Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study attempts to overcome past failings in the analysis of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy. In contrast to "explanations" offered by most previous analyses, this work demonstrates that the behaviour exhibited by Pretoria is not immutable or simply subject to the global "realities", but is derivative of the specific historic conjuncture of forces that joined together during the transition from apartheid, and which remain open-ended. The changes in the African National Congress' economic and political policies during the transition period are seen as the key to any attempt to understand Pretoria's post-1994 foreign policy behaviour. This is intimately connected to the structural changes in the international political economy and the change in the balance of international class forces brought about by the neo-liberal counter revolution. Deploying a theoretical framework derivative of the work of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, this study situates South Africa's foreign policy in a world where the ideology of neo-liberalism has achieved hegemonic status amongst the transnational elite class - fractions of national elites, representing and reflecting the interests of money capital. Such a hegemonic project informs the beliefs of the Government of National Unity and the subsequent foreign policy activities postured by Pretoria. This study attempts to understand how and why the ANCacceded to the dominant discourse of neo-liberalism and why this must be contextualised within the structural constraints brought to bear upon the GNUin an increasingly globalised world. This accession to neo-liberal beliefs has gIVen nse to contradictions within the domestic polity between contending class fractions and within the ANC'sown ranks. This has provoked a fundamental tension in Pretoria's overall foreign policy, where on the one hand South Africa accepts the fundamental normative world order, whilst on the other pushes various reformist initiatives which seek to re-negotiate Pretoria's standing within this framework. Specifically, South Africa's behaviour in multilateral organisations has been marked by a tactical middlepowermanship role, essentially problem-solving, which seeks to smooth out the international system so that the ongoing world order may function as "efficiently" as possible. Such behaviour has been qualitatively different from the activist role that was expected from an ANC-led administration. Indeed, the activism exhibited by South Africa has been largely centred around the promotion of the liberalisation of markets and free trade, albeit tempered by an awareness of the need to reconcile its acceptance of the hegemonic order, with that of the appeals of a historically important fraction of its support constituency: the Left and labour. Attempts to reconcile these two positions, of promoting "free" trade whilst at the same time demanding "fair" trade for example, mirror the broader contradictions that have been evident in South African foreign policy. They reflect the historic compromise that saw the ANCcome to administrative power, and also the desire by the government to balance its neo-liberal credentials with certain reformist convictions. This has been most evident in Pretoria's behaviour in multilateral organisations. SLXmultilateral initiatives, and Pretoria's role within each, are examined: the World Trade Organisation, the Cairns Group, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Implications for future South African foreign policy are drawn out, and a critical eye cast on whether such roles played out by Pretoria are immutable, or subject to change. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie poog om vorige tekortkominge in die analise van post-apartheid Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid te oorkom. In teenstelling met die "verduidelikings" wat deur meeste vorige analises gebied word, illustreer die werk dat Pretoria se buitelandse gedragspatroon nie onveranderlik is en bloot onderhewig is aan die globale "realiteite" nie, maar voortvloei uit die besondere historiese tydsgewrig van magte wat saamgevoeg is gedurende die oorgang van apartheid na 'n onvoorspelbare era. Die veranderinge binne die African National Congress se ekonomiese en politieke beleid gedurende die oorgang periode word voorgehou as die sleutel tot enige poging om Pretoria se post-1994 buitelandse gedrag te verklaar. Strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale politieke ekonomie en die veranderinge in die magsbalans tussen internasionale klasse as gevolg van neo-liberalisme, het 'n fundamentele impak op die aard van hierdie buitelandse gedrag. Met behulp van 'n teoretiese raamwerk gedistilleer uit die werk van die Italiaanse Marxis, Antonio Gramsci plaas die studie Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid in 'n wêreld waarin die neo-liberale ideologie hoogty vier veral onder die transnasionale elite klas - fraksies van nasionale elites verteenwoordigend van die belange van finansiële kapitaal. Sodanige hegemoniese projek onderlê die oortuiging van die Regering van Nasionale Eenheid (RNE) en voortvloeiende buitelandse beleidsaksies. Die studie probeer vasstel hoe en waarom die ANC toenemend gehoor gegee het aan die oorheersende neo-liberale diskoers en waarom hierdie toetreding gekontekstualiseer moet word in terme van die strukturele beperkinge waaronder die RNE onderhewig is in 'n immerglobaliserende wêreld. Hierdie toetrede tot neo-liberale oortuiginge het aanleiding gegee tot teenstrydighede intern, tussen strydende klasfraksies asook binne die