Do domestic variables matter in a context of bilateral cooperation? What factors positively influence the decision-making process in the case of a policy harmonization between two countries? By studying both countries' institutional differences and governmental and non-governmental actors' preferences in the energy sector, this research analyzes the bilateral cooperation between Canada and the United States regarding the creation of the Electric Reliability Organization. Although domestic institutional constraints are important to consider, I argue that both physical and economic market integration and the use of a non-governmental organization by central governments have facilitated the success of the cooperation process. Those factors have favored the convergence of decisional actors' preferences and the inclusion of the majority of actors from all sectors of the industry into the process. The analysis uses a sequential model implying the division decision-making process over foreign policy into specific stages to show the importance of domestic variables. / Key words: Governmental cooperation, bilateral relations, actors' preferences, institution, energy sector, electricity, transmission network, reliability standards, market integration, restructured electricity market.

This thesis is an attempt to examine Anglo-American relations at the end of World War One, when Great Britain was no longer preeminent in world affairs and the United States was as yet unwilling to continue the responsibilities that it had taken during the war. Lloyd George who sought to keep the threads of power in his hands appointed Auckland Geddes as Ambassador to the United States, a man who was personally loyal to him, thus seeking to bypass Lord Curzon's authority as Foreign Secretary. Matters were complicated by the declining influence of President Wilson and the growth of isolationist sentiment in the United States. The advent of the Harding administration created further difficulties as Harding felt compelled to yield to the influence of public opinion which rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. / Various issues had to be resolved, the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the war debt, differences over the mandate of Yap, and the question of oil from the Middle East. Here the dealings of Anglo-American relations during Curzon's tenure at the Foreign Office are examined. Curzon took a conventional approach to Anglo-American negotiations. While Great Britain struggled to improve conditions with the United States, the outcome was nothing like the special relationship that manifested itself after 1945. Curzon's conventional view of foreign policy clashed with Lloyd George's essentially personal approach to foreign affairs. Geddes who was intended to be the Prime Minister's confidential agent proved, except on the question of the war debt, inadequate to the task.

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Research on Japanese current foreign policy suffers from neglect of the influence of domestic factors on Japan's decisions and behaviour in world politics. The question of the nature of Japanese foreign policy needs to go beyond the exogenous cause of state behaviour in international affairs. The object of inquiry of this thesis is the influence of social factors on the orientation of Japan's foreign policy. The central concern is: "how" and "why" Japan behaves as it does in world affairs. This examination addresses the question of the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors on the foreign economic policy of Japan, and postulates that Japanese national identity, national interests, and role conceptions, are the essence of Japan's defensive attitudes in world affairs on the one hand, and that Japanese behavioural patterns in international relations are in conformity with the ends of Japan's foreign policy: economic security and growth under the Japan-US alliance. Japanese response to US pressure and trade adjustment to the changing framework of the world economy from the 1980s up to the present give a relevant outlook to the defensive character of Japan's foreign policy. For Japanese policy-makers, the stability of Japan's economic performance in the world economy, its pacifist attitude in world affairs, its trade relations with the United States, and its protectorate status as a result of the Japan-US Security Treaty, are beyond question.

Following the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 Danish representatives were left to their own devices and their positions in their respective host-countries became very much dependent upon the goodwill shown to them by their host-governments and, in the case of the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, the governments and officials of the occupying forces. With their connections with the Government in Copenhagen severed the main task of the Danish representatives was to secure Danish interests in the North Atlantic Territories as well as elsewhere. The fact that Denmark had not put up a fight to defend her neutrality and the subsequent collaboration of the Danish Government with the German occupiers counted against the Danish representatives abroad. However, the Danes were able to exercise a remarkable level of influence on the British and Americans with regard to their policies towards the North Atlantic Area. The extent of influence was mainly due to the entrepreneurship of each individual, the constitutional status of the territory as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and also due to strategic importance attached by the occupying forces' governments to the occupied territories in question. This latter point became especially apparent in the power struggle amongst the Danish representatives that emerged from the lack of a Danish Government in exile. It became important to the British and the Americans that it was the Danish representative in their country, who emerged as the victor of this power struggle, because that would help to secure their future interests in the North Atlantic territories. The Danish representatives were thus in some cases shown more goodwill and attention than their Norwegian colleagues, although the Norwegians had put up a brave fight against the Germans and had joined the allied side. The North Atlantic area proved very important to the general war policy of the British and Americans during Second World War. British policies were much dependent upon the Americans and Greenland and Iceland became instrumental in the increased involvement of the Americans in the war.

