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1	Wijsgeerige studie over Plato's Charmides ... Boersma, Leffert Johan. January 1900 (has links) Proefschrift--Utrecht. / "Stellingen": [2] p. laid in. Plato / Charmides. Charmides (Plato)
2	Wijsgeerige studie over Plato's Charmides ... Boersma, Leffert Johan. January 1900 (has links) Proefschrift--Utrecht. / "Stellingen": [2] p. laid in. Plato / Charmides. Charmides (Plato)
3	Shame and virtue in Plato and Aristotle Raymond, Christopher Cecil 14 July 2014 (has links) In this dissertation, I examine Plato and Aristotle's reasons for denying that aidôs, or a sense of shame, is a virtue. The bulk of my study is devoted to the interpretation of two key texts: Plato's Charmides and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Although both philosophers see an important role for shame in moral education, they share the view that a fully virtuous person's actions are guided not by aidôs, but by practical wisdom. In the opening chapter, I provide an overview of their conception of shame as an essentially social emotion that expresses our concern for the opinions of others. I present and give a critique of a recent theory of shame that challenges this conception. The starting point of the second chapter is a brief passage in the Charmides where Socrates examines Charmides' claim that aidôs is the same as sôphrosunê ("temperance" or "moderation"). Socrates refutes the definition by citing a single verse from Homer's Odyssey: "aidôs is no good in a needy man." In order to make sense of his dubious appeal to poetic authority, I provide a close reading of Socrates' opening narration, in which he describes his initial encounter with the beautiful young Charmides. I show that the ambivalence about aidôs expressed in the quotation is justified through Socrates' portrait of Charmides. Though admirable at this early stage of his life, Charmides' aidôs is the very thing that prevents him from challenging Socrates' argument and gaining a deeper understanding of virtue. In the third chapter, I turn to the discussion of shame in Book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly argues that aidôs is not a virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled commentators. My aim is to reconstruct Aristotle's view of aidôs and show that he does in fact have good grounds for excluding it from his list of virtues. / text Shame Virtue Plato Aristotle Charmides
4	Elenchos et poésie : l'effet esthétique de Socrate dans le "Charmide" de Platon Mousseau, Fanie 11 1900 (has links) Le Charmide de Platon s’inscrit légitimement dans ce qu’il est convenu de nommer les « dialogues de jeunesse », et nous y constatons la forte présence de ce qui caractérise traditionnellement l’activité philosophique de Socrate, soit la réfutation. Cependant, tandis que les réfutations effectuées directement sur le jeune Charmide ne produisent aucun effet, celui-ci réagit fortement aux réfutations que Socrate fait subir à son tuteur Critias et auxquelles il assiste passivement. Qu’est-ce qui, dans ce qui s’apparente vraisemblablement à une réfutation indirecte, produit l’ébranlement de Charmide? Nous voulons regarder en quoi la réfutation est ici un traitement purgatif non pas par l’usage d’affirmations propositionnelles contradictoires, mais par une certaine dialectique de l’image, celles de Critias et de Socrate devant Charmide. Cette dialectique de l’image en appelant à une réflexion sur la dimension mimétique du rapport qu’entretient le jeune garçon avec ces deux hommes, nous voulons ainsi regarder en quoi la réfutation indirecte de Charmide nous dresse les contours d’une possible activité poétique de Socrate. Cette poésie résisterait à la critique que celui-ci en fait plus tard dans la République par un usage de l’image qui vise non plus à proposer des modèles fixes de la vertu, mais à montrer le mouvement de la pensée, et donc à « sensibiliser » Charmide à l’élan intellectuel qui l’habite et l’anime lui-même. Ainsi, en nous penchant sur la présence dans le Charmide de ce que nous nommons une « réfutation poétique », ce mémoire explore la possibilité de penser ensemble ce qui semble assoir l’intellectualisme socratique des premiers dialogues et la poésie qui, par son absence de visée intellectuelle, est rejetée par le Socrate de la République à moins qu’elle ne prenne la forme