Submitted by Fabio Sobreira Campos da Costa (fabio.sobreira@ufpe.br) on 2016-08-15T12:09:43Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO 2015.pdf: 1312846 bytes, checksum: 7aabfa3931d2003bcc0c56e25633b6b8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-15T12:09:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO 2015.pdf: 1312846 bytes, checksum: 7aabfa3931d2003bcc0c56e25633b6b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-03 / A presente dissertação versa o olhar heideggeriano ao processo de objetificação partindo desde os fundamentos modernos deste fenômeno até a sua consecução na era da técnica moderna. Esforçamo-nos primeiramente por expor a crítica apresentada por Heidegger à posição moderna da ontologia fundamentada na Vorhandenheit a partir do projeto de uma ontologia fundamental contida em Ser e Tempo. Seguindo o fio condutor da ontologia fundamental, analisamos a crítica do filósofo a insuficiente compreensão do ente humano enquanto sujeito (subjetum) como base para uma interpretação do processo de objetificação. Buscaremos, pois, expor as bases para uma desconstrução heideggeriana do projeto moderno. Em seguida, através da análise da verdade, observamos uma alteração na perspectiva heideggeriana na compreensão da metafísica. A procura pelo sentido do ser cede lugar à busca pela verdade do ser. Essa mudança ampliará seu entendimento sobre o fenômeno da objetificação. Ela estabelecerá a perspectiva do acontecer histórico do próprio ser no homem. O sentido do ser como horizonte de compreensão do Dasein cede lugar à apropriação crítica da acontecência da verdade do ser numa perspectiva histórico-filosófica, o qual a expansão planetária da técnica é a concreção desse processo. A técnica é, pois, a consumação do processo de objetificação moderno. / This paper deals with Heidegger’s approach into the objectification process starting from the basic of this modern phenomenon to its development in the era of modern technology. Firstly, we struggle for exposing the criticism presented by Heidegger to the modern position of the ontology based on the Vorhandenheit from the original project presented in Being and Time. Flowing thorough the fundamental ontology we analyze the philosopher's criticism of lack of understanding of the human being as a subject (subjetum) as the foundation for an interpretation of the objectification process. Thus, we intend to express the grounds for Heidegger's deconstruction of modern project. Then, by analyzing the truth, we take notice of a change in Heidegger's perspective in the understanding of metaphysics. The seek for the sense of the being gives way to the seek for the truth of being. It will establish the perspective of the historical event of being in the human itself. The sense of being as a project onto the horizon of understanding from Dasein gives way to critical appropriation of happening the truth of the being in a historical and philosophical approach, in which the global dimension of the technique is the concretion of this process. The technique is therefore the consummation of modern objectification process.

The essay deals with the understanding of the two key concepts from Sein und Zeit (SZ) mentioned in the headline, including a debate on the issue of das Man in Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. It is noted that reading SZ involves being simultaneously written by the work in a process of reciprocity; this entails a questioning of alleged possession of this or any work, it having been made accessible to the public by its publication. Das Man, as a concept for inauthenticity, needs a counterpart for authenticity, which in SZ is provided by Eigentlichkeit, Self-ownership.This comes into existence via “being-towards-death”, where the caring being, as a being of possibilities, encounters its ultimate possibility death which is also the end of possibilities. The Inquiry debate, the main contenders of which were Hubert Dreyfus and Frederick Olafson, hinges on the question whether das Man should be understood primarily as “at bottom a deformation of Mitsein” (Olafson) or “the conformity necessary for the institution of collectively intelligible social practices (Dreyfus, in the words of his advocate in the debate, Taylor Carman). Both sides, however, give evidence of misreadings of SZ of a kind that call for an explanation. The proposal is that this could be given in an analysis of such a rhetoric of polemics that transforms SZ into a state of Vorhandenheit when making it an object of investigation by the contenders rather than such a tool for being-changed that is mentioned above. The relation between the two aspects of das Man, as oppressive know-all or as forms of established truth for Dasein, remains unsolved, however. At the end of the essay, das Man is understood primarily as established truth. It is argued that it should be seen as involved in a process of change as its immobility must be challenged by the living/dying, a challenge that is being recuperated into das Man in order to re-establish itself as undisputed truth and thereby changing it. This change involves technical developments, including the threat of these to the living.