La présente thèse de doctorat porte sur la fiscalité des prix de transfert. Dans un contexte mondial propice à la remise en cause des législations et des pratiques fiscales, elle traite de la question des instruments de régulation appropriés et du rôle du droit dans un tel édifice. En effet, nombre d'observateurs imputent les désordres majeurs de la régulation des prix de transfert à l'imprécision des règles qui la sous-tendent et à l'absence d'autorité mondiale contre la concurrence fiscale dommageable. En réponse, nous supposons que le principe de pleine concurrence ne se limite pas à la définition usuelle qui en est donnée. Nous montrons qu'il peut être considéré comme élément d'une norme universelle destinée à neutraliser les effets des particularismes fiscaux sur les échanges économiques internationaux. Une telle hypothèse fournit le critère d'évaluation des législations nationales et de a pertinence des politiques de prix de transfert des groupes. Nous analysons ensuite la législation et la jurisprudence française, et montrons qu'une transposition réelle du principe de pleine concurrence ne peut se résumer à copier l'article 9 § 1 des conventions modèles, mis suppose d'en traduire le contenu et l'esprit en instaurant les conditions d'une coopération réelle entre les acteurs. Nous exposons également la dialectique entre les lacunes de la régulation des prix de transfert et les tendances normatives à l'œuvre dans le monde entier, qui malgré leur hétérogénéité sont parfois présentées en réponse à la question des prix de transfert Nous fournissons une grille de lecture du plan BEPS et du développement des limitations légales imposées par les Etats ainsi que des obligations de conformité fiscale (compliance). Enfin, nous montrons que la reconstruction d'une régulation des prix de transfert en référence à la nonne universelle donnerait l'occasion d'instaurer un véritable partenariat entre l'Etat et les parties prenantes, ouvrant la voie vers une nouvelle manière de discuter la loi. / This doctoral thesis deals with the tax aspects of transfer pricing. ln the context of a globalized economy where the transfer pricing policies and legislations are at stake, it raises the question whether proper instruments of regulation can be set, and if the law is the adequate tool to that end.Indeed, numerous people consider that the major disorders in the regulation of transfer pricing stem from the Arm's Length Principle itself, due to its lack of economic precision and the absence of a global authority against harmful tax competition.To address the issue, we assume that there is more to the Ann's Length Principle than its common definition. Indeed, we show that it can be considered as part of a universal law aimed at neutralizing the effects of the tax differences in the international economic exchange. Such an assumption provides for a criterium to assess the quality of national legislations as well as the relevance of the groups' transfer pricing policies.By analyzing the French legislation and case law, we show that a thorough implementation of the Ann's Length Principle implies not only to copy article 9 § 1 the convention models, but more generally to capture its content and essence by setting the conditions for a proper cooperation between actors. We also explain the relationship between the lacks in the regulation of transfer pricing and the process of setting new rules that takes place around the world, describing the rationale of the BEPS plan and of the various limitations and compliance obligations that Governments impose to the taxpayers. Lastly, we show that building a national legislation with reference to the universal Ann's Length Principle implies a true partnership between the Government and all stakeholders, paving the way to a new manner of debating the law.

M. Tech. (Cost and Management Accounting), Vaal University of Technology / This study was undertaken to assess the extent to which transfer pricing was effectively used by multinational manufacturing companies operating in the Southern Gauteng region of South Africa. The target participants of the study traded their products across international borders and as such made use of transfer pricing in one way or the other to achieve strategic objectives. Scant research has been undertaken to analyse the degree to which transfer pricing can be used to effectively influence managerial performance. On the other hand there is a wealth of knowledge on the relationship between transfer pricing and taxation. In-depth review of literature showed that even though multinationals formulated their transfer pricing policies to target financial and managerial objectives, self-interest and outside influences tended to hinder the equitable realization of both types of objectives. The study therefore set out to establish whether this is true of Multinational corporations (MNCs) in Southern Gauteng and in the process answer questions about the procedure for formulating transfer pricing policies by these MNCs, the relationship, if any, between transfer pricing and profitability and the use of transfer pricing for performance enhancement and assessment. The study made use of a mixed methods research methodology to collect and analyze data from 45 MNCs operating in the target geographical area. Of the 45 companies, 15 cooperated fully with the study. Data was collected via the use of questionnaires and follow-up face-to-face and/or telephonic interviews. Collected data was analysed using statistical methods including the Chi Square Test, standard deviation, frequency tables and the Kruskal-Wallis H test. The results from the questionnaire and interviews show that there is no universally appropriate Transfer Pricing Policies(TPP) which applies equally to all organizations in all circumstances. Firms are affected by different environmental factors while striving for tax-compliance and value creation. The fear of falling on the wrong side of tax laws is a major driving force behind transfer pricing policies of MNCs. As such other objectives that are managerial in nature become secondary and tend to be neglected if/when they conflict with the primary objective.