d’un « éloge des hommes bons ». / Plato's Charmides is part of what we refer to as the «early dialogues», and we find in these dialogues a major feature of Socrates's philosophy, mainly refutation. However, while these refutations don't have any effects on the young Charmides, he still reacts to Socrates's refutation of Critias. We wonder how this indirect refutation produces such a reaction on Charmides. We look at how refutation represents here a purgative treatment not by using contradictory propositions, but with the use of a certain dialectic of the image, the ones of Critias and Socrates facing Charmides. Examining this dialectic, which refers to the study of the mimetic dimension that the young boy maintains with the two men, we wish to reflect on how the indirect refutation of Charmides draws the outline of Socrates's possible poetical activity. This poetry resists to the critics made later in the Republic pertaining to the use of images relating to certain models of virtue, by showing the motion of thought, and hence guiding Charmides in his own intellectual motion. By reflecting on the «poetical refutation» we find in Plato's Charmides, this thesis explores the possibility of linking what seems to ground Socrates's intellectualism in the early dialogues to the poetry that is rejected par Socrates in the Republic, besides the one that pertains to the «defense of good men». Philosophie Philosophy Platon Plato Socrate Socrates Charmide Charmides Réfutation Refutation Poésie Poetry Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)
5	Elenchos et poésie : l'effet esthétique de Socrate dans le "Charmide" de Platon Mousseau, Fanie 11 1900 (has links) Le Charmide de Platon s’inscrit légitimement dans ce qu’il est convenu de nommer les « dialogues de jeunesse », et nous y constatons la forte présence de ce qui caractérise traditionnellement l’activité philosophique de Socrate, soit la réfutation. Cependant, tandis que les réfutations effectuées directement sur le jeune Charmide ne produisent aucun effet, celui-ci réagit fortement aux réfutations que Socrate fait subir à son tuteur Critias et auxquelles il assiste passivement. Qu’est-ce qui, dans ce qui s’apparente vraisemblablement à une réfutation indirecte, produit l’ébranlement de Charmide? Nous voulons regarder en quoi la réfutation est ici un traitement purgatif non pas par l’usage d’affirmations propositionnelles contradictoires, mais par une certaine dialectique de l’image, celles de Critias et de Socrate devant Charmide. Cette dialectique de l’image en appelant à une réflexion sur la dimension mimétique du rapport qu’entretient le jeune garçon avec ces deux hommes, nous voulons ainsi regarder en quoi la réfutation indirecte de Charmide nous dresse les contours d’une possible activité poétique de Socrate. Cette poésie résisterait à la critique que celui-ci en fait plus tard dans la République par un usage de l’image qui vise non plus à proposer des modèles fixes de la vertu, mais à montrer le mouvement de la pensée, et donc à « sensibiliser » Charmide à l’élan intellectuel qui l’habite et l’anime lui-même. Ainsi, en nous penchant sur la présence dans le Charmide de ce que nous nommons une « réfutation poétique », ce mémoire explore la possibilité de penser ensemble ce qui semble assoir l’intellectualisme socratique des premiers dialogues et la poésie qui, par son absence de visée intellectuelle, est rejetée par le Socrate de la République à moins qu’elle ne prenne la forme d’un « éloge des hommes bons ». / Plato's Charmides is part of what we refer to as the «early dialogues», and we find in these dialogues a major feature of Socrates's philosophy, mainly refutation. However, while these refutations don't have any effects on the young Charmides, he still reacts to Socrates's refutation of Critias. We wonder how this indirect refutation produces such a reaction on Charmides. We look at how refutation represents here a purgative treatment not by using contradictory propositions, but with the use of a certain dialectic of the image, the ones of Critias and Socrates facing Charmides. Examining this dialectic, which refers to the study of the mimetic dimension that the young boy maintains with the two men, we wish to reflect on how the indirect refutation of Charmides draws the outline of Socrates's possible poetical activity. This poetry resists to