Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-278).

This essay will research aspects of romantic love, as well as aspects of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The purpose of the essay is to discuss if romantic love can be part of virtue ethics and eudaimonia. The philosopher Raja Halwani presents two concepts of romantic love that are relevant to the discussion. The concepts are romantic love 1 and romantic love 2. The first one is a new love, where the partners only want to be with each other. The second type of love is closer to companionship where the partners are familiar with each other and have been together for a long time. To contrast this, I will use Martin Hägglund’s theory concerning romantic love. In Hägglund’s theory love is built upon the care we feel for our partners. However, it is the fear that the loved one can be taken away from us that constitutes this care. In the end, one of the two concepts Raja Halwani were determined to be virtuous and part of eudaimonia. Hägglund’s theory was partly virtuous due to the care he deems that we feel for our loved ones. / Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka aspekter av romantisk kärlek, samt aspekter av Aristoteles Nichomachean Ethics. Uppsatsen syfte är att diskutera om romantisk kärlek kan vara en del av dygdetiken och eudaimonia. Filosofen Raja Halwani presenterar två olika typer av romantisk kärlek som är relevanta för diskussionen. Dessa två typer är romantic love 1 och romantic love 2. Den första är en typ av ny kärlek där personerna endast vill vara med varandra. Den andra typen av kärlek är närmare engelskans companionship. Här är partnerna väldigt nära varandra och har varit tillsammans under en lång tid. För att kontrastera detta så kommer jag använda Martin Hägglunds teori som har att göra med romantisk kärlek. Hägglunds teori bygger kärlek på omsorgen vi känner för våra älskade. Dock är det rädslan att våra älskade kan tas ifrån oss som utgör denna omsorg. Till slut klargjordes det att en av Halwanis typer av kärlek var dygdig och del av eudaimonia. Hägglunds teori var till viss del dygdig på grund av omsorgen han fastställer att vi känner för våra älskade.

In this dissertation, I examine Plato and Aristotle's reasons for denying that aidôs, or a sense of shame, is a virtue. The bulk of my study is devoted to the interpretation of two key texts: Plato's Charmides and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Although both philosophers see an important role for shame in moral education, they share the view that a fully virtuous person's actions are guided not by aidôs, but by practical wisdom. In the opening chapter, I provide an overview of their conception of shame as an essentially social emotion that expresses our concern for the opinions of others. I present and give a critique of a recent theory of shame that challenges this conception. The starting point of the second chapter is a brief passage in the Charmides where Socrates examines Charmides' claim that aidôs is the same as sôphrosunê ("temperance" or "moderation"). Socrates refutes the definition by citing a single verse from Homer's Odyssey: "aidôs is no good in a needy man." In order to make sense of his dubious appeal to poetic authority, I provide a close reading of Socrates' opening narration, in which he describes his initial encounter with the beautiful young Charmides. I show that the ambivalence about aidôs expressed in the quotation is justified through Socrates' portrait of Charmides. Though admirable at this early stage of his life, Charmides' aidôs is the very thing that prevents him from challenging Socrates' argument and gaining a deeper understanding of virtue. In the third chapter, I turn to the discussion of shame in Book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly argues that aidôs is not a virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled commentators. My aim is to reconstruct Aristotle's view of aidôs and show that he does in fact have good grounds for excluding it from his list of virtues. / text

This dissertation addresses the question: what should Discipline be for in Schools? It does so from a primarily philosophical and specifically neo-Aristotelian perspective. Indeed, the thesis would seem to be the first to try to derive an account of the possible purposes of modern day school discipline from Aristotle‘s works. The discussion also provides an original evaluation of the educational place and significance of Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues. The thesis proceeds from a conviction that: 1) recent policy and research concerning pupil behaviour in Scottish schools has not clearly enough articulated what discipline should be for; and 2) previous theoretical attempts to explain the purposes of school discipline have not been grounded upon sufficiently robust moral and/or epistemological foundations. The most relevant extant treatises of Aristotle are therefore explored in depth, in search of a more justifiable theory of school discipline. In this respect, particularly detailed scrutiny is given to the various traits of character (virtues) that Aristotle believed to comprise human flourishing. During this analysis and discussion, it is argued that educators should try to foster such virtuous habits of thinking, acting and feeling in pupils, in the course of seeking to instil discipline in their schools and classrooms. It is concluded that school discipline should promote pupil virtue and wisdom.

