Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (LLM. (Management and Development)) -- University of Limpopo, 2014 / Every accused person has the right to a fair trial which encompasses the right to adduce and challenge evidence in court. Whilst the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa confers the right to legal representation, an accused person may still opt to conduct his or her own defence. Once an unrepresented accused opts to conduct his or her own defence, the presiding officer then becomes obliged to assist the undefended accused to present his or her own case. South Africa adheres to the accusatorial / adversarial system. Under the accusatorial / adversarial system the presiding judicial officer is in the role of a detached umpire, who should not descend the arena of the duel between the state and the defence for fear of becoming partial or of losing perspective as a result of the dust caused by the affray between the state and the defence. Under the accusatorial/adversarial system, a presiding officer may find it challenging to assist an unrepresented accused or may inadequately assist him or her. This may be so because a fair trial is not determined by ensuring exercise of one of the rights to a fair trial but all the rights to a fair trial. This mini-dissertation, on the injunction of section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which makes provision for the rights to a fair trial, covers the different rights of an unrepresented accused. This is done alongside related provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and pertinent case law. The fat that an unrepresented accused has waived legal representation at the expense of the state and has opted to conduct his or her own defence should not be to his or her peril. The court has a constitutional injunction to protect and advance the rights of an unrepresented accused. Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.

Over the last several decades, researchers have documented how impaired reasoning by adult offenders impeded the intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Logically, it stands to reason that juveniles – who are developmentally less mature and have less life experience than their adult counterparts – would possess even greater impairment, thereby heightening their risk for invalid Miranda waivers. Juvenile Miranda research supports this notion; with some researchers finding that psychosocial maturity, among other factors, affect a juvenile’s understanding of their rights. Yet, relatively few studies have examined its relation to Miranda reasoning and decision-making. Thus, the current study investigated the specific role of maturity in juveniles’ Miranda comprehension and reasoning. Participants included 236 legally-involved juveniles recruited from either a juvenile detention center or a juvenile justice alternative education program. The effects of psychosocial maturity were examined on a variety of Miranda-related measures and assessed a broad range of Miranda abilities. It was found that, in general, immature juveniles performed more poorly on all Miranda measures as compared to their mature counterparts. However, the impact of maturity varied considerably depending on the ability. Specifically, maturity was most important in the context of Miranda reasoning. As a novel addition to the literature, the current study also investigated the effects of developmental timing on maturity (i.e., immaturity-delayed versus immaturity-expected) on Miranda abilities.

Millions of custodial suspects waive their rights each year without the benefit of legal counsel. The question posed to psychologists in disputed Miranda waivers is whether this waiver decision was, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Mental health professionals must be aware of potential barriers to Miranda comprehension to provide expert opinions regarding a defendant's competency to waive rights. The current study examined how Miranda warning reading level, length, and method of administration affects Miranda comprehension. Recently arrested detainees at Grayson County Jail were administered oral and written Miranda warnings from the Miranda Statements Scale (MSS; Rogers, 2005) to measure their comprehension of the warnings. Surprisingly low levels of Miranda comprehension were found for most warnings. For all warnings at or above 8th grade, a substantial minority (27.1% - 39.6%) of defendants exhibited failed (i.e., < 50% understanding) Miranda comprehension. Regardless of other variables, oral administrations resulted in a substantially larger number of defendants with failed Miranda comprehension. Implications for public policy and clinical practice are discussed.