ANC se eie geledere. Hierdie teenstrydighede word ook weerspieël in Pretoria se buitelandsebeleids aksies in die algemeen. Aan die een kant aanvaar Suid- Afrika fundamenteel die normatiewe basis van wêreldorde, terwyl daar ook aan die ander kant gepoog word om Pretoria se posisie binne hierdie wêreldorde te bowe te kom. Suid-Afrika se gedrag in multilaterale organisasies in die besonder word gekenmerk deur 'n taktiese intermediêre rol ("middlepower role") hoofsaaklik van 'n probleem-oplossende aard, wat daarop gemik is om die internasionale sisteem so glad moontlik te funksioneer en teenstrydighede binne die wêreldorde te oorkom. Hierdie rol konstitueer 'n fundamentele wysiging van die aktivistiese rol wat van 'n ANC-regeerde Suid-Afrika verwag is. Die aktiwiteite wat wel deur Suid-Afrika geopenbaar is, sentreer hoofsaaklik om die bevordering van vrye en regverdige handel, alhoewel gerigsnoer deur 'n bewustheid van die behoefte om sodanige posisie te versoen met die aanvaarding van die bestaande hegemoniese orde aan die een kant en die eise van arbeid en politieke steun aan die Linkerkant van die politieke spektrum. Pogings om hierdie twee posisies te versoen - om "vrye" sowel as "regverdige" handel te versoen byvoorbeeld, weerkaats die algemene teenstrydighede waardeur Suid-Afrikaanse buitelandse beleid gekenmerk word. Die paradokse is tekenend van die historiese kompromie wat tot die ANC se bewindsoorname aanleiding gegee het asook die regering se behoefte om sy neoliberale orientasie te balanseer met bepaalde hevormingsoortuiginge. Hierdie patroon is besonder merkbaar in die geval van multilaterale organisasies. Ses multilaterale inisiatiewe en Pretoria se verhoudinge met elk van die volgende internasionale organisasies word van naderby bekyk, veral ten opsigte van die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie, die Cairns Groep, die Verenigde Nasies Konferensie oor Handel en Ontwikkeling, die Onverbonde Beweging, die Statebond en die Kernspêrverdrag. Daar word gewys op die implikasies vir Suid- Afrika se buitelandse beleid, terwyl daar krities gevra word of sodanige rolle wat deur Pretoria gespeel word, 'n bepaalde onveranderlikheid geniet of ook onderhewig is aan veranderinge.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The emergence and growth of the environmental/green movement has been linked to a value shift from materialism towards postmaterialism. In this study, the emergence of the South African environmental/green movement and its growth potential is investigated within the context of Ronald Inglehart's value change theory and its implications for developing societies. The positive link between postmaterialism and environmentalism is well researched and widely accepted. However, many researchers focusing on developing societies argue that a shift towards postmaterialism does not adequately explain the emergence of environmentalism, because environmentalism is taking root in developing societies despite postmaterialist values not being prioritised. This relationship is investigated by means of a literature study about the values, principles and issues addressed by the environmental/green movement. It is argued in this study that environmentalism can indeed be linked to postmaterialism, but that prematerialist values could also playa role, especially in developing societies. The South African environmental/green movement is discussed as an example of environmentalism in a developing society. The South African movement is often described as a white middle class movement. It is argued on the basis of a literature study that the movement has changed considerably and incorporates a wide range of interests ranging from more conservative forms of environmentalism to radical political forms of environmentalism such as environmental justice. This change is linked to the concepts of prematerialism and postmaterialism emphasising that both sets of goals seems to be prioritised by different discourses within the movement. Issues concerning both the welloff and the poor are addressed by the movement. This is followed by an analysis of the 1995 World Value survey data set to obtain a demographic and socio-economic profile of the active members of an environmental organisation and the environmentally concerned. The relationship between active membership of an environmental organisation, the environmentally concerned and the concepts of prematerialism, materialism and postmaterialism is also established. The positive relationship between postmaterialism and environmentalism is confirmed, but contradictory results have been found regarding the relationship between prematerialism and environmentalism. This can possibly be attributed to the inadequate survey material that is available. Although active membership of an environmental organisation correlates positively with prematerialism, no relationship could be found between environmental concern and prematerialism. Lastly, a demographic and socio-economic profile of the "don't know" response group has also been compiled as this group is an important target group for the expansion of the environmental/green movement. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die totstandkoming en groei van die groen- of omgewingsbeweging word gekoppel aan 'n waardeverskuiwing van materialisme na postmaterialisme. Die totstandkoming van die Suid-Afrikaanse groen/omgewingsbeweging en die groeipotensiaal daarvan word ill hierdie studie ondersoek binne die raamwerk van Ronald Inglehart se waardeverskuiwingsteorie en die implikasies daarvan vir ontwikkelende lande. Die positiewe verband tussen postmaterialisme en omgewingsbewustheid is goed nagevors en geniet wye aanvaarding. Tog het verskeie navorsers, veral dié wat op ontwikkelende lande fokus, probleme daarmee. Hierdie navorsers argumenteer dat postmaterialisme nie die totstandkoming van die omgewingsbeweging in ontwikkelende lande voldoende verklaar nie, aangesien die beweging in hierdie lande posgevat het terwyl die prioritisering van postmaterialisme ontbreek. Hierdie verband word ondersoek d.m.v. 