When violence against civilians is high in armed conflicts, it is predicted that the UNSC will pay close attention to those conflicts. However, it does not always happen to an equal degree. Based on recently collected data of UNSC agenda-setting behaviour by Susan H. Allen and Amy T. Yuen, this paper asks: why do some conflicts receive more UNSC attention than others, despite similar levels of violence against civilians? The thesis looks into the role of ROs in the UNSC agenda-setting. To account for the variation, the thesis argues that ROs are able to influence the UNSC agenda-setting in a way that leads some conflicts to have more recurrences of items on the agenda and others less. By applying a structured focused comparison on the conflict in Darfur between 2003 – 2007, and the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar between 2016-2022, I find a correlation between representation of ROs and recurrences of agenda-items. However, correlation is not causation, and I conclude that ROs had little influence in the UNSC decision-making and that it was the interests of the P5 and the institutional role of the UN Secretary-General that lead to the variation in the number of recurrences of items on the agenda.

This thesis examines the reactions to the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 on the political left. The focus is on understanding how the German left’s responses differ from those of the global left and the extent to which these differences are influenced by the concept of "German guilt." The study employs content analysis of social media statements, guided by theoretical insights from Karl Jaspers' notion of metaphysical guilt and Moishe Postone's critique of violence against civilians. The findings reveal a distinct divergence in responses: while the German left uniformly condemned the violence, the global left displayed a wider range of reactions, including significant support framed as “resistance”. This thesis suggests that beneath the apparent national or ethnic differences, there lies a more fundamental divide grounded in Postone’s critique of the left’s approach to violence against civilians as a legitimate means to achieve progressive goals.

The question of how armed group ideology influences its behaviour has been tentatively explored in the past decade. However, which role distinct ideological commitments play in civilian targeting has not been satisfactorily discussed thus far. This thesis turns to research on genocide and mass violence and incorporates the concepts of ‘exclusionary ideologies’ and ‘threat perceptions’ to fill this research gap. It addresses the following question: to what extent do exclusionary ideologies of armed groups influence their use of violence against civilians during civil conflicts? When revolutionary armed groups pursue their goals, threat perceptions determine which groups are considered legitimate targets for attack. Therefore, it is hypothesized that exclusionary groups will employ more violence against civilians than inclusionary groups because the former have a more expanded understanding of legitimate targeting than the latter. Through a structured focused comparison, discourse analysis and process tracing applied to the cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, moderate support for this hypothesis is found. It is shown that both armed groups to varying extents invoke threat perceptions regarding certain out-groups to legitimize and rationalise their patterns of violence. Nonetheless, a descent into indiscriminate violence by Boko Haram and data shortage of Al-Shabaab attacks warrant caution.

Existe-t-il un lien entre le degré de publicité du soutien fourni par des États à des groupes rebelles et les relations entre les insurgés soutenus et les civils durant les guerres internes ? Les études sur les conflits examinent de plus en plus la manière dont un soutien étatique externe à des insurgés locaux façonne le comportement de ces derniers. Cependant, la littérature néglige l’influence de la décision des États-soutiens de nier ou reconnaître leur aide sur la conduite des rebelles. Divisée en trois parties, ma thèse de doctorat utilise une méthodologie mixte alliant analyses quantitatives et études de cas qualitatives pour combler cette lacune dans la littérature. L’Article 1 présente de nouvelles données sur le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux rebelles durant les guerres civiles entre 1989 et 2018. Il montre ensuite que cette variable est négativement corrélée à la propension des insurgés à user de la violence envers les non-combattants. L’Article 2 commence par présenter une théorie expliquant comment, pourquoi et dans quelles circonstances les États-soutiens tentent-ils de superviser les interactions avec les non-combattants des insurgés qu’ils appuient lors des guerres civiles. Il applique ensuite ce cadre théorique au soutien des États-Unis aux Unités de protection du peuple (YPG) et aux Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) dans le nord-est de la Syrie entre 2014 et 2020. L’Article 3 montre qu’en plus d’être corrélé négativement à la violence rebelle envers les civils, le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux insurgés est corrélé positivement à la propension de ces derniers à fournir des services à la population. Il nuance ensuite les résultats statistiques en montrant que l’existence d’institutions formelles de fourniture de services n’équivaut pas nécessairement à une participation effective des civils à l’exercice du pouvoir en zones rebelles. Ainsi, la thèse met en évidence le lien critique entre le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux rebelles et les interactions entre insurgés soutenus et civils. Les résultats de recherche montrent dès lors que les expériences des non-combattants au cours de conflits qualifiés d’internes à un espace sont corrélés à des facteurs et intérêts liés à des acteurs externes à ce même territoire. / What is the relationship between the overtness of state support to rebels and the nature of insurgent-civilian interactions during civil wars? Conflict studies increasingly examine how external support to local insurgents influences rebel behavior. However, the literature neglects the link between the state sponsors’ decisions to acknowledge or deny their support and insurgent behavior. My three-part doctoral dissertation uses a mixed-methods research design combining quantitative analyses and qualitative case studies to address this gap in the literature. Article 1 introduces new data on the overtness of external support to rebels during civil wars between 1989 and 2018. The paper then shows that this variable negatively correlates with the propensity of the insurgents to target civilians. Article 2 begins by outlining a theory of how, why, and when the state sponsors monitor the interactions with civilians of the insurgents they support. The paper then applies this theoretical framework to the United States’ (US) support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northeast Syria between 2014 and 2020. Article 3 shows that in addition to negatively correlating with civilian targeting, the overtness of external support to rebels positively correlates with the propensity of the insurgents to provide social services during civil wars. The paper then qualifies the statistical results by showing that the creation of formal social service institutions by the rebels does not necessarily lead to effective civilian participation in decision-making in insurgent areas. The dissertation thus highlights the critical link between the overtness of state support to rebels and the insurgent-civilian interactions. In this way, I show that civilian experiences during conflicts we characterize as internal to a territory correlate with factors and interests linked to external actors.