The relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades was infamous in antiquity. Alcibiades’ notorious betrayal of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war helped to bring about Athens’ downfall, and the charges of corrupting the young and impiety for which Socrates was ultimately executed point unambiguously to the misdeeds of his most renowned and treasonous pupil. In Plato’s Alcibiades, Socrates approaches Alcibiades for the first time, claiming to have the power to bring the youth’s grandest and most tyrannical political hopes to a culmination. What does the ensuing conversation tell us about the nature of Alcibiades’ ambition and about Socrates’ intentions in associating with him? In this essay, careful attention is paid to the structure and unity of this underappreciated dialogue in order to uncover Plato’s teaching about the roots of political ambition and the approach of Socratic philosophy. The resulting analysis reveals that Socrates is interested in recruiting politically ambitious students because of how powerfully youthful political ambition seeks the good by means of just, noble, and honorable activity, and that Socrates’ hope is to awaken Alcibiades to the ambiguous and unquestioned character of his belief that the greatest human good can be obtained in the world of politics. Having recognized this as central to the Socratic project, we can consider how and to what extent political ambition relies on some misapprehension about the relationship of the good and the advantageous to the just and the noble. / text

In evaluating Alcibiades' speech in Plato's Symposium, modern commentators often either conflate the historical figure and the fictive character, or else fail to make a distinction between Alcibiades the narrator and Alcibiades the eager young man whose adolescent encounters with Socrates which the more mature adult describes. The resulting scholarship tends to cast Alcibiades as a foil for Socrates and to reduce Plato's creation to a philosophic cautionary tale. Such reductions are misleadingly simplistic and require revision.By taking care to let neither history nor reputation supersede the textual evidence the Symposium provides, we can make a compelling case for a more moderate assessment of Alcibiades' philosophical progress. In doing so, we find that he is not lacking in understanding but rather that his understanding is incomplete. As such, Alcibiades occupies the vaguely defined space of intermediacy and intermediaries--the metaxu with which so much of the Symposium is concerned.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2004. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 305-311) and index.

My goal in the present work is to add to our understanding of Socratic protreptic. I do so by focussing on psychological traits and qualities of character in Socrates’ young associates. There are a number of candidates throughout the dialogues whose colourful depiction and careful psychological rendering offer us ample material for study. In this study, I focus on two characters in particular. First, I look at the presentation of Alcibiades in the final scene of Symposium. Here I explore how Plato uses hubris and shame to explain the failure of protreptic in this gifted Socratic associate. Next, I look at Theaetetus as presented in the eponymously named dialogue. His characterization as an able, intelligent and model candidate for philosophy gives us a penetrating insight into the Socratic ideal. Finally, I offer a reading of Eros in Phaedrus that examines the psychological dynamic between the lover and his beloved. While a number of types of lovers are envisioned in this dialogue, I argue that if a beloved is to succeed in turning toward philosophy his lover must be a philosophical lover motivated by other-regarding care for his beloved’s soul. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-04-02 11:04:07.292

From Introduction: Much of the commentary is historical and biographical in its emphasis. In making detailed reference to other accounts , I have tried to fill important gaps in Nepos' brief and (in places) abrupt account, to compare the picture of Alcibiades in his account with that of other accounts and to trace sources which he may have used important passages have been quoted in full so that verbal similarities can be seen. A striking feature of Nepos' work is his tendency to describe many non-Roman situations in Roman terms. This reflects not only his vagueness about details (a common fault in his writing), but also perhaps a desire to make his Lives more relevant to his reading public and thus more readable. From antiquity to the present day biography and history have tended to be distinguished from each other, and biography has had the greater popular appeal. Readability is perhaps the most abiding quality of Nepos' Lives and Alcibiades may be the most readable of them all. On the whole Nepos portrays him consistently, although of course he also emphasises the inconsistency which was such an important part of his nature. He has told the story simply, yet dramatically; many of the complicated details about Alcibiades are omitted, yet particular incidents are highlighted, notably the return to Athens and the assassination. Above all, from Nepos' Life there emerges the impression that Alcibiades was unique and worth writing about.

Alcibiades was one of the most dynamic and engaging figures of the Peloponnesian War. Like a chameleon, he managed to change himself to fit almost any occasion and audience; few historical figures can claim to have successfully switched allegiances as many times during a conflict. Starting as a general in Athens, he moved on to side with the Spartans, then the Persians, and then returned to Athens. Some would consider him a young and impulsive egoist, but a closer investigation indicates that he more than likely had a larger, pragmatic goal motivating his actions. This essay will aim first to establish his break from the philosophical status quo of Athens, and then to determine the nature of these larger goals. It will pivot around Alcibiades’ address to the Athenian assembly, using it in a comparative analysis of both Pericles’ Funeral Oration, and briefly supplementing it with Plato’s Alcibiades I.

