Submitted by Automa??o e Estat?stica (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2016-04-25T23:18:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CarmenSylviaAlvesDeVasconcelos_DISSERT.pdf: 1357187 bytes, checksum: 38a11f58bea2e31976a8b91e8261c9da (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-04-28T00:13:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 CarmenSylviaAlvesDeVasconcelos_DISSERT.pdf: 1357187 bytes, checksum: 38a11f58bea2e31976a8b91e8261c9da (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T00:13:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CarmenSylviaAlvesDeVasconcelos_DISSERT.pdf: 1357187 bytes, checksum: 38a11f58bea2e31976a8b91e8261c9da (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-26 / Esta disserta??o analisa a decis?o proferida pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro na A??o de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 132/RJ e na A??o Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4277/DF, que criou, no pa?s, a uni?o est?vel entre pessoas do mesmo sexo. Nessa decis?o, o STF interpretou conforme a Constitui??o o art. 1.723, do C?digo Civil, invocando v?rios direitos fundamentais positivados na Carta Maior. De todos esses direitos invocados pela Suprema Corte para basear a cria??o pretoriana, o conte?do do direito constitucional ? igualdade ? o ?nico que corresponde, e ? suficiente, para evidenciar a necessidade da cria??o pela via legislativa do referido instituto de direito civil, em raz?o da proibi??o constitucional de qualquer distin??o que n?o seja expressamente prevista na pr?pria Constitui??o (art. 3?, IV da CF). Nesse sentido, o art. 226, ? 3?, n?o se apresenta como exce??o capaz de atender a essa condi??o de previs?o constitucional, pois, embora proteja segundo seu teor t?o somente a uni?o est?vel ?entre o homem e a mulher?, n?o tem cond?o de proibir a cria??o pelo legislador de outros tipos de entidades familiares, incluindo a uni?o est?vel entre pessoas do mesmo sexo. No entanto, tal racioc?nio, embora leg?timo do ponto de vista do legislador, n?o sustenta a cria??o do instituto pela Corte Constitucional, a quem cabe aplicar o direito criado, interpretando-o nos limites permitidos pelo texto legal e de sua constitucionalidade. No caso da uni?o est?vel entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, n?o poderia a Corte deduzir que ela estivesse impl?cita na lei, como na interpreta??o conforme a Constitui??o que foi dada pelos julgadores, em raz?o dos limites sem?nticos das palavras homem e mulher, presentes em ambos os dispositivos. Tampouco poderia a Corte cri?-la, ultrapassando o papel constitucionalmente destinado ao Poder Judici?rio. Criando o instituto, o STF ultrapassou, pois, dois limites: o da interpreta??o e o da aplica??o do direito. / This dissertation analyses the Brazilian Supreme Court?s judgement in the Non-compliance Action of the Fundamental Precept 132/RJ and in the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 4277/DF, which created in the country the same-sex civil union. In This decision, the STF interpreted according to the constitution Article 1.723 of the Civil Code, invoking several fundamentals reaffirmed in the Constitution. From all these laws invoked by the Supreme Court to support the pretorian creation, the content of consitutional Law regarding equality is the only that corresponds, and it is sufficient to evidence the necessity of the creation, by legislator, of the institute for civil rights, since the Constitution forbids distinctions that is not expressly provided for in the Constitution (Art. 3?, IV, of Federal Constitution). In this way, Article 226, ? 3? is not an exception capable of satisfying the condition of the consitutional foresight because although it protect, according its content only the civil union ?between the man and the woman?, it is not able to forbid the creation, by legislator, of another kinds of families, including the same-sex civil union. As such, the reasoning, now legitimate according to the legislator, is not support the creation of institute by Constitutional Court, because the Court may enforce the Law, interpreting in the purviews allowed by the legal text and its constitutionality. In regard to the civil union of individuos of the same sex, the Court could not deduce that such union was implied by Law, like the interpretation according to the Constitution given by judges, on grounds of semantic purviews of the words man and woman, existents in both articles. The Court could not created it either, exceeding the legal system role. So, upon the institute creation, the STF, exceeded two limits: the interpretation and Law enforcement.