China's policy makers see international standards as a barrier to their country's economic development, more importantly, as an offence to the country's national pride. This belief has been reinforced by the view that multi-national companies have used international standards to force developing countries to deprive them of the ability to enter the international markets by forcing them to pay high royalty rates, due to the patents incorporated in these standards. Moreover, these standards, as they believe, have been created at international standards setting platforms dominated by multi-national companies and developed countries. In return, China has launched several initiatives to create home-made Chinese standards free from patent claims of these companies. China's home-madestandards, some of which differ significantly from international standards, also reportedly serve to protection of its domestic market. China's accession to the WTO was formally approved in November 2001 and China became the WTO's 143rd member on December 11, 2001. WTO membership opened a new era for China. In spite of the international expectations for removal of all trade protection mechanisms which are incompatible with the international trade regime, China is reported to have sought to reform its policies by employing new strategies concerning IPR and standards. The thesis of this report is that China has not diverged significantly from developing home-made Chinese standards after the country’s entry into the WTO, but Chinese authorities have adopted more flexible strategies to implement this policy. Accordingly, this report is about change in policy strategies. I argue that China has continued to enforce its own will upon foreign companies with a strong self-confidence stemming from its ability to negotiate on unequal terms with foreign companies, owing to its sheer market size. However, China's new strategies have been shaped by weak coordination and disagreement among government agencies and institutions. To illustrate the potential explanatory power of this account, I have examined two important home-made standards initiatives by China; Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) and Audio Video Coding Standards (AVS). From the examination of the WAPI and AVS cases, I conclude that China's strategies have continued to evolve through disagreements and negotiations between Chinese government institutions within policy boundaries set by China's WTO membership and increasing international criticism. / text

本論文試圖檢驗中國在技術標準化中推動自主標準的政治思維，並以全球治理概念中多元主體的研究途徑作為論文的基本分析架構。本論文試圖探尋以下三個問題的解答：其一，檢驗全球治理理論在分析技術標準議題的適用性；其二，描繪出中國的政府角色在全球治理中為重要的「看不見的手」；其三，歸納出中國推行自主技術標準的舉動為闡述中國在「和諧世界」政策下中國式全球治理思維的經典案例。 　　本論文首先回顧了不同派別的全球治理理論。和既存理論最大的差異為，作者認為全球治理是一種動態的調整過程。中國藉由政府主導的模式，協助尚未成熟的第二、第三部門(企業及公民社會)參與全球治理，這種強調政府角色在全球治理中重要性的傾向，使得中國被歸類於「國家中心維持現狀派」。中國的學者將此種現象稱為「中國特色的全球治理」或是「中國模式」，然而本論文歸納出所謂中國模式的特色是以西方的價值為政策架構，本質上以政府的力量增進傳統國際關係理論中的核心國家利益項目。換言之，中國特色的全球治理為尚未成熟的全球治理。本論文的案例－中國的技術標準制定政策，闡述了中國參與全球治理的學習歷程，因此，將此稱為「過渡中的全球治理」，以彰顯中國參與全球技術標準化競爭的特殊狀態。 於知識的權力結構體系中，擁有技術標準制定的權力日趨重要，中國的技術標準戰略因而規劃於 2020 年前成為領導創新的國家之一。然而在中國 WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) 技術標準制定的經驗中，隱約可見中國在全球治理中自我調整的動態過程，這種觀察為現有主流的全球治理理論無法充分解釋的。 / The thesis tries to examine Chinese initiative in indigenization of technical standardization for the global market. The basic analytical framework is based on the theoretical concept of Global Governance with a multi-actor approach. The following chapters try to touch upon three inquiries. First, it examines the applicability of global governance on standards setting issues. Second, it depicts the ”invisible hand” of Chinese government in global governance. Finally, it concludes that Chinese initiative in indigenizing technical standardization can be a good case in point to demonstrate a Chinese version of global governance under the guidance of “harmonious world.” This thesis reviews different schools of global governance. Unlike any of the existing literature, the author considers global governance itself a dynamic adjusting process. China partakes in global governance by emphasizing guidance from the government to boost the second and third sectors which are relatively underdeveloped. Namely, China inclines to be characterized into “state-centric status quo” school, which affirms that government is the most determining actor of global governance, thus not willing to give up “controls of the government.”Chinese scholars dub this phenomenon “Chinese version of global governance” or “China model.” This paper concludes that the so called “China Model” of global governance was conducted in western culture’s framework with a realist’s state-led approach in essence. In other words, Chinese version of global governance can not be regarded as a full-fledged one. The case study standard setting policy of China has illustrated a better picture of China’s learning process of global governance. Accordingly, “global governance in process” was coined into the title of this thesis to identify the current status of China’s involvement in global competition of technical standardization. Given the growing stake of “technical standards setting” in a knowledge-based power structure, Chinese initiative of technical standardization strategy has paved the way for pursuing leading innovative state in 2020. The lesson China learned from WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) standard setting has provided us a clues about the self-adjusting role of the state in global governance as a dynamic process which could not be fully explained by conventional version of global governance prevailing nowadays.