En 1992, la Cour suprême du Canada souligne l'importance de faire la distinction entre l'obligation principale de conseil qui est l'objet principal du contrat et l'obligation d'information qui est accessoire. L'obligation principale de conseil est reconnue à l'égard des professionnels des professions dites libérales à l'époque, comme les avocats et notaires dans un contrat de mandat. Par contre, l'évolution jurisprudentielle récente démontre que l'obligation de conseil ne se limite plus à l'objet principal du contrat, et que la notion de «professionnel» n'a plus le sens restrictif d'autrefois. Au Québec, l'obligation principale de conseil est reconnue dans un premier temps à l'égard des professionnels soumis au Code des professions, notamment avocats et notaires. On reconnaît aussi une telle obligation accessoire de conseil à l'égard d'autres personnes qui, bien qu'elles ne soient pas des «professionnels» au sens du Code des professions, exercent tout de même des activités de nature professionnelle. C'est le cas, par exemple, des courtiers en valeurs mobilières, des courtiers en assurances ou des institutions financières. D'ailleurs, une controverse semble régner dans le domaine bancaire sur l'étendue de l'obligation de conseil et d'information des institutions financières envers un client dans le cadre d'un contrat de prestation de services. Plus particulièrement, les tribunaux semblent partagés sur la reconnaissance ou non d'une obligation de conseil de la banque dans le cadre d'un emprunt. Certaines décisions sont à l'effet que seule une obligation d'information s'impose alors que d'autres préconisent le conseil. Afin d'élucider la confusion qui règne présentement en jurisprudence dans le domaine bancaire ainsi que dans le contrat de services et d'entreprise en général, il faut faire une étude jumelée de l'évolution de l'obligation de conseil accessoire et de l'obligation de conseil principale. Notre étude porte sur l'évolution jurisprudentielle qui tend vers une théorisation dans le contrat de services ou d'entreprise, de l'obligation de conseil qui devient alors une variante ou une intensité de l'obligation accessoire d'information. Par le fait même, on constate qu'une obligation de conseil principale semble également s'étendre à une catégorie plus large de professionnels. Dans ce cas, l'obligation de conseil est similaire, dans son fondement, au devoir de conseil du «professionnel» traditionnel, au sens du Code des professions. On constate alors que l'obligation principale de conseil n'est plus restreinte aux professionnels au sens classique du terme. / In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada advised against confusing the obligation to counsel, a main obligation in a contract with the obligation to inform, that remains a secondary obligation. The main obligation to counsel is recognized in contracts with the customary professionals, such as mandates given to notaries and lawyers. However, recent evolution of the case law has revealed that the main obligation to counsel is extending in scope and that the notion of "professional" has moved towards a less restrictive meaning. In Quebec, the main obligation to counsel is imposed primarily on professionals subject to the Professional Code, in particular lawyers and notaries. A secondary obligation to counsel is recognized in contracts with other individuals who practice professional activities but are not professionals as defined by the Professional Code. It is the case, for example, of securities brokers or securities dealers, insurance brokers or bankers. Moreover, a controversy has arisen in the field of banking regarding the scope of the obligation of bankers to counsel and to inform a client in a contract for services. More specifically, the courts are divided over recognition of the obligation to counsel of bankers in loans. Some decisions only sustain the obligation to inform whereas others expand it to the obligation to counsel. To get a clear understanding of the confusion surrounding case laws in the field of banking and in the contract of enterprise or for services generally, we must proceed with a study combining the evolution of the secondary obligation to inform and the main obligation to counsel. Our analysis is based on the evolution of the case law towards the theorization of the obligation to counsel which thus constitutes a variation in intensity of a secondary obligation to inform. Furthermore, we show that an obligation to counsel is imposed upon a larger category of professionals. In this case, the obligation to counsel is similar in its essence to the duty to counsel of the customarily professional subject to the Professional Code. It becomes apparent that the main obligation to counsel is not restricted to professionals in the conventional sense.

À la suite d’une décision orale rendue le 28 janvier 2009 par la Chambre de première instance I dans l'affaire Lubanga, la Cour pénale internationale a institué un nouvel acteur du procès pénal international : le témoin susceptible d'auto-incrimination qui, à ce titre, est assisté d'un conseil. Ce « témoin assisté » a en commun avec le suspect leur suspicion, et, avec le témoin ordinaire, leur comparution à l’audience ès qualité de témoins. Il n’est cependant ni totalement un suspect – parce que non poursuivable devant la Cour – ni totalement un témoin, parce que notamment impliqué dans la procédure principale. L’évolution de cet acteur singulier du procès pénal international aura eu le mérite de permettre à la Cour de revisiter des notions classiques du droit international pénal. Grâce à lui, la qualité de « parties » n’est plus une forteresse réservée à l’accusation et à la défense. Le témoin ordinaire, considéré comme tiers passif à l’instance, partage désormais la barre avec un « témoin » actif pouvant diligenter des procédures « détachables » de la procédure principale. En sept ans d’existence, le témoin assisté a tellement impacté la procédure pénale internationale qu’une révision des textes fondamentaux de la Cour s’impose pour mettre un terme à la cacophonie jurisprudentielle des chambres sur l’étendue de ses droits et obligations. / Following an oral decision given by the Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case, the International Criminal Court has introduced a new player into international criminal cases: the self-incriminating witness, who is assisted by a counsel. This "assisted witness", like the suspect, is under suspicion, and like an ordinary witness appears before the Court to testify. However, he is neither completely a suspect, since he cannot be convicted by the Court, nor completely a witness, since he is implicated in the criminal proceedings. The evolution of the role of this singular player in international criminal cases has given the Court the opportunity of reviewing traditional notions of international criminal law. Thanks to this situation, the status of the different parties is no longer restricted to prosecution and defense. The ordinary witness, considered as a passive third party in the trial, now shares the stand with an active witness who is able to speed up proceedings that are separable from the main proceedings. In seven years of existence, the assisted witness has had such an impact on criminal proceedings that it has become necessary to revise the core texts of the Court in order to put an end to the legal confusion among the different chambers regarding the extent of this witness's rights and obligations.

No description available.

