Ever since her participation in UN in 1971, the PRC has exercised 23 times of veto power on non-procedural matters of UN Security Council. This thesis not only introduces thoroughly the individual case of PRC using 23 times of veto power, but also purports to apprehend, in light of the national interest, the behavior of PRC exercising veto power in the UN Security Council.

The chief purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework which can contribute to a broader theoretical understanding of the actions of the U.N. Security Council and its members. The framework rests upon a rationalistic foundation and it is set up with two different models of explanation; a first with focus on power and security and the second which is an institutional explanation. The framework is then applied on a case study in which the behavior of theUnited Statesand theUnited Kingdomin the Security Council are explained. The outcome of the paper is worth mentioning that the member nations have find the Security Council to be an important institution and that there is an apprehension of the precedential power of the institution. The study also points out that a permanent member is more likely to use its veto when there are strong national reasons of so doing. In general the developed theoretical framework seems to be well appropriate to explain states behavior in the Security Council and may provide a foundation for further theoretical studies on the subject.

This study in political science examines the UN adopted resolution 1970 (2011) and resolution 1973 (2011) on the basis of foreign policy decision-making. The study aims to explain how the UN principle of Responsibility to Protect came to be legitimized for the first time by the UN Security Council in the Libya conflict in 2011. By a poliheuristic perspective the study attempt to explain Russia and China’s acting in the voting of resolution 1970 and resolution 1973. The background to the conflict in Libya 2011 is presented in the study as well as the Security Council’s actions during the conflict, from the beginning of the conflict until the adoption of resolution 1973. The study is based on an argument analysis to crystallize the most important arguments from Russia and China’s statements regarding resolution 1970 and resolution 1973. The results of the research shows that the adoption of resolution 1973 and therefore a military intervention in Libya in 2011 can be explained, from a poliheuristic perspective, primarily by the few political options and decision-making dimensions actors have to choose from when making decisions.

In the aftermath of the South African election, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2011, the country amongst other things, promised to pursue an African Agenda for Peace and Stability on the continent and in all regions of the world, especially in the Global South. This was coupled with the promise to promote the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations (UN) as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. These became fundamental foreign policy principles of how South Africa would behave in the Security Council. The UN Charter mandates the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Council. Scholars that have analysed the United Nations often argue that the Council’s decision-making process is driven by the interests of the five permanent members who possess veto power. Thus, it is widely believed that, members that have continuous membership and veto power not only affect the passage of resolutions but also prevent certain issues from entering the agenda through the threat of a veto. While veto-wielding member states can use the veto to bargain their positions, non-permanent members of the Council can have limited influence on the agenda due to the unequal distribution of power. The power-politics argument is widely discussed in the literature of the United Nations; however, limited systematic analytical research has been done to understand how countries other than big powers exercise their influence in the UN Security Council, despite lacking the right to veto power. To contribute to the understanding of the power-politics argument, ways in which emerging countries influence the agenda will be identified. This research report analyses whether and how South Africa delivered on the promise to pursue African interests during its tenure in the UNSC in 2011-2012. This study embarks on content analysis of selected South African interventions and reports regarding African issues in the UNSC. / Mini Dissertation (MDIPS)--University of Pretoria, 2018. / Political Sciences / MDIPS / Unrestricted

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The UN Security Council is the preeminent multilateral decision-making body and has the legal authority to initiate military interventions if it first determines a threat to international peace and security, including from civil wars or widespread state repression. While traditional norms of non-intervention and the politics of the Cold War curtailed the body’s ability to fulfil this role, evolving understandings and practices of sovereignty and security in the post-Cold War era have led to the apparent emergence of a new norm permitting ‘humanitarian intervention’ and an in principle acceptance that the body has a ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians residing inside the borders of their own state, including through military means. In this context, the thesis argues that the situation in Darfur, western Sudan, has represented a quintessential case for the Council to fulfil its ‘responsibility to protect’. According to a number of authoritative investigations, since 2003 the Sudanese government and government-allied Arab militias have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity on a widespread and systematic basis against Darfur’s non-Arab population. As a result, over 200,000 people died either directly from violence or indirectly from conflict-induced disease and malnutrition, while a further two million fled from their homes and villages in fear. A number of nonmilitary measures were attempted by the Council but failed to create adequate security on the ground. As such, there was a compelling legal-institutional, normative and moral case for the Council to coercively deploy a military intervention in Sudan to protect vulnerable civilians in Darfur. However, during the 2003-06 period of study, no such intervention was deployed. The thesis argues that intervention by the Council was precluded by the national interests of its permanent members, including a lucrative economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because of valuable Sudanese intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism operations in the region. The thesis concludes that the Council’s members chose to preserve these national interests at the expense of protecting civilians in Darfur.

During the past decade, a significant change in use of force norms took place within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The United Nations (UN) is founded on a collective security agreement, which gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force to protect UN member-states. The UN Charter explicitly provides the UNSC with a mandate to keep peace between states, not within them. In 2006, however, the UNSC unanimously adopted the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine, which expanded what I call the UNSC's circle of protection to include "human protection." Further, in exceptional circumstances, R2P gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force in a country without the consent of its government. Many UNSC members initially resisted institutionalizing R2P, especially those with contested territory and a history of foreign intervention, such as China. This dissertation attempts to explain how and why this change in use of force norms developed. I argue this macro-level change was principally due to two often overlooked factors: an epistemic community pushing the Council to become more empathetic and altruistic, and Council members wanting to gain social status. In order to adequately explain the development of R2P you must explain the significant role the epistemic community played. And to adequately explain the significance of the epistemic community you must explain the significant role empathy played. Further, to sufficiently explain the UNSC's decision to adopt R2P you must explain the significance of China's acceptance. And to sufficiently explain China's acceptance you must explain the significant role status-seeking played. Explanations for the adoption of R2P that do not acknowledge the significant role of empathy and social influence are incomplete and insufficient. Although others have argued emotion and social influence are important causal variables in international relations, few offer specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these factors work. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap. The implications are that empathy and status-seeking matter far more to international relations than many suggest.

Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization--and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so--led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations.

The thesis primarily aims to describe main events and a role of the United Nations in Iraq in 2002-2005. However, since broader knowledge in needed, the thesis also deals with historical events in Iraq and in the UN Security Council. Equally, it seeks to explain in a concise manner the specificities in Iraq that played or play an essential role. In the period after the American invasion in 2003 the thesis confront US expectations and plans with the reality on Iraqi soil and UN standpoints. In fact, the link through the whole thesis is the depiction of the relationship between the US and the Security Council and after the invasion also with UN Assistance mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Given the limited extent the thesis is concluded by the elections to the permanent Iraqi parliament in December 2005.

The diploma thesis "The KFOR mission in Kosovo: The NATO activity in Kosovo after the military intervention in 1999" has its aim in describing individual steps of the KFOR mission in Kosovo after 1999 and strives to analyze the achievements of this activity. How much effectiveness KFOR produced in pursuing the goal of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction? What were the achievements of the mission and when is it feasible to withdraw the mission from Kosovo? In addition, the thesis also analyzes the activity of other international missions in Kosovo and their cooperation with KFOR.