TACtical Intelligence: Disrupting the Terrorist Attack Cycle by Analysing Terrorists' Intelligence Operations Keywords: terrorism, intelligence, confidence, intelligence competition, violent non-state actors Abstract: Commensurate with prevailing Realist influence in military and security studies,the majority of academic literature on topics of intelligence are from state-centric perspectives, failing to sufficiently address other actors who are taking on greater and more salient roles on the international security stage. In particular, the use of intelligence by violent non-state actors is a premature subject matter in the academic discourse, as literature at the intersection of the two disciplines tends to evaluate the ways in which state intelligence succeeds or fails with regards to, or acts upon violent non-state actors. Rarely are violent non-state actors perceived of as intelligence actors of their own respect. Nevertheless, an intelligence competition persists between the rivals. The intelligence competition between terrorist organisations, seeking to instigate attacks, and state agencies, seeking to thwart them, is underdeveloped in both terrorism and intelligence studies. This study finds terrorist organisations engage in an intelligence competition with their state adversaries-a pursuit to...

Yes / This article examines the influence of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) on the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects in conflict-affected territories. Recentering such territories, it challenges state-centric geoeconomic narratives, which often overlook the significant role of local illicit authorities in shaping project outcomes. The study demonstrates how geoeconomic ambitions, such as regional or global influence and energy security, depend on negotiating with local actors in contested territories. The findings reveal the blurred boundaries between domestic and international authority in these regions and suggest that megaprojects must account for multi-scalar authority dynamics. We illustrate our argument by analyzing the construction of two megadam projects: the Hidroituango dam in Colombia’s Antioquia department and the Myitsone dam in Myanmar’s Kachin State. Drawing on original evidence collected during extensive fieldwork comprising semi-structured interviews and observations in these two conflict-affected regions, we show that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Myanmar’s Kachin Independence Army, respectively, exercised authority in regions where the state’s monopoly on violence was limited. These VNSAs obstructed or facilitated megaprojects based on tactics including extortion and community representation. / AHRC/ESRC, ESRC DTP (Grand Union Grant ESP0006491-1923618), Minerva Research Initiative, Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-22-1-0338) / The full-text of this article will be released for public view at the end of the publisher embargo, 24 months after first publication.

Scholars generally assume that states are shamed for their own behavior, but they can also be shamed for the lack of investigation for violence perpetrated by domestic non-state actors. I engage this previously-unstudied phenomenon and develop a theory to explain how states will respond to being shamed for failing to control domestic violence. I examine two types of outcomes: the governments' change in behavior, and the accountability efforts against state agents that have abused human rights. For the government's reaction to being shamed for violence from non-state organizations, I develop a theory to examine changes in coercive state capacity – including military and police personnel – since this reaction may largely exacerbate human rights violations. I hypothesize that states shamed due to abuses by violent non-state organizations (VNSO) will increase military personnel to halt criminal violence and respond to the international spotlight. I then examine the relationship between naming and shaming states over physical integrity abuses by different types of perpetrators and human rights prosecutions. Using newly coded data on the types of perpetrators shamed in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) country reports, I find that shaming over abuses that include VNSO as perpetrators decreases the likelihood of expanding their police force when the state has the military patrolling the streets and is likely to increase the predicted number of police prosecutions, particularly if the shaming is over killings from VNSOs. Lastly, I examine how changes in coercive capacity affect human rights violations and the number of violent episodes from VNSOs.

Borderlands are critical security zones but remain poorly understood. In regions plagued by drug violence and conflict, violent groups compete for territorial control, cooperate in illegal cross-border activities, and substitute for the functions of the state in these areas. Despite undermining physical security, fuelling fear, and challenging the state’s sovereignty, the exact modi operandi of these groups are little known. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores how different interactions among violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands impact on citizen security. These border areas attract rebels, paramilitaries and criminal organisations alike: they constitute geo-strategic corridors for the global cocaine industry and are sites of supply and operation for the major actors involved in Colombia’s decades-long armed internal conflict. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this thesis consolidates the literature on conflict, security and organised crime, borders and borderlands, and anthropological approaches to fear and violence. It integrates theories of cooperation among social actors with original empirical research. It is based on a comparative, multi-sited case-study design, using ethnographic methods complemented by quantitative data. The research involved over twelve months of fieldwork with 433 interviews and participant observation on both sides of the crisis-affected Colombia-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela borders, and in Bogotá, Caracas and Quito. Developing a typology of VNSA interactions, I argue that these create not only physical violence but also less visible types of insecurity: when VNSAs fight each other, citizens are exposed to violence but follow the rules imposed by the opposing parties. Fragile alliances produce uncertainty among communities and erode the social fabric by fuelling interpersonal mistrust. Where VNSAs provide security and are socially recognised, "shadow citizen security" arises: security based on undemocratic means. I show that the geography of borderlands reinforces the distinct impacts of VNSA arrangements on citizen security yet renders them less visible.