'n literatuurstudie oor die waardes, beginsels en vraagstukke wat deur die groen/omgewingsbeweging aangespreek word. Daar word in hierdie studie geargumenteer dat omgewingsbewustheid wel aan postmaterialisme gekoppel kan word, maar dat prematerialistiese waardes waarskynlik ook 'n rol kan speel, veral in ontwikkelende lande. Die Suid-Afrikaanse groen/omgewingsbeweging word beskryf as 'n voorbeeld van omgewingsbewustheid in 'n ontwikkelende land. Die Suid-Afrikaanse beweging word dikwels beskryf as 'n wit middelklasbeweging. Daar word op grond van 'n literatuurstudie geargumenteer dat die beweging aansienlik verander het sodat dit nou 'n breë verskeidendenheid van belange aanspreek wat wissel van die meer konserwatiewe vorme van omgewingsbewustheid tot die radikale politieke vorme soos byvoorbeeld omgewingsregverdigheid (Eng: environmental justice). Die verskuiwing word aan die konsepte van postmaterialisme en prematerialisme verbind. Dit word beklemtoon dat verskillende groeperings binne die groen/omgewingsbeweging verskillende waardes prioritiseer. Vraagstukke wat beide die welvarendes en die armes raak, word deur die beweging aangespreek. Die literatuurstudie word gevolg deur 'n analise van die 1995 World Value Survey datastel. 'n Demografiese en sosio-ekonomiese profiel van die aktiewe lede van 'n omgewingsorganisasie en respondente wat as omgewingsbewus geïdentifiseer is, is opgestel. Die verhouding tussen die konsepte van prematerialisme, materialisme en postmaterialisme en aktiewe lidmaatskap van 'n omgewingsorganisasie aan die een kant en omgewingsbewustheid aan ander kant word ook bespreek. Die positiewe verband tussen postmaterialisme en omgewingsbewustheid, sowel as aktiewe lidmaatskap word deur die data bevestig. 'n Positiewe verband is ook tussen aktiewe lidmaatskap van 'n omgewingsorganisasie en prematerialisme gevind, maar teenstrydige resulte is gevind rakende die verband tussen omgewingsbewustheid en prematerialisme. Hierdie resultate kan egter moontlik beïnvloed wees deur die onvoldoende meetinstrument wat beskikbaar is. Laastens is 'n demografiese en sosio-ekonomiese profiel van die "weet nie" responsgroep saamgestel, aangesien hierdie groep 'n belangrike teiken is indien die groen/omgewingsbeweging wil uitbrei.

Thesis (PhD) -- Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world economic order has passed through a transformation which can be characterised as a shift away from the idea of the "Keynesian compromise" to the idea or principle of greater openness and a revision of the role of the state in macroeconomic policy formulation. As a result, and to achieve the goal of global competitiveness, states have become more "outward" orientated. The last twenty years have also seen an increase in the levels of inequality within and between states, which means that the effect of economic growth on the reduction of poverty is much reduced. Critics of the "openness" principle point out that the policies of developing states should be more inwardly focused to ensure that economic openness contributes more directly to the alleviation of poverty and inequality. Southern Africa is a region where the problem of inequality (particularly within states) is prevalent. The Critical Theory ofRobert W Cox (CCT) suggests that one of the ways in which increasing levels in inequality can be observed and analysed is to determine how people are related to the dynamics (via their national economies) of the contemporary world economic order. Are they marginalised, in a precarious position, or integrated? Furthermore, Cox assumes that the marginalised are a social force which could bring about transformation "from below." Following on from this assumption a number of claims about the marginalised can be deduced from CCT: they are inclined to political protest, they are dissatisfied with the political economic system of their country, they are politically apathetic, they are prone to low levels of political efficacy, they have turned "their back on the state" and belong to self-help associations, they are more inclined to participate in the activities of civil society and they are critical of neoliberal economic policies. The study's primary empirical question investigates whether the attitudes which Cox attributes to the marginalised are accurate. This is done through a detailed exposition of his core theoretical framework and a thorough conceptualisationloperationalisation of the marginalised, precarious and integrated. The area which is focused on is southern Africa. The vast majority of people in the region belong to the marginalised and the precarious components of Cox's economic hierarchy. They derive little or no economic benefit from greater openness and outward orientated forms of state. The question is whether they can be mobilised into a "counter-hegemonic social movement" (as Cox foresees) and how they view the role of the state. The second question is theoretical and is concerned with the usefulness and strong points of Cox's explanatory framework compared to other approaches which either (1) ignore the state as a point of entry for analysis, (2) regard it as the primary actor in the international system, (3) or "bypass" it because they predict its demise