Texte remanié de: Th. Ph. D.--University of Leiden, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 343-358. Index.

This study, using the theoretical basis of the writings of Lenin and Gramsci on revolutionary theory and praxis, traces the formation, policy and aims, membership and structure, and practices of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and selected affiliate organisations during the period 1983-1987. The central problem investigated is the relation between revolutionary theory and praxis and the aims, policies and practices of the UDF and its affiliates. More particularly, in what respects does the formation of the UDF and revolutionary developments thereafter meet the strategic and tactical requirements of Lenin and Gramsci's theories of revolutionary strategy? It is argued that the formation of the UDF, and revolutionary developments during the period of review, conformed to the strategic and tactical requirements of a Leninist-Gramscian model of revolutionary praxis in the following way: the general drive to establish mass-based community organisations (increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass organisations); the formation of the UDF in August 1983 (creating a historical bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc during the phase of democratic struggle); and the development and spread of a common national political culture based on resistance to apartheid (expanding the revolutionary consciousness of the masses). During the period under review, the UDF-Ied opposition to apartheid resulted in the organisational and ideological penetration of the Front into almost every major sector of black civil society. The major forces behind the increasing political and ideological leadership of the UDF were the affiliated civic associations, trade unions, student/youth and women's organisations. These organisations played a central role in mass mobilisation and organisation and the spread of revolutionary consciousness throughout black civil society. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1998.

ABSTRACT This thesis investigates political violence between the United Democratic Front and Inkatha in Mpumalanga township, Natal. In the early 1980s and early 1990s Mpumalanga was one of Natal’s townships most gravely affected by political violence. I ask and answer four questions: 1. Why and how did the conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent? 2. What forms did the violence take? 3. Why, as a result of the violence did ordinary people with little prior history of political activity come to identify with either the UDF or Inkatha? 4. How were these political identities produced? In order to answer these questions the thesis explores three primary arguments. The first argument is that 1987 represents a severe rupture in the politics of Natal. This rupture is captured in the violent form of political conflict that gripped the province. To understand this rupture the thesis looks back at a complex set of processes that interlocked over space and time. A second major argument of the thesis is that an aspect of the distinctiveness of the violence was its profoundly spatialised form in combination with gendered and generational forms. There were two major shifts in the spatialised form of the violence. The first shift occurred when instead of only attacking individuals, the household and its members also became targets. And then the second shift was when the purpose of the violence was about the pursuit of territory. Boundaries between territories identified who was ‘in’ and who was ‘out’ and all aspects of everyday life became politicised. The third major argument of the thesis is that there was a strong relationship between space/place and political identity. The re-territorialisation of space - iv - during the violence was central to the production of these new identities. Political violence created new spatialities, with space itself acquiring political meaning and identity. The political meanings of these spaces were intense markers of their identity and overrode all other meanings and identities. As the spatial form of the violence shifted it forced people to question their political identities. The lived experience of the politicisation of everyday life by the violence shaped the production of political identities.