De amore: Socrates and Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium”. This articleproposes to study the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades according toPlato’s Symposium. By these means, we seek to relect upon the other kind of lovewhich Socrates also exempliies in the dialogue, with the aim of understandingSocrates’ behavior towards Alcibiades beyond the moral contraposition betweenthe spiritual love of contemplation and the earthly love of Alcibiades. Moreover,we aim to present an approach to this relationship without identifying it with aSocratic conirmation of Diotima’s version. To this end, we will not neglect theimportant homoerotic atmosphere of the dialogue and the epoch. / Este artículo se propone estudiar las relaciones entre Sócrates y Alcibíades según la versión de Platón en el Banquete. Con ello, se busca relexionar acerca del otro tipo de amor del que Sócrates también es protagonista en el diálogo, con el fin de comprender su comportamiento con Alcibíades, más allá de contraponer moralmente el amor espiritual de la contemplación y el amor terrenal de Alcibíades. Más aun, se busca una lectura sobre la relación sin ver en ella necesariamente la confirmación socrática de la versión de Diotima. Para tal fin, no se omite el ambiente homoerótico propio del diálogo ni de la época.

Depuis une trentaine d’années environ, les études sur la réfutation, ou elenchos (ἔλεγχος), se sont multipliées. Cet engouement n’est pas étranger à la publication d’un article de Gregory Vlastos, intitulé « The Socratic Elenchus », dans lequel sont abordées des thèses qui tranchent avec les théories généralement acceptées jusqu’alors. Or, il est intéressant de noter que Vlastos a complètement écarté l’Alcibiade de son étude, le jugeant apocryphe, et ce, même si les arguments apportés par les tenants de l'inauthenticité de l'Alcibiade sont loin d'être convaincants. Dans le cadre de ce mémoire, nous comptons mener une analyse détaillée du texte de Vlastos et de l’Alcibiade, en nous attachant particulièrement aux questions suivantes : qu’est-ce que l’Alcibiade nous dit de l’elenchos? Que nous apprend-il de nouveau? En quoi ces révélations originales viennent-elles invalider ou confirmer les théories de Vlastos ou notre conception traditionnelle de la réfutation socratique? Le premier chapitre s’intéressera principalement aux thèses présentées dans la dernière version de « The Socratic Elenchus », parue en 1994 dans Socratic Studies. Nous en ferons un résumé critique et nous intéresserons aux réactions de différents commentateurs. Le deuxième chapitre se concentrera quant à lui sur l’Alcibiade. Nous proposerons une analyse de ce dialogue en nous concentrant principalement sur le thème de l’elenchos, puis confronterons les principales thèses de Vlastos aux résultats de notre analyse. Notre mémoire montrera que la description de l'elenchos donnée par Vlastos ne correspond pas à celle fournie dans l’Alcibiade. / For about thirty years, studies on refutation, or elenchus (ἔλεγχος), have multiplied. This interest has been stimulated by the publication of an article by Gregory Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus, in which an original and controversial theory of the elenchus is presented. It is interesting to note, however, that Vlastos rejected Plato’s Greater Alcibiades from his study, judging it inauthentic, even though the arguments presented by the supporters of its inauthenticity are rather unconvincing. In this master’s thesis, a detailed analysis of Vlastos’ article and the Greater Alcibiades will be conducted. Special attention will be given to the following questions: what the Greater Alcibiades can tell us on the elenchus? Can it tell us something new? If so, will this new knowledge confirm or invalidate the theories of Vlastos or the traditional conception of Socratic refutation? The first chapter focuses on the thesis presented in the last version of the article “The Socratic Elenchus”, published in 1994 in Socratic Studies. A critical summary of the article shall then be presented in addition to an exposition of the reactions of various commentators. The second chapter will focus on the Greater Alcibiades. An analysis of this dialogue, more precisely of the elenchus, is conducted as well as a comparison of Vlastos’ principal thesis with the results of our analysis. This master’s thesis will show that the Greater Alcibiades provides a description of the elenchus that does not concur with Vlastos’ conception.