in a future post-sovereign world. I argue that it is incorrect to associate Cox's approach with the work of Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater and Mark Neufeld and to group them into a Critical Theory of International Relations school. Two important differences between Cox and these scholars are his incorporation of the state in a flexible, multiple points of entry framework and his resourceful combination of a diverse number of sources. The theoretical question is addressed by a substantive literature review of Cox's major publications in English and a representative review of the contributions made by Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater and Neufeld. In the reading of Cox's work, I focused on the development of his thinking, his major influences and on the epistemology and ontology of his core theoretical framework. The empirical question was investigated through a nationally representative survey of seven southern African states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) which was undertaken by a research consortium of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa's Public Opinion Service during 1999-2000. In terms of Cox's theoretical expectations ofthe marginalised the study found that, in southern Africa; their political protest potential is lower than the integrated, they participate less in politics and in civil society, they are not more inclined to belong to self-help associations, they are inclined to accord slightly more legitimacy to the state than the integrated, their economic values cannot be summarised as generally unsympathetic to "market" orientated policies, and that the majority (significantly more so than the integrated) think that the state should be the major provider of social services. The marginalised are more tolerant of authoritarian political alternatives, but are not significantly more dissatisfied (relatively) with the economy than the other groups. We cannot, therefore, uncritically accept Cox's assumption that the marginalised will act as a potential source of transformation "from below." Furthermore, in the countries which were part of the survey, the marginalised still regard the state as the primary source for development assistance and social services. There was, however, strong support for the claim that the marginalised are inclined to be more politically apathetic and less politically efficacious. A close reading of Cox's work and comparison with Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman and Neufeld revealed that they share some tenets with CCT. However, they cannot be grouped with Cox in a school of critical thought because their intellectual debt is mainly located in the work of Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, while CCT is influenced by a variety of sources (cf. Braudel, Carr, Gramsci, Khaldun, Marx, Sorel and Vico). This is an important and essential distinction to make because the empirical results of the survey data analysis validate Cox's focus on the mutual influence between social forces, forms of state and world orders. It is, therefore, more accurate to regard CCT as a "critical realist" theory of International Relations (cf. Richard Falk, 1997). It is recommended that, in a world order which is characterised by increasing inequality and the outward orientated form of state, public policy practitioners in developing states must reconsider the standard TINA (There is no Alternative) response to the critics of the openness principle. A more balanced approach to addressing inequality and poverty, which requires an outward/inward policy orientation is essential. What is needed, is a form of state which creates opportunities for the integrated but protects and assists those who are marginalised. This essential inward orientation remains one of the state's primary responsibilities, even in a postW estphalian world where there are other centres of authority. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die laatste twee dekades van die twintigste eeu het die wereld ekonomiese orde deur 'n verandering gegaan. Hierdie verandering is gekenmerk deur 'n verskuiwing vanaf die "Keynesiaanse kompromie" idee, na die idee of beginsel van meer oopheid en 'n hersiening van die rol van die staat in makroekonomiese beleidsformulering. Gevolglik, en om die doelwit van globale mededingendheid te bereik, het state meer "uitwaartsgeorienteerd" geword. Die laatste twintig jaar is ook gekenmerk deur 'n toename in ongelykheid binne en tussen state. Hierdie ongelykheid het die impak van ekonomiese groei op armoede baie verminder. Die kritici van die "oopheid" beginsel wys daarop dat die beleid van ontwikkelende state meer na binne gerig moet word ten einde te verseker dat ekonomiese oopheid meer direk hydra tot die vermindering van armoede en ongelykheid. In die Suider-Afrikaanse streek kom die ongelykheidsprobleem (spesifiek binne state) algemeen voor. Die Kritiese Teorie van Robert W Cox (CKT, Coxiaanse Kritiese Teorie) doen aan die hand dat een van die maniere waarvolgens toenemende vlakke van ongelykheid waargeneem en geanaliseer kan word, is om te bepaal wat die verhouding is tussen mense en die dinamika (via die nasionale ekonomie) van die hedendaagse wereld ekonomiese orde. Is hulle gemarginaliseerd, in 'n onsekere posisie, of gei'ntegreerd? Daarby, is dit 'n aanname van Cox dat die gemarginaliseerdes 'n sosiale mag is wat "van onder af' verandering sou kon teweegbring. Voortvloeiend uit hierdie aanname, kan 'n aantal beweringe oor die gemarginaliseerdes afgelei word uit CKT: hulle is geneig tot politieke protes, hulle is ontevrede met hulland se