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Soldiers in the Unites States Army operate under uniquely demanding conditions with increasingly high performance expectations. Modern missions, including counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, are complex operations. The Army expects this complexity to continue to increase. These conditions affect Soldier performance in combat. Despite spending billions of dollars to provide Soldiers with better equipment to meet the demands of the modern battlefield, the U.S. Army has dedicated comparatively little resources to measuring and improving individual Soldier performance in real-time. As a result, the Army does not objectively measure a Soldier’s performance at any point in their active duty career. The objective of this report is to demonstrate the utility and feasibility of monitoring Soldier performance in real-time by means of visual 3D performance maps supported by a Bayesian network model of Soldier performance. This work draws on techniques developed at the University of Texas’ Robotics Research Group for increasing performance in electro-mechanical systems. Humans and electro-mechanical systems are both complex and demonstrate non-linear performance trends which are often ignored by simplified analytical models. Therefore, application of empirical Bayesian models with visual presentation of data in 3D performance maps enables rapid understanding of important performance parameters for a specific Soldier. The performance maps can easily portray areas of non-linear performance that should be avoided or exploited, while presenting levels of uncertainty regarding the assessments, thus empowering the individual to make informed decisions regarding control and allocation of resources. The present work demonstrates the utility of visual performance maps by structuring 19 relatively mature 3D performance maps based on published empirical research data and analytical models related to human performance. Based on a broad review of the literature, the present research evaluated 10 potential physiological indicators, termed biomarkers that correlate with human responses to a select set of stressors, referred to as impact parameters. The 10 evaluated impact parameters affect various components of Soldier performance. The present research evaluated the documentation of these relationships in the existing literature with regard to 9 general Soldier performance measures. Identifying the research supported relationships from biomarkers to impact parameters to Soldier performance measures resulted in a preliminary Bayesian Soldier Performance Model, from which it is possible to create 70 distinct 3D performance maps. Based on the quality of the relationships identified in the reviewed literature, and a contemporary evaluation of existing sensor technology for the related biomarkers, the present research assessed 26 of the potential 70 performance maps as being achievable in the near-term. Continuing development of the Soldier Performance Model (SPM) as proposed in this report has the potential to increase Soldier performance while simultaneously improving Soldier well-being, reducing risk of physical and mental injury, and reducing downstream treatment cost. / text

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This work examines what constituted 19th century American military science, why it was framed within government policy and taught within the United States Military Academy, and how it became the early American way of war. The work uses as evidence a wide array of documents including biographical records of 2046 West Point graduates. It tracks the evolution of military science from Enlightenment Europe to the United States during the American Revolution and its relative obscurity until after the War of 1812. It then explains why a deliberate decision was made to transplant a French Napoleonic version of military science to serve as the curriculum of the military academy and to support the formulation of a national defense policy that called for militarized coastal frontiers and an “expansible army.” The work then follows how and why military science was modified during the period 1820-1860 in response to changes to the threats to the United States, changes related to state and federal plans for “internal improvements,” Indian wars, westward expansion, war with Mexico, and advances in military technology. Specifically it tracks how the doctrine of military science evolved from the teaching of specific Napoleonic applications to embrace subjects needed for war in North America. Inculcation in this American military science eventually came to provide the army with an officer corps that shared a common all-arms doctrine and common skill in using mathematics for military problem-solving. The majority of long-service graduates went on to spend years of their career fulfilling general staff, engineering, or academy instructor functions. The proliferation of military science through their work, and through published texts available to state volunteers, ensured that on the eve of the Civil War there existed a distinctly American, and scientific, way of war. This work challenges two late 20th century liberal arts revisionist schools, championed by Samuel Huntington and Russell Weigley, that have unfairly reduced military science to near oblivion. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2012-05-28 10:47:55.375

Past research has shown that members of the military have less favorable beliefs regarding mental health services. To date, no known research has been conducted examining the beliefs about psychological services of students enrolled in ROTC. 136 undergraduate students participated in a study in which the beliefs about psychological services of students in a ROTC program were compared with students in the general college population. Participants completed the Beliefs About Psychological Services (BAPS) scale online. This scale consisted of three subscales that were analyzed independently; Expertness, Stigma Tolerance, and Intent. Results showed that the main effect of ROTC participation on all three subscales of BAPS was significant at the p ≤ 0.005 level. These results suggested that students enrolled in ROTC may have less favorable beliefs about psychological services than students in the general college population. Limitations of the study were discussed and directions for future research include: replication of the findings of this study, the use of a larger and more diverse sample, and the development of methods to improve ROTC students beliefs about psychological services in order to increase the chances of these individuals seeking necessary mental health treatment. / Department of Counseling Psychology and Guidance Services

The study reviews how self-paced training programs were developed by the U.S. Army for Initial Entry Training (IET), and conducted at the various service schools. In early 1975, after a long validation effort, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published guidance to the service schools and training centers to begin self-paced training. Most service schools sought to follow this guidance in one form or another which demanded a job analysis, systematic development, and tryouts on typical soldiers. Through the years 1975-78, the service schools worked diligently to develop, evaluate and implement self-paced instruction in most of the job specialties of the U.S Army. Around 1978, complaints from field units began to find their way to the Department of the Army and TRADOC. The units complained that they were receiving too many unqualified soldiers from the advanced individual training courses. In response to these complaints, an in depth study was conducted at many of the schools and training centers. As a result of this study, in June 1983, the TRADOC Commander of TRADOC directed the service schools to move from their self-pace efforts toward group-pace.Contributing factors that caused the U.S Army to move away from self-paced instruction were: inherent lack of reenforcement training for the students in skills they had learned in basic training (soldierization skills); students entering the U.S. Army had poor reading skills, lack of motivation, and little formal education; there were problems in scheduling students through the school's "pipeline" and on to their first unit of assignment; and a shortage of properly trained developers and instructors.The U.S. Army's decision to introduce self-paced instruction, although not successful, was not wasted time and resources. It laid out a course that has led to group-paced instruction. The victory, called "Desert Storm", has proven the United States has been very successful with its training stratagem and has a well trained military force.This study was prepared as a historiography, and as such, recorded events as they occurred along a time continuum, and analyzed, correlated, and drew conclusions from those events.3 / Department of Educational Leadership

There is no abstract available for this dissertation.