The philosophy of Henry Fielding turns more upon a study of human nature than upon any stated adherence to a system of beliefs. The thesis of this paper is that he was a moderate law-and-order Anglican of his time, but strongly influenced by the deist Shaftesbury's studies of the psychological characteristics of men. These inquiries into motivations and Shaftesbury's advocacy of the social virtue of desiring good for others seem to have helped determine Fielding's philosophy.

This paper aims to establish a conception of humility which can be of use in nurturing interpersonal relationships of intrinsic value. The conception of humility asserted herein is a doxastic one that demands that an individual make an as-accurate-as-possible estimation of her knowledge, merits, and accomplishments in relation to others, in relation to the totality of knowledge, merits, and accomplishments, both actual and possible, of humankind, and in relation to an ideal. This paper asserts that humility consists of both a cognitive and an attitudinal component. The necessary cognitive component is an acknowledgment of the presence of great unknowable mysteries at play in every situation and every interaction between persons, which is further specified as the acknowledgment of the unknowability of the inner lives and consciousnesses of others. It is asserted that the attitudinal component of humility must result from the cognitive component and consists in keeping this acknowledgment consciously in mind in interactions in personal relationships and adopting actions and responses to others which are congruent with this acknowledgement. The conception of humility advocated in this paper takes points from the traditional Jewish conception of humility as presented by Daniel M. Nelson, a later account as formulated by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber as well the more recent accounts of humility asserted by André Comte-Sponville, Julia Driver, G. Alex Sinha, J.L.A Garcia and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev.

張慧真 = The changing hero models : .. / 稿本影印本 / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1991. / Gao ben yin ying ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 17-27 (last group) / Zhang Huizhen = The changing hero models : .. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1991. / Chapter 第一章 --- 導論 / Chapter 甲 --- 「英雄模範」與 「理想人格」的涵義 --- p.2 / Chapter 乙 --- 傳統中國社會與英雄模範的關係 --- p.4 / Chapter 丙 --- 當代中國社會與英雄模範的關係 --- p.13 / Chapter 丁 --- 小結 --- p.23 / Chapter 第二章 --- 研究觀念和問題的闡釋 / Chapter 甲 --- 「自我」概念的界說 --- p.25 / Chapter 乙 --- 「角色」理論的界說──角色和角色叢的概念 --- p.38 / Chapter 丙 --- 「象徵互重理論」──自我意義的詮釋 --- p.41 / Chapter 丁 --- 「顯著價值取向」的界說──價值賦予者與受惠者的關係分類 --- p.44 / Chapter 戊 --- 「自我」概念分析架構的整合 --- p.46 / Chapter 已 --- 研究問題的界說 --- p.53 / Chapter 第三章 --- 研究設計 / Chapter 甲 --- 研究意義和目的 --- p.54 / Chapter 乙 --- 研究範疇 --- p.56 / Chapter 丙 --- 研究工具 --- p.60 / Chapter 丁 --- 研究方法和步驟 --- p.61 / Chapter 戊 --- 研究限制 --- p.64 / Chapter 第四章 --- 英雄模範 （一）：雷鋒 / Chapter 甲 --- 雷鋒生平和社會背景 --- p.65 / Chapter 乙 --- 雷鋒「自我」概念的分析架構 --- p.70 / Chapter 丙 --- 雷鋒「自我」概念的涵義 --- p.72 / Chapter 丁 --- 小結──死後論英雄 --- p.112 / Chapter 第五章 --- 英雄模範（二）：張海迪 / Chapter 甲 --- 張海迪的生平和社會背景 --- p.116 / Chapter 乙 --- 張海迪「自我」概念的分析架構 --- p.121 / Chapter 丙 --- 張海迪「自我」概念的涵義 --- p.123 / Chapter 丁 --- 小結──英雄模範的生涯 --- p.159 / Chapter 第六章 --- 英雄模範（三）：其他當代中國的英雄模範(1978-1985) / Chapter 甲 --- 與「四人幫」鬥爭型的英雄模範 --- p.163 / Chapter 乙 --- 知識和科技型的英雄模範 --- p.167 / Chapter 丙 --- 自學成才型的英雄模範 --- p.173 / Chapter 丁 --- 回頭是岸型的英雄模範 --- p.177 / Chapter 戊 --- 經濟改革型的英雄模範 --- p.180 / Chapter 已 --- 企業管理型的英雄模範 --- p.183 / Chapter 庚 --- 小結──多元化的英雄模範 --- p.188 / Chapter 第七章 --- 異軌份子：魏京生 / Chapter 甲 --- 魏京生的生平和社會背景 --- p.193 / Chapter 乙 --- 魏京生「自我」概念的分析架構 --- p.196 / Chapter 丙 --- 魏京生「自我」概念的涵義 --- p.198 / Chapter 第八章 --- 總論──綜論當代中國英雄模範的變化(1960-1985) / Chapter 甲 --- 文化連續性和早期經驗的比較 --- p.235 / Chapter 乙 --- 與權威人物之間的「自我－他人」關係比較 --- p.242 / Chapter 丙 --- 在工作崗位上的「自我－物質」關係比較 --- p.248 / Chapter 丁 --- 集體目標與個人理想的比較 --- p.253 / Chapter 戊 --- 自我的社會角色狀態和建立模式的比較 --- p.259 / Chapter 已 --- 小結──當代中國英雄模範自我概念模式的變化和發展 --- p.266 / 註釋 --- p.(1) / 參攷書目 --- p.(17)

