The worldwide financial services industry has undergone in the past two decades an unprecedented wave of consolidation within and across its three main sub-sectors: banking, securities activities and insurance. Today's observers assert that in ten years, most of the financial sector will be controlled by a small group of huge diversified banks. By enacting the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, Congress repealed the depression-era "Glass-Steagall" Act of 1933 and thereby officially removed the longstanding legal barriers that insulated banks from securities firms and insurance companies. As promoters of financial convergence have long been claiming that the introduction of universal banks in the United States would produce numerous benefits for themselves, but also for the economy and for their customers, these predictions can be assessed today in the light of empirical analysis. Now that "financial supermarkets" are totally legal in the United States, it is essential to assess whether they are economically and morally viable.

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This thesis uses the history of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to argue that the role of universal banks in fostering German industrialization was less than has previously been assumed. The archive of the Disconto-Gesellschaft is not currently accessible, so the thesis will use industrial archives to examine the bank's relations with industrial companies. After a discussion of the literature, a summary of other Disconto-Gesellschaft ventures shows that the Dortmunder Union was not an isolated disaster, but one among many. The thesis discusses the boom of 1867-1873 and. suggests it was engendered by a spate of railway building which fed into heavy industry. The next section recounts how the collapse of universal banks during financial crises led most countries outside Germany to separate commercial from investment banking either by law or by custom. The first chapter concludes with a discussion of how German industry raised capital. The second chapter discusses the origins of the Disconto- Gesellschaft; David Hansemann's introduction of a new corporate form, the Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien; the Disconto- Gesellschaft' s rise during the crisis of 1859, relations with competitors, internal structure and the character of its management and supervisory board. The third chapter treats the history of the Dortmunder Union, and the reasons for its failure. The fourth chapter discusses Krupp's difficulties in raising funds; how the Disconto-Gesellschaft coped with the problem of lending to two competing firms, Krupp and the Union; and management of this conflict through the rail cartel. The fifth chapter uses the correspondence of Kirdorf and Russell to discuss the coal industry's plight in the 1870's, and the reasons for the success of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-Actien-Gesellschaft. The conclusion suggests that private banks were more successful in financing industry than universal banks like the Disconto-Gesellschaft because their great number meant that even a Krupp could find a private banker who believed in him, and because their narrow capital bases prevented them from keeping lame ducks alive.

Previous research of the controller role is extensive and has been studied in several sectors, whichprovides a wide range of definitions of the controller role. These definitions have contributed to an ambiguous controller role in regards to what work assignments are most important and to whom the controller should report. This thesis aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the controller role based on work assignments within a decentralised organisation working with complex financial products. This thesis also contributes to an understanding of how controllers perceive that their role is affected by their work with handling information and their report relations. This has generated three research questions: What role does the controller have in a Swedish universal bank based on work assignments? What are the eventual differences in the controller role depending on department in the organisation? How do the controllers perceive that their role is affected by their work with handling information and by their report relations? Delimitation was made to analyse controllers at various levels in Handelsbanken. In order to create an understanding of the controller role in this context, an abductive approach as been used in order to combine existing theories with empirical findings. Based on a qualitative approach, triangulation was chosen to combine assembled empirical data with semi- structured interviews. The result of this study implies that controllers mainly lean towards the role as a Business partner as they work as a support function to provide local or higher managers with relevant analysis for decision-making. Based on work processes with information, the controllers lean towards an Analyst and Coach as they generally handle all business related information. From this case study, controllers in decentralised organisations possess the role as a Specialist as they  are  situated in separate departments with a clear focus. Results also show that more automated work assignments due to technological development do not increase the controllers’ opportunity to dedicate more time on analysis. Instead, increased information flows require controllers to allocate resources towards assembling information. In terms of report relations, close adherence towards the local managers does not affect the controller’s objective reporting to higher management and the controller can arguably bemore independent within their report relations than what is described by literature.

Due to widespread bank scandals and failures around the world, there has been renewed interest in the effect of corporate governance on bank performance. The majority of research concerning corporate governance and its effect on bank performance has been undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the USA and European Union but relatively little evidence is provided in Sub Saharan Africa, specifically, Ghana. This study investigates the effects of corporate governance on financial performance of Ghanaian universal banking companies during the period 2006- 2014. This study primarily employs relevant governance theories to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. Multiple regression panel data analysis and other appropriate methods are the main tools of analysis in this study. The empirical investigation revealed a mixed set of results. The findings showed that board size, board composition, bank size and foreign ownership are positively but insignificantly related to profitability in terms of return on asset and return on equity, while board committees have a positive and statistically significant impact on financial performance which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency theory which argues that board committees are an important mechanism of corporate governance in Ghana which impact on bank performance. This study contributes to the increasing number of research studies on the link between bank performance and corporate governance. The lacked of clarity, mixed and permanent relationships provided, show that the association the association between bank performance and different corporate governance mechanisms is complex and dynamic optimal governance arrangements may differ from bank to bank in relation to governance characteristics.

