Characteristics of consumers who used unit pricing were compared to consumers who did not use unit pricing. A numerical rating was developed to aid the researcher in classifying consumers into to extreme groups, "usually" and "seldom". The sample consisted of 50 shoppers who usually and 50 shoppers who seldom used unit pricing. Data was collected at a local supermarket where unit pricing is provided. Of the variables tested, annual family income was not significant (.861); number of individuals shopped for was relatively significant (.283); and age of consumer (.028), occupation of consumer (.067), employment pattern of consumer (.031), education of consumer (.00014), occupation of spouse (.00001), and shopping frequency (.026) were significant.

The purpose of this research was to compile data from both the consumer and business sectors of the economy in an attempt to determine whether unit price information given to the consumer by a mandatory unit price bill would be justified .

Characteristics of consumers who used unit pricing were compared to consumers who did not use unit pricing. A numerical rating was developed to aid the researcher in classifying consumers into two extreme groups, "usually" and "seldom." The sample consisted of 50 shoppers who usually and 50 shoppers who seldom used unit pricing. Data was collected at a local supermarket where unit pricing is provided. Of the variables tested, annual family income was not significant (.861)r number of individuals shopped for was relatively significant (.283)r and age of consumer (.028), occupation of consumer (.067), employment pattern of consumer (.031), education of consumer (.00014), occupation of spouse (.00001), and shopping frequency (.026) were significant.

Numerical information is ubiquitous in modern life. The prevalence of numerical information in the marketplace necessitates understanding how consumers handle and interpret that information, for both theoretical and practical reasons. Past research has largely focused on consumers’ encoding of numbers, calculative limitations, and usage of heuristics. This dissertation will contribute to this burgeoning literature in several ways. First, I identify a general tendency in how consumers calculate ratios based on an intuitive model of division. Specifically, consumers tend to divide larger numbers by smaller numbers. The intuitive model of division has marketing implications for both consumers’ evaluations of quantity offers and sensitivities to promotions. Next, I examine how consumers draw inferences from distributional information. In contrast to the assumption that consumers utilize means to assess central tendency, I demonstrate that consumers use the modal response to judge what is typical, with implications for consumers’ inferences about product ratings and other social distributions. / PHD / Numerical information is ubiquitous in modern life. The prevalence of numerical information in the marketplace necessitates understanding how consumers handle and interpret that information, for both theoretical and practical reasons. Past research has largely focused on how consumers’ mentally perceive numbers, how difficult it is to engage in calculation, and usage of mental shortcuts. This dissertation will contribute to this burgeoning literature in several ways. First, I identify a general tendency in how consumers calculate ratios based on an intuitive model of division. Specifically, consumers tend to divide larger numbers by smaller numbers. The intuitive model of division has marketing implications for both consumers’ evaluations of quantity offers and sensitivities to promotions. Next, I examine how consumers draw inferences from distributional information. In contrast to the assumption that consumers utilize means to assess central tendency, I demonstrate that consumers use the modal response to judge what is typical, with implications for consumers’ inferences about product ratings and other social distributions.

Cette thèse étudie l’efficacité de deux instruments relatifs à la gestion des déchets ménagers : la tarification incitative et la responsabilité élargie des producteurs. Dans un premier temps, nous analysons l’efficacité de ces deux instruments à l’aide d’un modèle d’équilibre général. Dans ce modèle, tous les marchés représentés sont concurrentiels mais l’élimination des déchets génère un dommage environnemental qui est la source d’externalités. Dans le cas d’une tarification incitative comme d’une responsabilité élargie des producteurs, une politique optimale implique une tarification au coût marginal social d’élimination des déchets. Pour internaliser le coût du dommage environnemental, une taxe sur le stockage semble l’instrument le plus efficace. Dans un second temps, nous analysons l’efficacité d’une tarification au coût marginal social de gestion des déchets en supposant que le marché du bien n’est pas concurrentiel. Nous représentons ce marché par un duopole avec une différenciation verticale des biens. Chaque producteur produit une qualité différente d’un même bien et les consommateurs ont des préférences différentes pour la qualité. Dans le cas d’une responsabilité élargie des producteurs, une tarification au coût marginal social de gestion des déchets ne décentralise pas l’optimum social. Une politique optimale suppose de moduler le coût supporté par les producteurs en fonction des préférences des consommateurs pour la qualité. / This thesis examines the effectiveness of two instruments for the management of household waste : unit-pricing systems and extended producer responsibility. In a first step, we analyze the effectiveness of these two instruments using a general equilibrium model. In this model, all markets are competitive but waste disposal generates environmental damage which is the source of externalities. In the case of a unit-pricing systems as an extended producer responsibility, optimal pricing policy involves a marginal social cost of waste disposal. To internalize the cost of environmental damage, a landfill tax seems the most effective tool. In a second step, we analyze the effectiveness of social marginal cost pricing of waste management by assuming that the final market is not competitive. We represent this market by a duopoly with vertical product differentiation. Each firm produces a different quality of the same good, and consumers have different preferences for quality. In the case of an extended producer responsibility, the social marginal cost pricing of waste management does not decentralize the social optimum. An optimal policy involves the modulation of the cost that is borne by producers based on consumer preferences for quality.