This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.

Abstract not available

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-249).

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2010. / Title from screen (viewed on February 26, 2010). Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Cornelis de Waal, André De Tienne, Nathan R. Houser. Includes vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-114).

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many theories of vagueness employ question-begging assumptions about the semantic boundaries between truth and falsity. This thesis defends a theory of vagueness put forward by Charles S. Peirce and argues for a novel solution to the sorites paradox based upon his work. Contrary to widespread opinion, I argue that Peirce distinguished borderline vagueness from other related forms of indeterminacy, e.g. indefiniteness, generality, unspecificity, uninformativity, etc. By clarifying Peirce’s conception of borderline vagueness, I argue for a solution to the sorites paradox based upon his logical semantics. In addition, I argue for this theory against the epistemic theory of vagueness, which makes controversial claims concerning the sharp semantic boundary between truth and falsity, and against the supervaluationist theory of vagueness, which is committed to the in principle impossibility of sharp semantics boundaries for propositions with vague terms.

This study investigates six theoretical approaches offered as solutions to the paradox of the heap (sorites paradox), a logic puzzle dating back to the ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides. Those considered are: Incoherence Theory, Epistemic Theory, Supervaluation Theory, Many-Valued Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Non-Classical Semantics. After critically examining all of these, it is concluded that none of the attempts to explain the sorites are fully adequate, and the paradox remains unresolved. / Philosophy / M.A. (Philosophy)

According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.

This study investigates six theoretical approaches offered as solutions to the paradox of the heap (sorites paradox), a logic puzzle dating back to the ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides. Those considered are: Incoherence Theory, Epistemic Theory, Supervaluation Theory, Many-Valued Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Non-Classical Semantics. After critically examining all of these, it is concluded that none of the attempts to explain the sorites are fully adequate, and the paradox remains unresolved. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)