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O conceito de psicologia fenomenológica na Husserliana IX e suas implicações para a psicologiaCormanich, Eduardo Luis 31 March 2017 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2017-03-31 / Essa dissertação explana sobre o desenvolvimento do conceito de Psicologia Fenomenológica na
obra do filósofo Edmund Husserl e, mais especificadamente, na obra “Psicologia Fenomenológica”
que corresponde ao vol. IX da coleção de obras completas do filósofo, denominada Husserlina.
Apresentamos o ideário husserliano através da formação do conceito de Psicologia Fenomenológica
e como seu entendimento torna possível respostas a questões de cientificidade para a Psicologia,
que estão presentes desde a sua fundação como uma disciplina científica moderna, desde o final do
sec. XIX. Concluímos ser necessária a construção de um campo intermediário entre a
Fenomenologia e os estudos científicos em Psicologia, através da redescoberta deste ideário
proposto por Husserl para uma possível Psicologia Científica de bases eidético-transcendentais e
que utilize-se do método fenomenológico, e do caráter intersubjetivo da psique humana como
fundamento desta possibilidade. / This dissertation explores the development of the concept of Phenomenological Psychology in the
work of the philosopher Edmund Husserl and, more specifically, in the work "Phenomenological
Psychology" that corresponds to vol. IX of the complete works of the philosopher, denominated
Husserliana. We present the husserlian through the formation of the concept of Phenomenological
Psychology and how its understanding makes possible answers to questions about psychology
scientificity, which has been present since its foundation as a modern science, at the end of the XIX
century. We conclude that it is necessary to construct an intermediate field between
Phenomenology and scientific studies in Psychology, through the rediscovery of Husserl’s theory
over the possibility of a Scientific Psychology of eidetic-transcendental bases and the usage of the
phenomenological method, as well as the intersubjective character of human psyque as the basis of
this possibility.
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Critique de l'interprétation transcendantale de l'ego cartésien : Husserl, sa postérité et le sujet cartésien / Criticism of the transcendental interpretation of the cartesian ego : Husserl, his posterity and the cartesian subjectCalixte, Claude 15 December 2015 (has links)
Cette thèse discute l’interprétation transcendantale de la découverte de l’ego cartésien et l’accusation selon laquelle Descartes se serait trompé sur le sens de sa propre découverte. Nous soutenons la conformité de la philosophie cartésienne à une subjectivité concrète ; donc une subjectivité assumant ce que récuse Husserl, à savoir sa dimension sensible et l’intra-mondanéité du sujet. Ainsi allons-nous à l’encontre tant de sa réduction à un étant empiriquement neutre qu’à l’idée selon laquelle son sens d’être s’explicite par le mouvement vivant. Cette étude ne se limite pas seulement à Husserl ; elle s’étend sur une large partie de la tradition phénoménologique. Après avoir étudié le cadre néo-kantien dans lequel s’inscrit la réception husserlienne de Descartes et mis en évidence la compatibilité entre le sujet cartésien et le sujet kantien, nous relisons des textes centraux de Descartes en montrant le caractère problématique de l’idée d’un sujet transcendantal et en mettant en lumière la corporéité constitutive et spécifique de la subjectivité cartésienne. La question est de savoir ce qui distingue notre thèse de celle de la phénoménologie du mouvement post-husserlienne qui, s’opposant à la subjectivité a-mondaine, défend aussi la corporéité du sujet tout en accusant Descartes de séparer la subjectivité de la vie. Notre enquête philosophique montre qu’au contraire la subjectivité cartésienne n’exclut ni le mouvement ni la vie, mais que le mouvement vivant ou corporel n’en est pas le critère définitionnel et que la corporéité en question jouit d’une spécificité. / This thesis discusses the transcendental interpretation of the cartesian discovery of the ego. It discusses the accusation following which Descartes was in error about his own discovery. We will defend the conformity between cartesian philosophy and a conncrete subjectivity. This means a subjectivity that upholds what Husserl eliminates, namely the sensitive dimension and the worldliness of the subject. So we go both against Husserl’s reduction to an empirically neutral subject and against the idea that the meaning of being explicates itself by the movement of life. This discussion does not limit itself to Husserl : it extends to a large part of the phenomenological tradition. After having studied the neo-kantian framework which organizes the husserlian reception of Descartes and after having shown the compatibility of the kantian and the cartesian subject, we take up anew the texts of Descartes. We aim to show the problematic character of the transcendental subject by showing the constituive and specific « bodyness » of the cartesian subjectivity. The question then is : how does this thesis separate itself out of the posthusserlian movement, which opposing a subjectivity devoid of world, also defends the « bodyness » of the subject whilst at the same time accusing Descartes of separating subjectivity and life ? Our inquiry shows that quite to the contrary, cartesian subjectivity excludes neither movement nor life, but that the living or bodily movement is not its definitional criteria and that the cartesian « bodyness » in question posseses its own specificty.
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