A central concept for Plato is the kalon – often translated as the beautiful, fine, admirable, or noble. This dissertation shows that only by prioritizing dimensions of beauty in the concept can we understand the nature, use, and insights of the kalon in Plato. The concept of the kalon organizes aspirations to appear and be admired as beautiful for one’s virtue. We may consider beauty superficial and concern for it vain – but what if it were also indispensable to living well? By analyzing how Plato uses the concept of the kalon to contest cultural practices of shame and honour regulated by ideals of beauty, we come to see not only the tensions within the concept but also how attractions to beauty steer, but can subvert, our attempts to live well.

Shaftesbury believed that the height of virtue was impartial love for all of humanity. But Shaftesbury also harboured grave doubts about our ability to develop such an expansive love. In The Moralists, Shaftesbury addressed this problem. I show that while it may appear on the surface that The Moralists solves the difficulty, it in fact remains unresolved. Shaftesbury may not have been able to reconcile his view of the content of virtue with his view of our motivational psychology.

archives@tulane.edu / The Platonic Socrates is renowned both for his disavowals of knowledge and for his irony, and it is often the case that both interlocutors and readers believe his disavowals to be ironic. Such a belief frequently underlies interpretations of Plato’s Meno, which take Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is to be either partially or entirely untrue; either Socrates knows what virtue is or he at least knows in some respect even if he does not know its essential being, its ousia. This dissertation argues that Socrates is being honest in his claim in the Meno not to know at all what virtue is, and this means he is not able to recognize some one thing called “virtue.” This serves as a starting point for a new interpretation that examines the arguments and the drama of the dialogue as an illumination of Socrates’ perplexing disavowal of knowledge. Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is shown to indicate an aporia he confronts with respect to his understanding of virtue. And this aporia, it is argued, concerns, not what virtue is but that it is. The dissertation argues further that Socrates’ aporia with respect to virtue is fundamentally woven into his uncertainty about whether knowledge is possible at all. The fundamental character of Socratic philosophy, which is practiced by investigating with others into the virtues, is thus shown to involve an investigation into the very foundation of philosophy itself. / 1 / Alexander James Shaeffer