Inaug.-Diss.--Münster. / Lebenslauf. Literaturverzeichnis, p. [vii]-ix.

Inaug.-Diss.--Münster. / Lebenslauf. Literaturverzeichnis, p. [vii]-ix.

The  article  takes  as  a  point  of  departure  Brentano`s intentionalist  theory  and  its  problematic  distinction  between  intentional  and transcendent object, in order to present the way in which Twardowski reformulates these concepts by means of a differentiation between the content and the object of representations: on the one hand, the ‘content’ is the way of givenness of an object and fulfils an intermediary function between the act and its objective correlate; on the other hand, the ‘object’ is the necessary transcendent correlate of every representation, even of those, whose objects do not exist. In this context, it is the dimension of judgment that solves the problem of nonexistent objects. The final aim is to show how Twardowski presents an articulated theory that integrates an intentionalist theory of acts with a theory of objects and a philosophical semantics of sense (content). / Tomando como punto de partida la teoría intencionalista de Brentano y  su  problemática  distinción  entre  objeto  intencional  y  objeto  trascendente,  el artículo presenta el modo en que Twardowski reformula dichos conceptos a partir de la diferenciación entre contenido y objeto de las representaciones: por un lado, el ‘contenido’ es el modo de darse del objeto y cumple una función intermediaria entre el acto y su correlato objetivo; por otro lado, el ‘objeto’ es el correlato trascendente necesario de todas las representaciones, aún de aquéllas cuyo objeto no existe. En este contexto, es la dimensión del juicio la que permite resolver el problema  de  los  objetos  inexistentes.  La  intención  final  del  artículo  es  mostrar cómo Twardowski articula una teoría intencionalista del acto con una teoría del objeto y una semántica filosófica del sentido (contenido).

Inaug.-Diss.-Bonn. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 259-263.

Akademisk avhandling--filosofie doktorsexamen--Stockholms universitet, 1990.

Texte remanié de: Ph.D.--University of Stockholm, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 249-258.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesuino Junior Pires.pdf: 1325069 bytes, checksum: bb85f406de727e9479fc7148c6297230 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to investigate the distinction between content and object of presentation as presented by Kasimir Twardowski in his opuscule Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Our object of study is the distinction between the content and the object of Twardowski before Brentano and Höfler. This research is characterized as a literature and the procedures are meant for reconstitution, analysis and reflection on the topic. The text is structured in three parts: the first part deals with some points developed by Brentano in his work Psychologie vom Empirischen Stankpunkt, especially with regard to the distinction between psychic and physical phenomena, and, consequently, on his assertion that the whole psychic phenomenon there is something given as immanent object. The second part presents the distinction between content and object, and the particularities of Twardowski before Höfler and Brentano. The main criticism of Twardowski to Brentano is that, like the term presentation , the term presented is also ambiguous and what is meant by immanent object , is in fact the content of representation. For this reason, it is proposed a threefold distinction of psychic phenomenon: act, content and object. This award culminates in the formation of one theory of objects in general, advocated by Twardowski. In the last part of the text some problematic issues are identified regarding the Twardowski s theory mainly on the notion of content and the concept of reality and possibility. Thus, we can infer that the particularities of Twardowski s distinction must be evidenced, firstly by his conception of content as a mediating body between the act and the object of representation; secondly, because this distinction has its linguistic counterpart from the functions name; and finally, through different logical functions performed by the adjective the presented / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto de representação tal como apresentada por Kasimir Twardowski em seu opúsculo Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Nosso objeto de estudo é a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto de Twardowski perante Brentano e Höfler. Esta pesquisa se caracteriza como uma pesquisa bibliográfica e os procedimentos são voltados para a reconstituição, análise e reflexão sobre o tema. O texto está estruturado em três partes: a primeira parte trata de alguns pontos desenvolvidos por Brentano em sua obra Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, principalmente no que diz respeito à distinção entre fenômenos psíquicos e fenômenos físicos e, consequentemente, sobre sua afirmação de que a todo fenômeno psíquico há algo dado como objeto imanente. A segunda parte apresenta a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto e as particularidades de Twardowski perante Höfler e Brentano. A principal crítica de Twardowski a Brentano é que, assim como o termo representação , o termo representado também é ambíguo e aquilo que se entende por objeto imanente é, em realidade, o conteúdo de representação. Propõe-se, assim, uma tripla distinção do fenômeno psíquico em: ato, conteúdo e objeto. Esta distinção culmina na constituição de uma teoria dos objetos em geral defendida por Twardowski. Na última parte do texto algumas questões problemáticas são apontadas no tocante à teoria de Twardowski, principalmente sobre a noção de conteúdo e sobre o conceito de realidade e possibilidade. Inferimos assim, que as particularidades da distinção de Twardowski podem ser evidenciadas: primeiro, por sua concepção de conteúdo como uma instância mediadora entre o ato e o objeto de representação; segundo, porque esta distinção tem sua contraparte linguística a partir das funções do nome; e terceiro, pelas diferentes funções lógicas exercidas pelo adjetivo o representado

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-266).

The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts: The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) and The Psychology of Aristotle (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of "being" in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object....