The advent of prohibition in America in the early 1920's brought on wide-spread smuggling activity along the Canadian and Mexican borders as well as along the Atlantic coastline. Since many of the smuggling vessels sought protection from American authorities by foreign registry, the State Department initiated efforts to enable American officials to enforce prohibition without interfering with legitimate commerce. Washington concluded compromise agreements with fifteen countries that provided for American enforcement measures and suitable liquor cargo arrangements for the other signatory nations. The liquor conventions were not a final solution to the smuggling problem but they did provide for better enforcement. The agreements reinforced existing principles and represented an attempt to eliminate possible sources of friction on the international level arising out of American prohibition enforcement.

Based on the appropriate archival collections, official documents, and various published materials, this dissertation is an investigation of American diplomacy in Korea from 1945 to 1953. Between the end of World War II and the close of the Korean fighting, the United States moved from a limited interest in Korea to a substantial involvement in that nation's affairs.

This thesis contends from the time of September 1940 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan offered each no workable concessions that might have deterred war. A stalemate was finally established between the two countries. The position of the Japanese nation was to expand and control "Greater East-Asia," while the position the United States held was one that claimed all nations should uphold certain basic principles of democracy, that all nations should honor the sanctity of treaties," and that they should treat neighboring countries in a friendly fashion. This thesis also contends that Yosuke Matsuoka used his position as Foreign Minister of Japan to determine policy for the entire nation. Matsuoka led Japan in such a way that a settlement of differences between the United States and his country was not attainable through diplomatic talks. Even after Matsuoka had been removed from his position, the Supreme Command was determined to prepare for war and at the same time carry on diplomatic discussions with the United States. The only possible way that war could have been avoided was if one of the two nations had been willing to break the stalemate by giving in to the demands of the other. Neither was willing to compromise.

This study is an attempt to combine the disciplines of Asian history and United States diplomatic history in analyzing the 1871 Korean-American Incident. The Incident revolves around the Low-Rodgers expedition to Korea, and the subsequent breakdown of peaceful negotiations into a military clash of arms. To describe the Incident as merely another example of American "imperialism,'' or as a result of narrow-minded Korean isolationism, is to oversimplify its causes and miss the larger implications that can be learned from it. A basic premise of this paper is that the 1871 Incident is an example of East-West cultural conflict. As such, the forces that helped to determine the attitudes and behavior of both the Americans and Koreans were of a broad nature reflecting their respective cultural differences. At times, these differences were so basic and general that the specialist in history can easily overlook them. To better understand this conflict of cultures, Chapters II and III discuss elements of Korean and American diplomacy before the 1860’s, and how their unique experiences led to widely different attitudes toward foreign relations. Chapter II concentrates on traditional Chinese-Korean relations, and their effect upon Korea's approach to diplomacy; Chapter III emphasizes the nature of America's first contacts with East Asia and the important influence of the activities of the United States in the Mediterranean region. Chapters IV and V deal with domestic politics in Korea and the United States, and how these internal conditions affected each nation's attitude toward the other. Chapter VI is a detailed description of the immediate events that culminated in the 1871 Incident. Chapters I and VII are the introduction and conclusion. In researching this paper, government documents, memoirs, diaries, personal accounts, contemporary newspapers, books, and articles were all used. When writing the chapters that deal primarily with Korea, Korean sources have been used as much as possible. The Korean and American officials, though communicating in the same language (Chinese characters), were negotiating from completely different cultural norms. Both sides felt that their positions and actions were morally justified. In studying the official documents concerning the Incident, the reader is indeed impressed by the sincerity and honesty of all parties involved. In this sense, it is difficult to label one group "guilty" and the other group "innocent." It must be remembered, however, that the Americans were carrying out naval activities in Korean waters, and not the Koreans in American waters. The student of history is reminded that American-East Asian relations, unlike most American-European relations, must constantly confront and overcome wide cultural differences. To ignore these differences, or to impose one's own cultural views on another society, is to invite misunderstanding, raise suspicions, and increase the possibility of conflict.

Throughout the period of the American Revolution, Great Britain pursued a policy of reconciliation and reunion toward its North American colonies. While this was but one of the several policy alternatives open to British leadership, it was always an element of British strategy toward the colonies from 1775 to 1783. This thesis follows the evolution of reconciliation and reunion in the final days of crisis in 1774-1775. It seeks to define its development during the war itself, and especially during the abortive American Peace Commission of 1778. By tracing this policy from its emergence through to the peacemaking in 1782-1783, it shows its growth and analyzes its strengths and weaknesses as a coherent whole rather than considering it in relation to particular events. This provides an understanding of why reconciliation and reunion had become the dominant and controlling policy toward America at the time of the Anglo-American negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris.