Submitted graduation theses has charakter as a theoretical study, which offers different views of questions of sameness and differences in dadaistic and constructivistic objects and in objects of its inheritors. I have made criterions to observe relation between these objects, criterions are: principle of creation, relation between content, form and matherial.We observe also using movement in object art. We show, that object-art have disturbed the then tradition of plastic art. New approach of matherial, decleration common thing as a part of art open up a lot of questions about function of art. The main aim of these theoretical study was to find out samenesses anddifferences in these objels, show a process of object art.We came to the conslusion that between dadaistic and constructivistic objels are some samenesses (for example discruption of visual art, realiton between system and chance, using movement). Didactical, didactical-visual and visual parts are fasten together with theoretical part. These parts watch on object art in two viewpoint: utilization of common thing as a dadaistic principle, relation between matherial and form as a constructivistic principle

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesuino Junior Pires.pdf: 1325069 bytes, checksum: bb85f406de727e9479fc7148c6297230 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to investigate the distinction between content and object of presentation as presented by Kasimir Twardowski in his opuscule Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Our object of study is the distinction between the content and the object of Twardowski before Brentano and Höfler. This research is characterized as a literature and the procedures are meant for reconstitution, analysis and reflection on the topic. The text is structured in three parts: the first part deals with some points developed by Brentano in his work Psychologie vom Empirischen Stankpunkt, especially with regard to the distinction between psychic and physical phenomena, and, consequently, on his assertion that the whole psychic phenomenon there is something given as immanent object. The second part presents the distinction between content and object, and the particularities of Twardowski before Höfler and Brentano. The main criticism of Twardowski to Brentano is that, like the term presentation , the term presented is also ambiguous and what is meant by immanent object , is in fact the content of representation. For this reason, it is proposed a threefold distinction of psychic phenomenon: act, content and object. This award culminates in the formation of one theory of objects in general, advocated by Twardowski. In the last part of the text some problematic issues are identified regarding the Twardowski s theory mainly on the notion of content and the concept of reality and possibility. Thus, we can infer that the particularities of Twardowski s distinction must be evidenced, firstly by his conception of content as a mediating body between the act and the object of representation; secondly, because this distinction has its linguistic counterpart from the functions name; and finally, through different logical functions performed by the adjective the presented / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto de representação tal como apresentada por Kasimir Twardowski em seu opúsculo Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Nosso objeto de estudo é a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto de Twardowski perante Brentano e Höfler. Esta pesquisa se caracteriza como uma pesquisa bibliográfica e os procedimentos são voltados para a reconstituição, análise e reflexão sobre o tema. O texto está estruturado em três partes: a primeira parte trata de alguns pontos desenvolvidos por Brentano em sua obra Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, principalmente no que diz respeito à distinção entre fenômenos psíquicos e fenômenos físicos e, consequentemente, sobre sua afirmação de que a todo fenômeno psíquico há algo dado como objeto imanente. A segunda parte apresenta a distinção entre conteúdo e objeto e as particularidades de Twardowski perante Höfler e Brentano. A principal crítica de Twardowski a Brentano é que, assim como o termo representação , o termo representado também é ambíguo e aquilo que se entende por objeto imanente é, em realidade, o conteúdo de representação. Propõe-se, assim, uma tripla distinção do fenômeno psíquico em: ato, conteúdo e objeto. Esta distinção culmina na constituição de uma teoria dos objetos em geral defendida por Twardowski. Na última parte do texto algumas questões problemáticas são apontadas no tocante à teoria de Twardowski, principalmente sobre a noção de conteúdo e sobre o conceito de realidade e possibilidade. Inferimos assim, que as particularidades da distinção de Twardowski podem ser evidenciadas: primeiro, por sua concepção de conteúdo como uma instância mediadora entre o ato e o objeto de representação; segundo, porque esta distinção tem sua contraparte linguística a partir das funções do nome; e terceiro, pelas diferentes funções lógicas exercidas pelo adjetivo o representado

On soutient ici que la théorie des relations de Meinong, bien qu’elle s’établisse selon une visée psychologique, a des implications ontologiques fortes en raison d’un aspect propre à la perspective de Meinong. C’est à la lumière des exigences issues du rapport entre psychologie et ontologie que le réalisme meinongien peut être éclairé. Associée à la problématique des complexions que Meinong élabore suite à la découverte des qualités gestaltiques par Ehrenfels, et à certaines applications qui en sont faites dans la théorie de la mesure, sa théorie des relations conduit Meinong à distinguer les activités de l’esprit et les propriétés des objets de ces activités – certaines de ses propriétés ne pouvant ontologiquement dépendre de l’esprit. Dans ces conditions, et au vu des textes, on soutient que la distinction de Twardowski entre contenu et objet n’est pas ce qui détermine la position de Meinong sur les objets, dont les objets dits d’ordre supérieur. Par contre, Meinong semble disposer d’une distinction très semblable à celle de Twardowski dans ses recherches sur les relations et les complexions, encore qu’il semble adopter une posture critique envers les implications de la distinction de Twardowski, cette posture traduisant la spécificité du réalisme meinongien. La théorie des relations conditionne aussi la position de Meinong quant à la distinction entre jugements existentiels et jugements catégoriques. Son refus du représentationnalisme twar-dowskien comme de la perspective Brentano-martyenne sur la réductibilité des jugements catégoriques aux jugements existentiels est intrinsèquement lié à sa thèse sur les assomptions et les objets qui sont « hors-l’être ». / In this work, it is claimed that Meinong’s theory of relations, although established in a psychological aim, has strong ontological implications under a particular aspect and peculiar to Meinong’s view. The requirements appearing from this relationship between psychology and ontology enlighten the meinongian realism. Associated with the problem of complexions which Meinong inherited from the discovery of gestalt qualities by Ehrenfels ; and regarding some applications which are made in the theory of the measure ; such a theory of relations leads Meinong to distinguishing the activities of the mind and the properties of the objects of these activities – properties that cannot ontologically depend on the mind. We claim that the distinction of Twardowski between content and object is not what determines the position of Meinong on objects and on objects of higher order. Meinong seems to have conceived a very similar distinction along his researches on relations and complexions. He even seemed to adopt a critical posture toward some implications of the Twardowski’s distinction - this posture clarifying the specificity of the meinongian realism. The theory of relations also grounds the Meinong’s view on the distinction between existential judgments and categorical judgments. His refusal of Twardowski’s representationalism, and his refusal of the Brentano-martyan view on the reducibility of the categorical judgments to existential ones, are internally connected with his thesis on assumptions and on “absistent” objects.