politiek-ekonomiese stelsel, hulle is polities apaties, hulle is geneig tot lae vlakke van politieke doeltreffendheid, hulle het hul "rug gedraai op die staat" en behoort aan selfhelp-organisasies, hulle is meer geneig om deel te neem aan burgerlike samelewing aktiwiteite en hulle staan krities teenoor neoliberale ekonomiese beleidsrigtings. Die primere empiriese vraag wat die studie ondersoek is om te bepaal of die houdings wat Cox toeskryf aan die gemarginaliseerdes akkuraat is. Dit word gedoen deur 'n breedvoerige uiteensetting van sy verklarende raamwerk en 'n deeglike konseptualisering/operasionalisering van die drie ekonomiese kategoriee (gemarginaliseerd, onseker, gei'ntegreerd). Die fokus-area is Suider-Afrika. Die oorgrote meerderheid mense in die streek behoort tot die gemarginaliseerde en onsekere komponente van Cox se ekonomiese hierargie. Hulle trek min of geen ekonomiese voordeel uit meer "oopheid" en uitwaartsgeorienteerde staatsvorme nie. Die vraag is of hulle gemobiliseer kan word in 'n "teen-hegemoniese sosiale beweging" (soo Cox in die vooruitsig stel) en hoe hulle die rol van die staat beskou. Die tweede vraag is teoreties van aard en is gerig op 'n evaluering van die bruikbaarheid en sterk punte van Cox se verklarende raamwerk, in vergelyking met ander benaderings wat of (1) die staat ignoreer as 'n vlak van analise, (2) die staat beskou as die belangrikste akteur in die intemasionale stelsel, (3) die staat "omseil" omdat hulle die ondergang daarvan voorspel in 'n toekomstige post-soewereine wereld. Ek argumenteer dat dit verkeerd is om Cox se benadering te assosieer met die bydraes van Richard Ashley, Mark Hoffman, Andrew Linklater en Mark Neufeld, en om hulle saam te voeg binne 'n Kritiese Teorie van Intemasionale Betrekkinge denkskool. Twee belangrike verskille tussen Cox en die ander bydraes is sy inkorporering van die staat in 'n buigsame, veelvoudige vlak-van-analise raamwerk en sy vindingryke samevoeging van 'n diverse aantal bronne. Die teoretiese vraag is ondersoek deur middel van 'n uitgebreide literatuuroorsig van Cox se belangrikste publikasies in Engels en 'n verteenwoordigende oorsig van Ashley, Hoffman, Linklater en Neufeld se bydraes. Die evaluering van Cox fokus op die ontwikkeling van sy denke, die identifisering van diegene wat horn beYnvloed het, en die kennisleer en ontologie van sy kem-teoretiese raamwerk. Die empiriese vraag is nagevors deur die analise van 'n verteenwoordigende nasionale opname in sewe Suider-Afrikaanse state (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibie, Suid-Afrika, Zambie en Zimbabwe). Die opname is ondemeem deur 'n navorsingkonsortium van die Instituut vir Demokrasie in Suid-Afrika se Openbare Meningsdiens tydens 1999-2000. Aangaande Cox se teoretiese verwagtinge van die gemarginaliseerdes, het die empiriese analise van die Suider-Afrikaanse data-stel bevind dat hulle politieke protes potensiaal laer is as die van die geYntegreerdes, dat hulle minder deelneem aan die politiek en 'n minder aktiewe rol speel in die burgerlike samelewing, dat hulle nie geneig is om aan selfhelp-organisasies te behoort nie, dat hulle geneig is om die staat as ietwat meer legitiem te beskou as die geYntegreerdes, dat hulle ekonomiese waardes nie veralgemeen kan word as onsimpatiek tot mark-georienteerde beleidsopsies nie, en dat die meerderheid (betekenisvol meer as die geYntegreerdes) die staat beskou as die belangrikste verskaffer van sosiale dienste. Die gemarginaliseerdes is meer verdraagsaam ten opsigte van outoritere politieke altematiewe, maar is nie betekenisvol meer ontevrede (relatief gesproke) met die ekonomie as die ander groepe me. Ons kan dus nie Cox se aanname, dat die gemarginaliseerdes as 'n moontlike bron vir verandering "van onder af' sal optree, onkrities aanvaar nie. Daarby beskou die gemarginaliseerdes, in die lande wat deel was van die opname, steeds die staat as die primere bron vir ontwikkelingshulp en sosiale dienste. Daar was egter beduidende ondersteuning vir die bewering dat hulle meer geneig is tot politieke apatie en politieke ondoeltreffendheid. Die bestudering van Cox se benadering en die vergelyking daarvan met Ashley, Linklater, Hoffman en Neufeld, toon aan dat die vier skrywers sekere beginsels met CKT deel. Nietemin, kan hulle nie saam met Cox in 'n skool van kritiese denke gevoeg word nie, omdat hulle intellektuele inspirasie uit Habermas en die Frankfurt Skool van Kritiese Teorie geput word. Cox, daarenteen, is beYnvloed deur 'n verskeidenheid denkers (bv. Braudel, Carr, Gramsci, Khaldun, Marx, Sorel, en Vico). Hierdie onderskeid is belangrik en noodsaaklik omdat die empiriese resultate van die opname data-analise, Cox se fokus op die wedersydse invloed tussen sosiale magte, staatsvorme en wereldordes, ondersteun. Dit is dus meer korrek om CKT te beskou as 'n "krities-realistiese" teorie van Intemasionale Betrekkinge (bv. Richard Falk, 1997). Die studie beveel aan dat, in 'n wereld wat gekenmerk word deur toenemende ongelykheid en die voorkoms van die uitwaarts-georienteerde staat, openbare beleidmakers die standaard DIGA (Daar is geen Altematief) antwoord, in reaksie op diegene wat die "oopheid" beginsel kritiseer, in heroorweging moet neem. 'n Meer ewewigtige benadering tot die aanspreek van ongelykheid en armoede is noodsaaklik, en dit vereis 'n uitwaartslbinnewaartse beleidsherorientering. Wat benodig word is 'n staatsvorm wat geleenthede skep vir die ge'integreerdes maar wat ook die gemarginaliseerdes help en beskerm. Selfs in 'n post-W estphaliaanse wereld waar daar ander magsentra voorkom, bly hierdie noodsaaklike binnewaartse orientasie een van die staat se primere verantwoordelikhede.