The right to legal representation at labour proceedings of an administrative or quasi-judicial nature is not clear in our law, and has been the subject of contradictory debate in the South African courts since the1920’s. Despite the ambiguities and uncertainty in the South African common law, the statutory regulation of legal representation was not comprehensively captured in labour legislation resulting in even more debate, especially as to the right to be represented by a person of choice at these proceedings in terms of the relevant entrenched protections contained in the Bill of Rights. The Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002 (prior to amendment) is silent on the right to representation at in-house disciplinary proceedings. Section 135(4) of Act 12 of 2002 allows for a party at conciliation proceedings to appear in person or to be represented by a director or co employee or a member or office bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union. Section 138(4) of the same Act allows for legal representation at arbitration proceedings, but subject to section 140(1) which excludes legal representation involving dismissals for reasons related to conduct or capacity, unless all parties and the commissioner consent, or if the commissioner allows it per guided discretion to achieve or promote reasonableness and fairness. The abovementioned three sections were however repealed by the amendments of the Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002. Despite the repealing provision, Item 27 of Schedule 7 of the Amendment reads that the repealed provisions should remain in force pending promulgation of specific rules in terms of section 115(2A)(m) by the CCMA. These rules have not been promulgated to date. The common law’s view on legal representation as a compulsory consideration in terms of section 39 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 and further a guidance to the entitlement to legal representation where legislation is silent. The common law seems to be clear that there is no general right to legal representation at administrative and quasi judicial proceedings. If the contractual relationship is silent on representation it may be permitted if exceptional circumstances exist, vouching such inclusion. Such circumstances may include the complex nature of the issues in dispute and the seriousness of the imposable penalty ( for example dismissal or criminal sanction). Some authority ruled that the principles of natural justice supercede a contractual condition to the contrary which may exist between employer and employee. The courts did however emphasize the importance and weight of the contractual relationship between the parties in governing the extent of representation at these proceedings. Since 1994 the entrenched Bill of Rights added another dimension to the interpretation of rights as the supreme law of the country. On the topic of legal representation and within the ambit of the limitation clause, three constitutionally entrenched rights had to be considered. The first is the right to a fair trial, including the right to be represented by a practitioner of your choice. Authority reached consensus that this right, contained in section 35 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 is restricted to accused persons charged in a criminal trial. The second protection is the entitlement to administrative procedure which is justifiable and fair (This extent of this right is governed y the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000) and thirdly the right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law. In conclusion, the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 upholds the law of general application, if free and justifiable. Within this context, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 allows for specific representation at selected fora, and the common law governs legal representation post 1994 within the framework of the Constitution. The ultimate test in considering the entitlement to legal representation at administrative and quasi judicial proceedings will be in balancing the protection of the principle that these tribunals are masters of their own procedure, and that they may unilaterally dictate the inclusion or exclusion of representation at these proceedings and the extent of same, as well as the view of over judicialation of process by the technical and delaying tactics of legal practitioners, against the wide protections of natural justice and entrenched constitutional protections.

The right to legal representation at internal disciplinary hearings and arbitration proceedings at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and bargaining councils, where the reason for dismissal relates to misconduct or incapacity is a topic that is raised continuously and often debated. Despite no amendments to labour legislation pertaining to the issue at hand there was however a recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgment. This judgment alters one’s view and clarifies the uncertainties that were created around Rule 25 of the CCMA rules, it also brings a different perspective to the matter, but it will however continue to ignite significant interest. There is no automatic right to legal representation at disciplinary hearings, at the CCMA, and at bargaining councils where disputes involve conduct or capacity and this is the very reason why it is a contentious matter for all parties to grapple with. The dismissal of an employee for misconduct may not be significant to the employer, but the employee’s job is his major asset, and losing his employment is a serious matter to contend with. Lawyers are said to make the process legalistic and expensive, and are blamed for causing delays in the proceedings due to their unavailability and the approach that they adopt. Allowing legal representation places individual employees and small businesses on the back foot because of the costs. Section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides everyone with the right to fair labour practices, and section 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 gives effect to this right and specifies, amongst others, that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. At internal disciplinary hearings, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is silent as to what the employee’s rights are with regards to legal representation and the general rule is that legal representation is not permitted, unless the employer’s disciplinary code and procedure or the employee’s contract allows for it, but usually an employee may only be represented by a fellow employee or trade union representative, but not by a legal representative. In MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there exists no right in terms of the common law to legal representation in tribunals other than in courts of law. However, both the common law and PAJA concede that in certain situations it may be unfair to deny a party legal representation. Currently the position in South Africa is that an employee facing disciplinary proceedings can put forward a request for legal representation and the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing will have the discretion to allow or refuse the request. In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the South African law does not recognise an absolute right to legal representation in fora other than courts of law, and a constitutional right to legal representation only arises in respect of criminal matters.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.