the critics made later in the Republic pertaining to the use of images relating to certain models of virtue, by showing the motion of thought, and hence guiding Charmides in his own intellectual motion. By reflecting on the «poetical refutation» we find in Plato's Charmides, this thesis explores the possibility of linking what seems to ground Socrates's intellectualism in the early dialogues to the poetry that is rejected par Socrates in the Republic, besides the one that pertains to the «defense of good men». Philosophie Philosophy Platon Plato Socrate Socrates Charmide Charmides Réfutation Refutation Poésie Poetry Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)
6	Erôs and Education : Socratic Seduction in Three Platonic Dialogues Dypedokk Johnsen, Hege January 2016 (has links) Plato’s Socrates is famous for claiming that “I know one thing: That I know nothing” (see e.g. Ap. 21d and Meno 81d). There is one subject that Socrates repeatedly claims to have expertise in, however: ta erôtika (see e.g. Symp. 198d1). Socrates also refers to this expertise as his erôtikê technê (Phdr. 257a7–8), which may be translated as “erotic expertise”. In this dissertation, I investigate Socrates’ erotic expertise: what kind of expertise is it, what is it constituted by, where is it put into practice, and how is it practiced? I argue that the purposes this expertise serve are, to a significant extent, educational in nature. After first having clarified the dissertation’s topic and aim, as well as my methodological approach, I present an initial account of erôs and Socrates’ erotic expertise. While discussing what constitutes Socrates’ erotic expertise, I account for two erotic educational methods: midwifery and matchmaking. I further argue that these methods tend to be accompanied by two psychological techniques, namely charming and shaming. I argue that these methods and techniques are systematically applied by Socrates when he puts his erotic expertise into practice. In the dissertation, three dialogues where Socrates practices his erotic expertise are scrutinized: Lysis, Charmides, and Alcibiades I. I focus on Socrates’ encounters with the eponymous youths of the dialogues, and each dialogue is devoted a chapter of its own. I show how these dialogues are erotically charged, and also how Socrates in these dialogues demonstrates his erotic expertise. I argue that Socrates’ expertise on erôs plays an essential role in his attempts to engage the three youths in the processes of self-cultivation, learning, and the very practice of philosophy. In the final chapter of the dissertation I turn to some questions that arise in light of my readings, and summarize the results of my investigation. Alcibiades Charmides desire education erôs erotic expertise learning love Lysis matchmaking midwifery philia Plato self-cultivation self-knowledge Socrates Socratic seduction sôphrosunê
7	Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics Bader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links) Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se. Plato Medical Ethics Aristotle Techne Craft Rhetoric Contraries Predication Autonomy Paternalism Research Ethics Therapeutic Misconception Meta-Analysis Gorgias Laws Euthydemus Eleutheria Episteme Hippocrates Persuasion Bia Peitho Health Disease Measurement Metaphysics Phaedrus Privation Franklin G. Miller Education Informed Consent Freedom Lysias Hippias Minor Philebus Statesman Sophist Charmides Republic Protagoras Kolakeia Flattery Arche Essence Definition Suppliant Maidens Heraclidae Philoctetes Slavery Competition 0422
8	Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics Bader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links) Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se. Plato Medical Ethics Aristotle Techne Craft Rhetoric Contraries Predication Autonomy Paternalism Research Ethics Therapeutic Misconception Meta-Analysis Gorgias Laws Euthydemus Eleutheria Episteme Hippocrates Persuasion Bia Peitho Health Disease Measurement Metaphysics Phaedrus Privation Franklin G. Miller Education Informed Consent Freedom Lysias Hippias Minor Philebus Statesman Sophist Charmides Republic Protagoras Kolakeia Flattery Arche Essence Definition Suppliant Maidens Heraclidae Philoctetes Slavery Competition 0422

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