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the title suggests, the major challenge that this study faces is to set out and design a model for analysing and enabling the management of political risk as investment risk - a model that is both sensitive to and reflective of the comprehensive business and investment climate in a country, not only credit or country risk, or only pure political risk in its narrowest definition. In reading about past and more recent research in the field of political risk analysis, it becomes clear that many authors begin by noting the diversity and the discrepancies of the existing definitions of political risk, but evidence in political risk insurance shows that the major perceived political risks that investors insure their interests against seem to be confiscation, expropriation and nationalisation. In the light of this study's findings though, a case can be put forward for urging that the conceptualisation of political risk be extended to further include any or all of the micro political risk factors and their indicators that have been identified to ensure that political events do not impact negatively on a foreign company's profitability. Foreign investors put assets at risk to achieve their objectives and the assessment of these risks, including political risks, is the key to successful operations. Opportunities and risks are often two sides of the same coin and political risk comprises a large part of the environmental forces in terms of the management challenges a Multinational Company (MNC) faces in any investment climate. A firm's foreign investment strategy deals with the positioning of the organisation in an uncertain host country environment and investment climate. This study attempts to explain how a firm's political risk exposure, which refers to the sensitivity of a firm's projected profitability and operationability in a host country to changes in the investment climate, could be managed and reduced. It is hoped that political risk analysis and management can assist foreign operations in managing the risks that might have otherwise proven to be destructive to profitability and operationability. It is irresponsible to present a potential investor with a risk assessment that does not incorporate political risk factors and their indicators, let alone environmental, societal and socio-economic risk factor indicators. Ultimately any business climate, regardless of the country being studied, is underwritten by a political system, political climate, political culture and business culture of the system in which foreign business wishes to operate profitably. What is often labelled as unnecessary and irrelevant detail in risk analysis often results in a lack of using micro risk factors and their indicators and an underestimation of the importance of such micro risk indicators. Hopefully this study takes up the challenge of showing that political risk can be managed and political risk analysis can be made more precise - that it is possible to measure and manage political risk. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die titel van hierdie studie voorstel is een van die grootste uitdagings die ontwerp van 'n model vir die analise van politieke risiko as beleggingsrisiko - 'n model wat ter selfde tyd sensitief is vir en weerspieëlend van 'n land se algemeen omvattende besigheids- en beleggingsklimaat, en nie slegs suiwer politieke risiko in die nouste sin van die woord nie. 'n Literatuurstudie van meer onlangse navorsing, asook navorsing wat in die verlede gedoen is oor politieke risiko en die analise daarvan, dui daarop dat baie outeurs melding maak van die diversiteit en teenstrydighede in die bestaande definisies van politieke risiko. Die teenwoordigheid van versekering teen politieke risiko wys egter daarop dat die primêre politieke risiko's waarteen beleggers hulle belange verseker meesal nasionalisering en onteiening is, asook die beslaglegging op beleggings. Teen die agtergrond van hierdie studie se bevindinge, kan daar egter 'n saak uitgemaak word vir die verbreeding van die konseptualisering van politieke risiko om enige of alle van die mikro-politieke risiko faktorindikatore wat in hierdie studie identifiseer word in te sluit, om sodoende te verseker dat die negatiewe gevolge wat politieke gebeure moontlik mag inhou vir 'n buitelandse maatskappy se belange, sover moontlik beperk word. Buitelandse beleggers stel bates bloot aan risiko's ten einde voorafgestelde doelwitte te bereik en die assessering van hierdie risiko's, insluitende politieke risiko's, is 'n groot bydraende' faktor tot die suksesvolle bedryf van buitelandse beleggings. Geleenthede en risiko's is dikwels twee kante van diesIefde muntstuk en politieke risiko maak 'n groot deel uit van die uitdagende beleggingsomgewing waarin die bestuur van 'n multinasionale korporasie (MNK) daagliks moet funksioneer. 'n Maatskappy se buitelandse beleggingstrategie handel met die posisionering van die organisasie in die onvoorspelbare beleggingsklimaat van 'n vreemde land. Hierdie studie poog ook om te verduidelik hoe die mate waarin 'n firma blootgestel word aan politieke risiko, met ander woorde die sensitiwiteit van 'n firma se voorgenome winsgewendheid en bedryf teenoor veranderinge in die beleggingsklimaat van 'n vreemde land, bestuur en verminder kan word. Daar word gehoop dat politieke risiko analise en die bestuur daarvan 'n bydra kan lewer tot buitelandse besighede se bestuur van hierdie risiko's, wat andersins 'n vemietgende impak kan hê op die winsgewendheid van buitelandse bedrywighede. Dit is onverantwoordelik om aan 'n buitelandse belegger 'n risiko analise voor te lê wat nie politieke risiko faktore en die daarmee gepaardgaande indikatore insluit nie. Die studie argumenteer verder dat faktorindikatore wat die fisiese omgewing, sosiale asook sosio-ekonomiese faktore aanspreek ook in 'n risiko analise ingesluit moet word. Oplaas is enige besigheidsklimaat, nieteenstaande die land wat bestudeer word, onderskryf deur 'n politieke stelsel, politieke klimaat, politieke kultuur en besigheidskultuur van die stelsel waarin die buitelandse besigheid winsgewende resultate as doelwit het. Wat dikwels beskou word as onnodige en irrelevante detail in risiko analise lei dikwels tot 'n gebrek aan die insluiting van mikro-risiko faktore en hulle indikatore weens 'n onderskatting van die noodsaaklikheid daarvan om juis sulke mikro-risiko faktorindikatore in 'n risiko analise in te bou. Hierdie studie aanvaar hopelik die uitdaging om te wys dat politieke risiko tog bestuur kan word en dat politieke risiko analise tog meer eksak gemaak kan word - dat dit wel moontlik is om politieke risiko te meet en bestuur.

