This thesis has three main objectives in examining the Slave Trade Question, an aspect of British-American diplomacy from 1840-1862: (1)to give a balanced treatment to both issues,(2) show their relationship to other foreign and domestic problems of the early Victorian Era, and (3) to present new material and views.

This study focuses on the reaction in the United States to Jay's Treaty, 1794-96. Though crucial in the development of American diplomacy, the treaty's greatest impact was on the domestic politics of the young nation. The most important sources were the correspondence of the participants. Other materials include newspapers, diaries, government documents, and secondary sources. The thesis argues that the treaty was in the best interests of the United States, and the nation was fortunate to be led at this time by the Federalist party.

This dissertation argues that John Quincy Adams’s American identity and views on the United States’ nation building process in the early republic were directly influenced by Great Britain’s politics and culture over his lengthy public service career. From this argument, this project inverts historiographical trends that tend to treat Adams as a footnote to the rise of Jacksonian Democracy or focus on his late career battles against slavery in the House of Representatives. Instead of these limiting approaches, I examine Adams’s complicated relationship with Britain by unpacking the distinct periods when he lived in London from the 1783 to 1817. Over six chapters, I focus on his three stays in London in the 1780s, diplomatic missions of varying lengths from 1794 to 1797, and his two years as ambassador in Britain from 1815-1817. I reveal how Adams, with unquestionable ties to the American Revolution through his parents John and Abigail, navigated a paradoxical relationship with Britain as a prominent public figure in the United States. He both engaged with and admired Britain’s relative stability, social life, and spectrum of reforming ideas while remaining wary of its diplomacy and perceived corrupting influences. Given Adams’s career longevity, he can be viewed as a central link between the American Revolution and the Civil War and, by proxy, both his and his nation’s complicated uncoupling from Britain as he served his nation nearly continuously from 1781 to 1848. This dissertation argues that even after the United States declared its independence from Britain, Adams’s worldview continued to be shaped by his travels to Britain, marriage to an Englishwoman, and consumption of British culture. They ensured his life-long, inextricable ties to Great Britain and are valuable lenses to illustrate America’s nation building into the 1840s from a biographical perspective. In constructing these arguments, my research draws primarily from Adams’s voluminous personal papers, namely his 14,000-page diary. These sources are contextualized by underutilized British sources on Adams from the Public Record and Foreign Offices in addition to personal papers from his British associates. / 2025-11-30T00:00:00Z

Based on the appropriate archival collections, official documents, and various published materials, this dissertation is an investigation of American diplomacy in Korea from 1945 to 1953. Between the end of World War II and the close of the Korean fighting, the United States moved from a limited interest in Korea to a substantial involvement in that nation's affairs.

Submitted by ANTONIO NEGRO (negro@ufba.br) on 2016-04-08T19:24:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010 LHSS.pdf: 1317428 bytes, checksum: c5385012d970c6de5d516156b0ebd04d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Oliveira Santos Dilzaná (dilznana@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-04-13T13:41:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010 LHSS.pdf: 1317428 bytes, checksum: c5385012d970c6de5d516156b0ebd04d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-13T13:41:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010 LHSS.pdf: 1317428 bytes, checksum: c5385012d970c6de5d516156b0ebd04d (MD5) / CAPES / Este trabalho tem por objetivo discutir as opiniões emitidas pelos diplomatas estadunidenses no período que precede a revolução de 1930, durante o movimento e no pós-revolução. Os olhares dos cônsules e do embaixador dos Estados Unidos no Brasil identificavam as tensões entre os grupos sociais brasileiros e o que eles esperavam que fosse feito pelo governo do Brasil a fim de garantir a estabilidade governamental. Os julgamentos dos estadunidenses estavam cheios de preconceitos em relação às classes subalternas, aos negros no Brasil. Não raro eles consideravam o fato de o país ter passado por um processo de miscigenação como a causa das mazelas que afligiam a sociedade brasileira. A partir desses olhares eles desejavam que Getúlio Vargas e seus interventores tomassem medidas no sentido de educar a população a fim de minimizar as insatisfações populares, prevenindo assim as influências dos comunistas, aos quais percebiam como grande ameaça ao país. Nesse processo de acompanhar o cotidiano da política brasileira, alguns diplomatas passarão a defender a permanência do governo provisório até que fossem eliminadas todas as estruturas montadas pelos antigos chefes do poder. Já outros advogarão ardorosamente o retorno do governo constitucional como forma de dar estabilidade aos governantes e diminuir a influência dos tenentes nos estados. This work aims at discussing assessments by US diplomatic officials on Brazil, before the 1930 Revolution, during the movement and after it. Consuls’ and Ambassadors’ regards pointed out tensions existing among Brazilian social groups, as well as the steps they expected to be taken by Brazilian Government in order to assure governmental stability. Those assessments were plenty of prejudice against Brazilian subaltern classes and Blacks. Not seldom they assumed the fact that the country had gone through a process of racial mixtures was the cause to the harshnesses which afflicted Brazilian society. Following from these regards US diplomatic officials wished that Getúlio Vargas and his federally-appointed state governors would engage in educating the country population in order to ease popular dissatisfactions, preventing thereby influences by the Communists, who were perceived as a huge threat to Brazil. In the process of observing the daily working of Brazilian politics, some officials would start to back keeping the provisional government in charge until all power structures put in place by the old prower brokers were swept out. Others would strongly favor the return of a constitutional government as the way of conveying stability to the rule of political incumbents and of undermining the influence held by the “tenentes” in Brazilian states.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer” os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer" os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.