dit te vervul.

Theory of mind is the ability to have mental states about mental states. Among theories concerning the structure and role of theory of mind is the view that theory of mind is the cognitive component of empathy. It is proposed that there is partial dissociation within theory of mind between emotional state representation and non-emotional state representation. In trying to test this hypothesis, an instrument was developed and implemented in a pilot study. Current theory of mind tests are reviewed and design features discussed in relation to the new hypothesis. The instrument aims to measure emotional and non-emotional state representation on separate subscales, as well as coding representations from emotional stories and non-emotional stories separately. The instrument was administered to 33 third level or higher students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Groups were chosen from science major (n = 9) and humanities major (n = 24) students. The findings fail to show the group performance patterns reported in literature, for example that humanities students tend to score higher in ToM tests than science students. A number of factors might contribute to the finding, but principally, low sample size and unequal general cognitive ability between groups are proposed as vital. Problems with the pilot study are identified and improvements suggested for subsequent testing. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

The aim of this study is to suggest, by selective example, a form of jurisprudence which relates to and may have a salutary effect upon law and justice in post-apartheid South Africa. I describe three ways in which South Africa can be regarded as negotiating a transition - from apartheid to post-apartheid, from modem to post modern and from colonial to postcolonial. I argue for a jurisprudence which directly concerns itself with each of these three overlapping and mutually informing modes of transition: an approach to law and justice which is post-apartheid, postmodem and postcolonial. Since my account of law and justice engages with all three transitions, it has the potential to bring about a positive transformation in the conservative legal theory currently in favour with the judiciary. I suggest that the positivist approach followed by the judiciary during apartheid led in most cases to a removal of ethics from the legal universe and a diremption of law and justice. I contend further that the current approach of the judiciary still bears the hallmarks of positivism, in its continued adherence to the 'literal approach' to constitutional interpretation and its misunderstanding of the role of morality in adjudication. I argue that positivism, with its potential to produce injustice, should be abandoned in favour of an approach based on a postmodem epistemology which incorporates a concept of justice which is both substantive and avoids the pitfalls of natural law: the historical exhaustion of classical teleology and the failure of religious transcendence to command widespread respect. The postmodem theorists I draw on, Michel Foucault, lacques Derrida and lean-Francois Lyotard, cumulatively point to the fai lure of the Enlightenment to ground legal practice upon the universalising faculty of reason. Postmodem jurisprudence. informed by postcolonial theory, postulates justice as an ethic of alterity and is able to reintroduce ethics into law in a manner which avoids the critique of Enlightenment epistemology. Having set out the jurisprudential views of these theorists, I turn to the activity of constitutional interpretation to demonstrate the way in which the judiciary's current approach to interpretation could be positively transformed through the introduction of interpretative techniques related to poststructuralism and specifically deconstruction. I argue that interpretation is an activity necessarily informed by values and that the indeterminacy of the language of the Constitution provides the interpreter with choice. Provided the choice is ethically motivated, interpretation is a transforrnative activity. Having concluded the expository section of this dissertation, I provide a close reading of two Constitutional Court judgements, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of (he Republic of South Africa and S v Makwanyane and Another. These judgements, decided under the interim Constitution, are arguably the most important judgements of the Constitutional Court to date. They represent sites of the judiciary's internal struggle to respond to the requirement for a new epistemology and practice of interpretation, which provide the means to adjudicate justly and also suggest ways in which to justify its decisions. My study is largely restricted to these two cases, and although I refer to other cases for their bearing on particular issues, I do not aim at a comprehensive survey of the Constitutional Court's record to date. Nevertheless. this study concludes with some provisional remarks about the record of the Constitutional Court since its inception and suggests possible ways in which the jurisprudence I have argued for may be pursued in furtherance of justice. / Theses (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.