Thesis (M.Sc. (Hons.)) -- University of Western Sydney, 2000. / "A thesis for the degree of Master in Applied Science" Bibliography : leaves 209-219.

This paper concerns the issue of ignorance about values, and how to best deal with it.I try to find out what we ought to do when we are ignorant of what it is valuable topromote. The proposed solution is an indirect system of “provisional values”, builtaround three goals that are likely to increase our chances of achieving real value,should such a thing be possible.These three provisional goals the system gives us are as follows: knowledge,optionality, and diversity.Knowledge is the traditional way of trying to relieve our ignorance and has beenthe focus of most philosophizing about value.Optionality means having options, or the power to act differently. This is likelyto become important should we ever discover what it is actually valuable to do.Finally, diversity is simply the idea that, not knowing what truly is valuable, weshould do as much as possible of everything in the hope that some of it may bevaluable. / Denna uppsats handlar om problemet med vår brist på kunskap om värde och hur manbäst hanterar det. Jag försöker ta reda på vad vi borde göra i situationer där vi ärokunniga om vilka mål som är värdefulla att uppnå. Den lösning som föreslås är ettindirekt system av ”provisoriskt värde”. Detta system är uppbyggt kring tre mål somsannolikt kommer att öka våra chanser att uppnå direkta eller verkliga värden, om ensådan sak skulle vara möjlig. Dessa tre provisoriska mål som systemet ger oss ärföljande: kunskap, optionalitet och mångfald.Kunskap är det traditionella sättet att försöka lindra vår okunnighet, och harvarit fokus för det mesta filosoferandet om värde.Optionalitet innebär att ha alternativ eller makten att agera annorlunda. Dettakommer sannolikt att bli viktigt om vi någonsin upptäcker vad det är värdefullt attgöra.Slutligen är mångfald helt enkelt tanken att om vi inte vet vad som verkligen ärvärdefullt så bör vi göra så mycket som möjligt av allt i hopp om att något av det kanvisa sig värdefullt.

Edmund Husserl tratta l’etica e l’intersoggettività separatamente e con scopi diversi. Allo stesso tempo, nei suoi testi sono presenti indizi di una mutua connessione tra tali ambiti. Nel mio lavoro intendo chiarire come sia interpretabile tale connessione. In particolare, considero che l’affermazione husserliana del valore della relazione e del dovere di promuoverla indica che il soggetto può realizzare attivamente la dimensione intersoggettiva in cui si trova solo attraverso una scelta a favore della relazione. Tale scelta presuppone l’esperienza del valore altrui. Mi chiedo quindi quali siano le condizioni dell’esperienza della rilevanza assiologica ed etica dell’altro e della relazione con lui. Per rispondere a questa domanda, mi rivolgo a due ambiti della fenomenologia trascendentale di Husserl: la teoria dell’intersoggettività e le analisi etiche. Attraverso la prima, valuto se gli strati costitutivi dell’esperienza intersoggettiva abbiano una rilevanza assiologica. Tuttavia, dati i limiti di una considerazione etica della teoria dell’intersoggettività, mi rivolgo alle analisi etiche per ulteriori approfondimenti. Esse mostrano che il valore dell’altro e il dovere nei suoi confronti sono colti dall’atto emotivo dell’amore e che l’amore a sua volta è fondato nel coglimento dell’altro come soggetto trascendentale. Così facendo chiarifico la mutua connessione tra etica e teoria dell’intersoggettività in Husserl. / Edmund Husserl treats ethics and intersubjectivity separately and with different purposes. At the same time, he disseminates clues of their interconnectedness throughout his works. In my dissertation, I aim to elucidate how to interpret their connection. In particular, I argue that Husserl’s insistence on the value of relationship and on the duty to promote it indicates that the subject can actively realize the intersubjective dimension in which it is situated only through a choice in favour of the relationship. This choice presupposes the experience of the value of the other. I thus ask which are the conditions of the experience of the axiological and ethical relevance of the other and of the relationship with it. To answer this question, I turn to two areas of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology: his theory of intersubjectivity and his ethical analyses. Through the first, I assess whether the constitutive levels of intersubjective experience have axiological relevance. However, given the limits pertaining to an ethical consideration of his theory of intersubjectivity, I move to Husserl’s ethical analyses for further insights. These analyses show that the value of the other and the duty towards it are captured by the emotional act of love, and that love is in turn grounded on grasping the other as a transcendental subject. I thereby shed light on the interconnectedness of Husserl’s ethics and theory of intersubjectivity.