The clash between South Africa's dual need of a new political identity and economic viability reflects not only the difficulty in conducting a traditional foreign policy with a strong ideological overlay but also has spurred the debate over whether her foreign policy is to be conducted on the basis of expediency or principle. This study argues that although the shift to a post-apartheid society has created the context for South African foreign policy to be shaped by a new culture of human rights, it remains an interest-based pragmatic activity rather than an exercise in the projection of ethical values or ideological principles. It seems that the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has not yet resolved the basic contradictions that have bedevilled its international thinking since it came into power. Faced with this dilemma, South Africa is often reduced to straddling the fence by half-heartedly supporting principles on one occasion (as in its relationship with the Republic of China), and on another pursuing its economic interests (as her intention to sell arms to the People's Republic of China attests). The government's basic goal of developing fruitful political and economic linkages without sacrificing the principles which underpin wider policy has proved elusive. The central proposition of this study is that the defining parameters of South African foreign policy have remained largely indeterminate because of the realities of the conflicting interests posed by its domestic and external concerns. In essence, the inability to reconcile primary foreign policy goals (preservation of national economic interest) with new foreign policy aspirations (promotion of human rights and peace through the pursuit of justice and fair-play) reflects a tense ambivalence in the founding principles of post apartheid South African foreign policy. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2001.

Since its emergence as the ruling party in 1994, when South Africa became a democratic country, the African National Congress has legislated and implemented a number of policies that are aimed at redressing the historical imbalances of the past caused by the Apartheid system. The Constitution of South Africa provides for the equality of men and women as a basic human right. The South African Employment Equity Act (1998) was introduced as a way of assisting the process of achieving equality and fairness in the employment practices of government, business and other sectors in South Africa. Scholars such as Merilee Grindle have argued that for a policy to succeed many things need to be considered such as the internal and external environment in which the implementation is to occur. There has also got to be a buy-in from the relevant stakeholders as policy implementation can be influenced by the implementer’s own belief system. Factors such as one’s upbringing, religion, race, class and culture can all impact on workplace practices. Through face to face interviews with the people who are the intended beneficiaries of this policy, this study moves away from looking at the statistics that have previously been the sole analysis of the implementation of the Employment Equity Act (EEA) to look at historical, political and cultural influences on the application of the EEA. In particular this study attempts to interrogate whether cultural factors play a role or impact on the way the EEA is being implemented within a government department using the KwaZulu Natal Department of Economic Development as a case study. The obvious reason for focusing on culture is that one’s cultural background inevitably shapes how an individual views the world and engages with other people. Cultural beliefs and prejudices can also affect a person’s conduct in the workplace. KwaZulu Natal is a province that has a very long history of cultural traditions rooted in a largely patriarchal system, therefore interrogating this topic within this province is highly appropriate. The responses of the participants will reflect the views of mostly women in management positions. From these perspectives the study will reflect on the degree to which culture does play a role in the implementation of the EEA in this particular case study. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2011.

In South Africa, both the number of people entering prison, and the number of people infected with HIV, are steadily increasing. While reliable statistics are not available on the number of HIV+ prisoners, the characteristics of the typical prisoner are those of a demographic group at high risk for HIV infection. As a result, many prisoners will already be HIV positive upon entering the prison. Additionally, the prison environment creates many situations of high risk behaviour for HIV transmission, which means there is also an as yet undetermined portion of inmates who will contract HIV while incarcerated. The current government policy is to provide HIV testing and condoms in conjunction with counselling, although poor design and implementation of this policy has limited its impact. In addition to issues of HIV infection and transmission, the government must address the needs of prisoners who have developed full-blown AlDS and will likely die as a result while imprisoned. AIDS is already the leading cause of death for prisoners in many countries, as well as in South Africa Adequate medical care, proper nutrition, and early release for those in the late stages of AIDS, are the international standards for minimum humane treatment of these prisoners. Today, crippling bureaucracy prevents the humanitarian release of dying· prisoners from South African prisons. Reliable data on the nature and extent of HIV/AIDS infection in South African prisons has yet to be obtained, owing to the closed nature of the prison administration. In order to design and implement effective policies, the secrecy surrounding the prison system must be eliminated so that further research and study may take place. Unlinked, anonymous HIV testing should be undertaken on a sample of the prison population so that accurate information and projections about HIV/AIDS in prison may become available. Until the government allows the issue to be quantified, the design and implementation of better policies will not be possible. The best HIV/AIDS policies are those which recognise the impact of prisoners' health on public health in general. Because the prisoner population consists of a core transmitter group, the pnson provides a critical intervention opponunity for the prevention of HIV infection in the greater community Further research on this issue should therefore focus on the evaluation, design, and implementation of intervention programs Intervention in the prison environment should include targeted education and use of existing gang structures to engender behavioural change The issues of HIV/AIDS in prison are compounded by issues of prison reform in general. The conditions in South Africa prisons are unconsitutional, and exacerbate the problems presented by HIV/AlDS. The most pressing problem in South African prisons is overcrowding; a problem which the Department of Correctional Services is all but powerless to address. Just as HIV/AIDS in the general community requires a multi-sectoral solution, so too does HIV/AIDS in the correctional setting. The Department of Correctional Services must re-evaluate both its policies and its entire policy making process in order to address HIV/AIDS in South African prisons. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal,Durban, 2001.