Due to widespread bank scandals and failures around the world, there has been renewed interest in the effect of corporate governance on bank performance. The majority of research concerning corporate governance and its effect on bank performance has been undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the USA and European Union but relatively little evidence is provided in Sub Saharan Africa, specifically, Ghana. This study investigates the effects of corporate governance on financial performance of Ghanaian universal banking companies during the period 2006- 2014. This study primarily employs relevant governance theories to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. Multiple regression panel data analysis and other appropriate methods are the main tools of analysis in this study. The empirical investigation revealed a mixed set of results. The findings showed that board size, board composition, bank size and foreign ownership are positively but insignificantly related to profitability in terms of return on asset and return on equity, while board committees have a positive and statistically significant impact on financial performance which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency theory which argues that board committees are an important mechanism of corporate governance in Ghana which impact on bank performance. This study contributes to the increasing number of research studies on the link between bank performance and corporate governance. The lacked of clarity, mixed and permanent relationships provided, show that the association the association between bank performance and different corporate governance mechanisms is complex and dynamic optimal governance arrangements may differ from bank to bank in relation to governance characteristics.

Cette thèse contient trois études sur le fonctionnement des banques.<p>Le premier Chapitre analyse empiriquement comment la capacité d’offrir des emprunts à long terme est influencée par la dimension des intermédiaires financiers.<p>Le deuxième Chapitre analyse, avec un model théorique caractérisé par la présence de soft-budget constraint, ratchet effect et short-termism, comment la pression compétitive influence la capacité des banque de financer le firmes ayant des projets de bonne qualité.<p>Le troisième Chapitre examine, avec un model théorique du type moral hazard common agency, le conflits d'intérêts des banques universelles.<p><p>Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is considered so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators.<p>Across and within banking sectors it is possible to observe a wide variety of intermediaries. Banks may differ in their size, market power and degree of specialization. This variety raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning banking sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies intending to contribute in this direction.<p>Chapter 1 will empirically study the willingness of smaller and larger lenders to grant long-term loans which, as credit to SME's, constitute an opaque segment of the credit market. Chapter 2 analyzes, with a theoretical model, the effects of competition on the efficiency of the banking sector when this is characterized by dynamic commitment issues which brings to excessive refinancing of bad quality investments (so called soft-budget constraint) or excessive termination of good ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). Chapter 3 presents a model to investigate to what extent the distortions posed by conflicts of interest in universal banks can be addressed through the provision of appropriate incentive schemes by the different categories of clients. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is perceived so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators. Differences in regulatory regimes as well as in the real economies have produced a large variety in the characteristics of financial sectors and of individual intermediaries. In particular, in different places and times it is possible to observe banking sectors more or less competitive, populated by credit intermediaries of different sizes and with different levels of specialization. This variety of institutions raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning financial intermediation sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies all intending to contribute in this direction. Chapter 2 Recent empirical works have found evidence consistent with larger banks having lower incentives to collect soft information and, in particular, to lend to small firms which are typically regarded as relatively opaque borrowers. Another market segment affected by relatively high levels of opaqueness is that of long-term loans and the reason is that, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature, short-term maturities are useful for the purpose of screening and monitoring investment projects. It is therefore interesting to assess whether large and small banks differ in their propensity to issue long-term loans, a type of investigation which has not been conducted yet. The reason why small and large banks might be expected to have a different propensity to issue long-term loans has to do with two notions. First, the effectiveness of a short-term maturity as a screening and monitoring device is preserved only if parties anticipate that, when payments are due, the lender will not be willing to extend the maturity, otherwise the initial short-term loan is de facto a long-term one. The problem may rise if the liquidation of insolvent firms produces lower payoffs than their refinancing: under these circumstances, as suggested by theories on renegotiation, liquidation is not implemented no matter what is written on the contract (parties can easily avoid the inefficiency that would result from liquidation, for example by simply granting a new loan). Second, at a more specific level theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability to commit to not extend thematurity decreases with bank size.1 Small banks are therefore predicted to issue shorter-term loans and to make a better selection of projects. The results are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for other characteristics of both the demand- and the supply-side as well as for the type of guarantee supplied, small banks have lower proportions of long-term loans to total loans and lower proportions of non performing loans to total loans. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that small banks are necessarily more efficient since short-term maturities also have costs; in particular, short-term maturities can interfere with the incentives of good types by inducing short-termism (the inflation of shortterm results at the expenses of total profitability). Moreover, beyond the ability to commit other supply-side features are shown to be relevant in the determination of the maturity, at least with specific classes borrowers. In particular, the findings are also consistent with the presence of economies of scale in lending at long maturities to firms in more technical and innovative industries. Since providing the right incentives to high quality entrepreneurs and to firms in innovative sectors is more likely to be a priority in more advanced countries, a policy implication is that these economies need more the presence of large credit institutions and the more so if venture capital and stock market are of limited size. Chapter 3 As already emphasized, theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability of banks to commit to a given course of action is an important factor for efficiency and that such ability depends on observable characteristics, like bank size. An important aspect which has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature is the effect that competition among banks exert on their ability to commit. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 tries to provide an answer to this question. More specifically, the model studies the effects of competition among banks when these are subject to dynamic commitment problems which may result in excess refinancing of insolvent borrowers (soft budget constraint) as well as in excess termination of profitable ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). The building assumption is that, because of priority schemes and relationship lending, competition is harsher for new lending than for lending to ongoing projects. The main conclusion is that there exists a trade-off between the benefits that competition brings by disciplining low quality borrowers and the costs implied by worsening the incentives of good ones. The model also allows to look at the effects of competition on stability. This is done in two ways by looking at the extent to which competition interferes with the procyclicality of the banking sector and by studying if competition may eliminate or add inefficient equilibria. The main policy implication is that the optimal level of competition of a banking system is positively related to the quality of the underlying economy. If taken together, the results of chapters 2 and 3 also provide a theory about local or regional banks which is not based on any aprioristic assumption about the technology of these type of intermediaries. As long as these institutions can be seen as banks with a relatively high market power and a relatively small size (they are often important players at a local level although of limited size), both chapters 2 and 3 suggest that these intermediaries can more easily commit to a tough stance at the refinancing stage, with positive effects on their ability to screen out bad projects but with negative effects on their ability to incentivize good types and to fund more technical and innovative firms. In other words, these institutions might promote growth at earlier stages of development, although they are not sufficient to address the incentive issues of more advanced economies. Interestingly, this interpretation of the role of local banks is totally distinct from the traditional one which is based on the aprioristic assumption that these banks are good in doing relationship lending. Chapter 4 Conflicts of interest of economic institutions carrying out a variety of functions are considered a widespread phenomenon severely limiting the efficiency that can be achieved. These worries are often taken as justification for regulations imposing transparency requirements or tougher measures like separation of functions. At the same time, contract theory suggests that the effects of opportunistic behavior can be limited by adopting appropriate incentive schemes. The third study, chapter 4, tries to understand from a theoretical point of view to what extent the use of incentive schemes can address the distortions posed by the presence of conflicts of interest. The universal bank is regarded as a (common) agent serving different clients with potentially conflicting interests: for example, it may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing firms. The clients offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a level of effort and, when firewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients (for example, the banks can at no cost sell the securities it is underwriting to the funds it manages and can do so at the price it likes). Firewalls are defined as all legal or economic devices imposing a real separation of functions and therefore preventing the bank from colluding as specified above. The main conclusion is that in the absence of firewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the equilibrium level of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefficiency of collusion. In other words, not only appropriate incentive schemes can eliminate the distortions posed by conflicts of interest but, at least in principle, their presence may even be necessary for efficiency (this happens if effort is a public good for the two principals so that the allocation without firewalls is characterized by under-provision of effort). At the same time, the allocation without firewalls is shown to be the least efficient in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence of the conflict of interest. As long as transparency requirements can be considered tools to improve market participants’ sophistication, these results suggest why and how this type of regulation can work. Moreover, the model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of tougher regulation prescribing a more or less neat separation of functions. With sophisticated economic agents, who can address the distortions posed by conflicts of interest by choosing appropriate incentive schemes, separation of functions is unnecessary or even detrimental for efficiency. On the other hand, more or less powerful firewalls are desirable if market participants are not considered sufficiently sophisticated to be able to react to the presence of conflicts of interest and if transparency requirements cannot increase their sophistication. In few words, the optimal regulation of conflicts of interest is softer in situations involving professionals who are more likely to realize and to react by choosing an appropriate incentive scheme or, more generally, for institutions operating in advanced economies where the average level of market participants sophistication is higher.