Qu’est-ce que l’être humain ? La question se pose depuis plusieurs millénaires. Platon n’y échappe pas et il suit l’inscription du temple de Delphes, le fameux « connais-toi toi-même », lorsqu’il cherche à mieux cerner l’homme dans ses écrits. Cette quête de l’essence de l’homme est présente à plusieurs moments de l’œuvre de Platon, mais nous sommes d’avis qu’il ne suggère jamais de définition de l’homme aussi claire que dans l’Alcibiade. Toute la fin de ce dialogue se consacre à cette question et l’on y trouve un Socrate avide de partager sa propre pensée sur le sujet. Les commentateurs de ce dialogue ne s’entendent pourtant pas sur la signification que l’on doit donner à ce développement parfois obscur sur l’essence de l’homme. Plusieurs affirment que l’homme y est présenté comme étant essentiellement son âme, d’aucuns que l’homme y est la réunion du corps et de l’âme, et d’autres encore que l’homme y est plutôt présenté comme étant la partie rationnelle de son âme. Les trois chapitres de ce mémoire présentent et analysent les arguments principaux de chaque camp dans le but de trancher la question. Il y est défendu que dans l’Alcibiade l’homme est, de manière approximative, son âme, mais que de manière plus précise, il correspond à la partie en lui qui domine, soit sa raison. Il y est également suggéré que cette conception de la nature humaine est reprise ailleurs dans le corpus platonicien. / What does it mean to be human? Plato is one of many to have pondered the eternal question and followed the famous Temple of Delphi inscription, “Know thyself.” While the quest for the essence of humanity is present in many of Plato’s writings, I believe that the Alcibiades gives us his clearest definition. Indeed, the entire ending of the dialogue is devoted to it, with Socrates enthusiastically offering his thoughts on the matter. Scholars are of different minds as to the proper interpretation of this somewhat obscure passage on the essence of human nature. Some argue that Plato is portraying man as primarily defined by his soul, others that the body and soul are both part of the definition of man, and others still, that man is the rational part of his soul. The three chapters of this thesis outline and analyze the main arguments of each school of thought in the hopes of resolving this contentious question. The argument will be made that in the Alcibiades, man is defined broadly as his soul, but more specifically as the dominant part of himself, his reason in other words. It will also be suggested that a similar portrayal of humanity is found in other works by Plato.

Depuis une trentaine d’années environ, les études sur la réfutation, ou elenchos (ἔλεγχος), se sont multipliées. Cet engouement n’est pas étranger à la publication d’un article de Gregory Vlastos, intitulé « The Socratic Elenchus », dans lequel sont abordées des thèses qui tranchent avec les théories généralement acceptées jusqu’alors. Or, il est intéressant de noter que Vlastos a complètement écarté l’Alcibiade de son étude, le jugeant apocryphe, et ce, même si les arguments apportés par les tenants de l'inauthenticité de l'Alcibiade sont loin d'être convaincants. Dans le cadre de ce mémoire, nous comptons mener une analyse détaillée du texte de Vlastos et de l’Alcibiade, en nous attachant particulièrement aux questions suivantes : qu’est-ce que l’Alcibiade nous dit de l’elenchos? Que nous apprend-il de nouveau? En quoi ces révélations originales viennent-elles invalider ou confirmer les théories de Vlastos ou notre conception traditionnelle de la réfutation socratique? Le premier chapitre s’intéressera principalement aux thèses présentées dans la dernière version de « The Socratic Elenchus », parue en 1994 dans Socratic Studies. Nous en ferons un résumé critique et nous intéresserons aux réactions de différents commentateurs. Le deuxième chapitre se concentrera quant à lui sur l’Alcibiade. Nous proposerons une analyse de ce dialogue en nous concentrant principalement sur le thème de l’elenchos, puis confronterons les principales thèses de Vlastos aux résultats de notre analyse. Notre mémoire montrera que la description de l'elenchos donnée par Vlastos ne correspond pas à celle fournie dans l’Alcibiade. / For about thirty years, studies on refutation, or elenchus (ἔλεγχος), have multiplied. This interest has been stimulated by the publication of an article by Gregory Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus, in which an original and controversial theory of the elenchus is presented. It is interesting to note, however, that Vlastos rejected Plato’s Greater Alcibiades from his study, judging it inauthentic, even though the arguments presented by the supporters of its inauthenticity are rather unconvincing. In this master’s thesis, a detailed analysis of Vlastos’ article and the Greater Alcibiades will be conducted. Special attention will be given to the following questions: what the Greater Alcibiades can tell us on the elenchus? Can it tell us something new? If so, will this new knowledge confirm or invalidate the theories of Vlastos or the traditional conception of Socratic refutation? The first chapter focuses on the thesis presented in the last version of the article “The Socratic Elenchus”, published in 1994 in Socratic Studies. A critical summary of the article shall then be presented in addition to an exposition of the reactions of various commentators. The second chapter will focus on the Greater Alcibiades. An analysis of this dialogue, more precisely of the elenchus, is conducted as well as a comparison of Vlastos’ principal thesis with the results of our analysis. This master’s thesis will show that the Greater Alcibiades provides a description of the elenchus that does not concur with Vlastos’ conception.