The political violence and vigilante activities that characterised Natal and Zululand between 1985 and 1996 had numerous causes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 contributed to the rise of vigilantism and political violence. The formation of the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 1985 compounded this situation. Both these movements were known to be sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), which was still banned at the time of their formation; hence they had similar objectives to the ANC. During this time, Inkatha was the only strong Black political movement in the country, and particularly in Natal and Zululand. The Inkatha movement and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi regarded the formation of the UDF and COSATU in 1985 as a challenge to the hegemony of Inkatha in the region, following his fall-out with the ANC leadership in exile. Local leadership of political movements, namely, UDF and COSATU on one hand and Inkatha on the other, mobilised their support-base and took arms against each other. The lifting of the State of Emergency in 1986 intensified political violence and vigilante activities in the region. The Natal Midlands’ violence saw a high number of deaths and causalities. Local communities as well such as Vulindlela suffered a great deal. Clan faction fights were characteristic of KwaShange in the period 1940s-1970s, but from the late 1980s onwards (especially 1987) political unrest and struggle against the Nationalist apartheid regime changed into conflict between Inkatha and the UDF, which gradually worsened into civil war. In the course of my previous studies in KwaShange I discovered that the violence had impacted upon families and inter-generational relationships. According to some senior residents’ thinking, a number of youths were ill disciplined. Issues of disciplining of youths had obscured the political struggle and violence, making it hard to disentangle them. When researching memories of the violence, I found that persons spoke of different incidents within this struggle period and described their violent nature and how it had impacted on families’ survival, both psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying that it was hard to forget the memories engendered by their horrific experiences. The South African Government was accused of secretly provoking acts of violence in Natal and Zululand and was furthermore accused of having sent IFP troops to the Caprivi in Namibia for training in guerrilla combat. The Government later acknowledged this, explaining that the Natal Legislature needed specially trained forces for its officials. The unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 saw KwaZulu- Natal entering a new phase of random vigilante activities and violence. The security forces (the South African Police and the South African Defence Force) were accused of supporting IFP vigilantes. All this led to the “Seven Days War” in 1990 in the Midlands, particularly in KwaVulindlela. In KwaShange this violence, from 1986 until 1996, created divisions in families and the community. Many people lost their lives. All efforts to put an end to the violence and vigilantism failed. The announcement that the first democratic election in South Africa was to be held in 1994 triggered more violence in Vulindlela. Exhaustion in the area, and a national climate which promoted peace were elements which eventually brought the conflict to an end. Socially and economically, the area is still experiencing problems. Survivors and generations born during and after the turmoil talk about endless psychological and emotional suffering born during this turmoil. My contention is that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across generations, through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these people and their families were affected for a long time, and many are still traumatised. The social structure of the community has been affected by it and by implication that of successive generations will also be affected. This study describes and analyses political violence in KwaShange and investigates how it is remembered by the survivors. It also attempts to answer the question of how communities, families and individuals survived these traumatic experiences, how they coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and fifteen years after the end of violence. By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, I hope to determine what was in play in the province, and find a common pattern underlying the dynamics of the conflicts. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the present, been confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that were a response to the struggle against the apartheid regime. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

D.Litt. et Phil. / Non-violent mass-based protest and resistance by liberation groups have a long history in the South African context. Prior to the 1980s, they had achieved only minor and isolated successes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and its successful mass protest action against the state to 1990, changed the equation, however. The UDF's origin could indirectly be traced back to attempts from the 1950s to launch mass-based protest and resistance against the apartheid state. Calls for the formation of a united front against the South African State were made by various persons and organisations since the 1950s, but it was only by the 1980s that circumstances allowed the formation of a united front. Demographic realities, urbanisation, the legalisation of black trade unions, an educated leadership, the growth of a grassroots-based civil society among blacks, all contributed to make the formation of the UDF a reality. Protest against the government's tricameral system, initially provided the direct stimulus for the formation of the UDF during 1983 to 1984. By the end of 1984, the UDF had built up a wide support base to directly threaten the government's position. The result was several states of emergency through which the state endeavoured to crush the UDF-led opposition. The UDF's unique structure, which consisted of affiliates from all sectors of civil society, including black trade unions as an alliance partner, managed to survive the state's repressive measures, continued to pressurise the state so that by 1989, under a new head-of-state, the National Party "capitulated" and opened the door to real elections for a democratic South Africa. The UDF's strategies were aimed to mobilise the masses and through its mass-based action, bring maximum pressure to bear on the government. This strategic approach was executed by employing various tactics, which related to the classic methods of mass-based non-violent action. In the end, the state's security apparatus proved unable to cope with the UDF's relentless actions, offset by its inability to act effectively against the UDF as an entity, mainly because of its amorphous structure. Although other factors, such as economic recession, foreign sanctions, the ANC campaign to isolate South Africa, among other played a role, the UDF provided the crucial domestic impetus to illustrate to the South African government, that black resistance couldn't be suppressed and that the situation would continue to worsen. Seen against this background, it is unlikely that CODESA would have occurred as soon as it did without the activities of the UDF throughout the 1980s.

