Global ETD Search

1	South Africaâs non-ratification of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), wisdom or folly, considering the effect of the status quo on international trade Matinyenya, Patience January 2011 (has links) <p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>
2	South Africaâs non-ratification of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), wisdom or folly, considering the effect of the status quo on international trade Matinyenya, Patience January 2011 (has links) <p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>
3	South frica’s non-ratification of the United Nations convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), wisdom or folly, considering the effect of the status quo on international trade Matinyenya, Patience January 2011 (has links) Magister Legum - LLM / The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa’s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity; uniformity must then be extended to its application and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG’s shortcomings, particularly regarding interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa’s membership of the WTO requires that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be needed in this regard. International commercial principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. / South Africa Non-ratification International sales contracts International trade Trade policy World Trade Organisation obligations Constitutional obligations Comparative lessons Alternatives to CISG
4	Changing from the silo model to the horizontal layers model in public policy regulations: the implications and potential for the telecommunications industry Spencer Logan, Lemuella C. 12 1900 (has links) The end of the Twentieth Century and the start of the Twenty First Century has been a tumultuous time for the Telecommunications Industry. Even as it moves forward to embrace the new technologies the Industry finds itself embroiled in issues of governance. The Industry finds itself in a dilemma since innovations increase at a rate faster than the laws can be changed and these render its existing laws and policies to be in some cases obsolete and inappropriate for the reality of the present. In the past, the United States of America has relied on vertically integrated top down laws and methods of regulating all the different parts in its Telecommunications Industry. These laws are contained in the different numbered Titles of this Countrys Legal Codes. Since the inception of these laws, emphasis was placed in creating and documenting policies structured by industry, sector and type of content. This form of regulation is usually referred to as the Silo Method. However, in recent years, especially in the regulation of the Telephony industry, the method of law and rule formulation moved from content regulation to one in which the technologies are getting regulated in what has been described as a Layers Method. This paper first considered whether the Silo Method of regulation is in actuality the same as using the Horizontal Layers method and showed that this is the case. Then it determined that Enhanced Services are the same as Basic Services and that Telecommunications Services are the same as Information services and showed that given that the pair sets as noted were the same, it went on to conclude that all these services were essentially the same. While studying to some detail the technologies of VoIP, the paper also showed that VoIP although an Internet technology is similar to traditional telephony, and is both a Telecommunications Service and Information Service based on the definition as given in the law as well as the technologies that are used and that as a result of this, the current regulatory environment for this service with regards to telephony is inconsistent. It concluded that Telecommunications policies though now adequate may need to be modified. Telecommunication/Internet Issues Telecommunications regulations Cable networks Cellular networks Common carriers Competitive carriers Computer inquiries Convergence Deregulation Digital networks FCC Federal Communications Commission Fiber optics Gatekeepers Gateways H.323 Horizontal Layers Model ICANN ILECs Information services Intelligent Network Architecture ISDN LAN LECs Loops LRN Call Flow MAN Network speed Networks NTIA OSI Model OSS Packet networks Packet switches Policies Protocols PSTN Networks PUCs Regulation SIP Spam SPY ACT Switched networks TC/IP Protocol Telecommunications Act of 1996 Telecommunications regulations Unbundled access UNCTAD UNICITRAL Vertical Silo Model VoIP VPN WAN Wireless Telecommunication Law and legislation Telecommunication Law and legislation

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