This thesis is concerned with an evaluation of AIDS education in KwaZulu-Natal schools. Although HIV and AIDS affect all segments of the population and all age groups, prevention efforts aimed at the youth may be the most effective. HIV/AIDS is a disease most prevalent in the fifteen to thirty-five age group, and if we can decrease rates of transmission in people under twenty, we will save much money, pain and suffering in the next ten years. It is often seen as prudent to save young generations, rather than older ones, and this may be especially true in the case of HIV/AIDS, where HIV/AIDS in the younger, reproductive age groups leads to the very youngest group, that it, babies, being born HIV-positive. In addition, the younger generation may be more easy to save: they have not yet formed unsafe sexual practices, and educating them before they develop habits is easier than changing habits of the older generation. I assessed various education departments' AIDS education programmes, based on the criteria of how well pupils are assisted in changing their unsafe sexual practices, or, if they are not yet sexually active, their attitudes towards sex, and on what type of message and ideal is presented about sexuality and sexual activity. Judged by my framework, I found the existent programmes to be lacking. But this act of assessment allowed for a more thorough evaluation of AIDS education in the region to emerge, and from this, recommendations for AIDS prevention programmes to be developed: AIDS education must occur in the context of more general skills development, skills in negotiating sexuality and sexual relationships, and skills for the negotiation of life in the late twentieth century. Innovative developments in the region, regarding AIDS and sexuality education teacher training, and the development of minimum criteria by which to set up and judge programmes, could be used as the basis for a sound AIDS education programme. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1996.

The main aim of this study was to investigate which factors are likely to affect the probability that events of violent collective action are reported by the press in KwaZulu-Natal. The study hypothesised that the likelihood of violent conflict events being reported by the press is affected by certain characteristics of the events themselves, such as their intensity and size, and by the environment in which events occur, such as their physicai location and the prevailing political context. The study was limited to the KwaZulu-Natal province where levels of violent collective action have been the highest in the country over the past decade. This province is also home to many violence monitoring agencies, which constituted an important alternative source of information against which the reporting trends of the newspapers in the province could be compared. The main source of information used in this study was the Conflict Trends in KwaZulu-Natal project's database of collective action events, which comprises events reported by both the press and the monitoring agencies. Data on a total of 3990 violent conflict events was analysed during 1987, 1990 and 1994, in the form of comparisons between the reporting tendencies of the press and the monitors. Interviews were also conducted with reporters and editors of the daily newspapers in KwaZulu-Natal, as well as with selected monitoring agency staff members. These interviews provided valuable information about how these media operate, and the factors which constrain their violence reporting activities. The most support was found for the argument that the political context influences violence reporting by the press. Analyses suggested that in all three years studied, the press contribution to the database decreased as monthly levels of violent conflict increased. This was explained in relation to the prevailing political context. The results also showed that reporting trends changed over time. In the earlier years, the press did not appear to be more inclined to report events of larger size and intensity, or events which were close to the newspapers' base. In 1994, however, this trend was reversed. There also was no clear evidence that the States of Emergency impacted negatively on press reporting of violence in terms of the variables studied. In addition, the study concluded that both the press and the monitOring agencies had made important separate contributions to the database on violent collective action. It is, therefore, vital that systematic studies of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal make use of multiple sources of data. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1995.

Since the dawn of political independence on the African continent, most governments have failed to properly develop systems of local government. In many cases efforts have resulted in mere tokenism, and in most cases failed experiments. South Africa is an exception. With the assumption of political leadership in 1994, the ANC government committed itself to a programme of restructuring the racially exclusive and compartmentalised local government systems at the time. The emphasis was to be on eradicating the effects of apartheid. Considering the debilitating aspects of the past political landscape, it was understood that democratisation and transformation would be a long process and not achievable overnight. The ANC government's commitment to restructuring local government was based on a trajectory of transition or developmental theories. The creation of more political space through Civil Society Organisations (CSO) was also promoted. With the introduction of the White Paper on Local Government in March 1998 it was agreed that it would serve as a blueprint for DLG (Developmental Local Government). The latter was also to focus on improving standards of living for previously disadvantaged people. The objectives were to be achieved through decentralisation and the devolution of power. There was to be a shift in approach from ' tier' to ' sphere' . The writer examines the importance of DLG and its ability to fulfil the demands and needs of local communities. The writer further examines the challenges that face DLG, namely administrative difficulties and unethical practices. Millions of rands are recklessly dissipated and siphoned off through dubious tenders. There have also been some measures of success, and these are noted. The writer comes to the conclusion that although institutional structures and mechanisms are in place to support service delivery, they are not responding effectively to community needs and demands. Local communities are still casualties in the ongoing processes of democratisation and transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.