The field of political violence is introduced with an overview of anti-State political violence in South Africa between 1 January 1977 and 21 July 1985. Incidents of political violence in that period were classified into one of three categories, each of which reflects different sources of political violence. Subsequently, the research analysed what is referred to 'spontaneous' collective violence in two of Durban's townships Lamont and KwaMashu. The theoretical framework for the analysis of this type of behaviour is provided by T.R. Gurr using the formula: MPV = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) where MPV is the magnitude of political violence; RD is discontent; JUST is the justifications for engaging in violence; and BALANCE is the ratio of support for, and coercive capacity of, dissidents vis-a-vis the State. The weight of each variable (RD, JUST and BALANCE) was assessed in Lamont and KwaMashu through interviews with 25 group leaders from both townships and by various inferential techniques. While discontent was found to be universal in both townships, the justifications for engaging in violence as a strategy to alleviate that discontent and alter existing power relations were found to be a function of ideology. For the purposes of this research two ideological classifications were employed: 'reactionaries' (those organisations operating within government created institutions, including bantustans, e.g. Inkatha); and 'progressives' (those organisations operating outside government created institutions and which are popularly labelled the Left e.g. the United Democratic Front). In Durban there is a specific spatial distribution of ideology which has resulted in support for, and the coercive capacity of, reactionaries' being greatest in bantustan townships ' (e.g. KwaMashu), while among 'progressives' support and coercive capacity are highest in townships in 'white' South Africa (e.g. Lamont). The distribution of ideology has its origins in historical forces which are discussed in detail. The question to be answered thus remains at what point does political violence reach a crescendo? This question was answered by identifying the issues precipitating political violence in Lamont and KwaMashu and then analysing specific incidents. Frequently, the most intense collective violence erupted when resistance to State hegemony was interpreted by the State, or its proxies, as challenging the existing status quo. In Lamont the State has directly intervened to crush resistance through the use of its security forces while in KwaMashu Inkatha vigilantes have acted as proxies for the State. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1987.

This study focused on the ‘silence of the prophets’ in the post-apartheid era. It sought to understand why the prophets, who spoke out so vehemently against the injustices of apartheid, did not speak out against the injustices of the government after 1994 even when it became blatantly apparent that corruption was beginning to unfold on various levels, especially with the introduction of the so-called Arms Deal. Accordingly, the study singles out Drs Allan Boesak and Frank Chikane who were among the fiercest opponents of the apartheid regime before 1994. The study traced the impact of the ideological forces that influenced Boesak and Chikane’s ideological thinking from the early Slave Religion, Black Theology in the USA and Liberation Theology in Latin America. Black Theology and Black Consciousness first made their appearance in South Africa in the 1970s, with Boesak and Chikane, among others, as early advocates of these movements. In 1983, Boesak and Chikane took part in the launch of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Mitchells Plain, Cape Town. This movement became the voice of the voiceless in an era when the members of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) had been sent into exile. It also signalled a more inclusive and reconciliatory shift in Boesak and Chikane’s Ideological thinking. Whereas Black Consciousness sought to exclude white people from participating in the struggle for liberation, the UDF united all under one banner without consideration for colour, race, religion or creed. After the advent of liberation in South Africa in 1994, it became increasingly obvious that corruption was infiltrating many levels of the new government. But the prophets were silent. Why were they silent? The study presents an analysis of the possible reasons for this silence based on interviews with Boesak and Chikane as role players and draws conclusions based on their writings both before and after 1994. Overall, the study concluded that they were silent because they had become part of the new political structures that had taken over power. To sum up, the study demonstrates the irony of prophetic oscillation and concludes that no prophet is a prophet for all times. Thus, as a new democracy unfolds in South Africa, the situation demands new prophets with a new message. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Phil. (Theology)