Note:

Thè editor's Thesis--Paris.

Thè editor's Thesis--Paris.

Thèse - Université de Paris.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Stuttgart, 1978. / Cover title: Taʻawwud al-bīʼah fī al-qism al-shimālī min Sāḥil Sūsah (Tūnis) maʻa akhdh al-jawānib al-ṭabīʻīyah bi-ʻayn al-iʻtibār. French and German on opposite pages. Includes bibliographical references (p. 590-638).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [v]-vii).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [304]-314).

Orginally present as the authr's Thesis (doctoral)--Kullīyat al-ʻUlūm al-Insānīyah wa-al-Ijtimāʻīyah bi-Tūnis, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 365-384).

Drawing on post-structuralist theories of identity politics, this thesis argues that the grounds of the December 2010 Tunisian uprising are rooted in the long accumulation of the state violence and the regime’s discursive strategies, used to interpret Islam and politics and deny a shared political space for rival identities and discourses. Relying on the regime’s assumptions about the opposition, the EU added yet another dimension of hegemony when they approved the idea that Ben Ali’s gradual political reform was needed in a country threatened by the rise of political Islam. When these discursive strategies failed to conceal the contradictions affecting political Islam and human rights, a non-elite contesting discourse emerged and opened a space for popular resistance. The uprising was a reaction to the material, ideological and discursive practices used by Ben Ali’s regime to forge a hegemonic order of rule, and cover up the state violence. Discourse analysis reveals that Ben Ali’s appropriation of Islam to resolve the political conflict and his discursive distortions on human rights radicalized youth and undermined his political control. His alliances with political elites and media prevented civil society from mediating between state and society and from anticipating the uprising. The EU was suspected of managing the potential security crisis through concessions to Ben Ali’s regime, rather than promoting its stated goals of democracy and human rights. The findings of 106 interviews covering 8 socio-political groups reveal that the vast majority of the opposition articulated a consistent discourse that the new order of Tunisian politics would either bring reform to state values by incorporating a proactive Islamic political thought of social justice and human rights or descend into political violence that would engender state failure. As the sociopolitical factors that led people to revolt against the regime are equally pertinent to Tunisia’s postuprising phase, interviewees displayed a uniform perception that Tunisia is not heading towards democracy, but is back to square one of state violence and political polarisation between the Islamists and the Secularists. They seemed to be wary of a longstanding crisis in the state’s values, suspecting political elites, the ‘deep state’ of reactivating the pre-revolution scenario in which the abuse of state power, stagnant political thought, and legislation were upheld. New rounds of identity conflicts loom large between a state defending its legacy of the French Laïcité model and an emerging Salafi youth who will challenge the former values and attempt to impose their discourse of ‘Islamic awakening’ in order to revive the Caliphate. Yet the presence of their Islamist counterparts in the government and the unknown outcome of other Arab revolutions seem to delay the Salafi associated backlash against both the state security services and the extreme secularists.

Despite the social reforms led by Bourguiba during his presidency, the state of Tunisia, as modern as it was, gave way to a thriving Islamic revival movement to such an extent that during the '80s their activities disturbed Tunisia's political life. The years between 1986 and 1991 were marked by open conflict between the regime and the Islamists. Since this conflict was an ideological one, the population was influenced only marginally by its outcome. Perhaps the concerns of the Islamists were not involved enough with those of most Tunisians. An analytical approach to Tunisian Islamist thought reveals that political matters, inspired by Islamic teachings as well as secular ones, formed its ideological basis. The ideological needs of the population were not a priority. Being easily influenced by mainstream thought, Tunisians were easily conditioned by the state and the mass media to reject any form of Islamism.