This thesis is concentrated on the topic of the post-war migration of Roms from Slovakia to the Czech Lands as the crucial process in the post-war history of Roms on the territory of former Czechoslovakia which had its effects not only on individual groups of Roms living in Slovakia and migrating to the Czech Lands, but also on the next developments in the relations of the Czech majority society towards the Roms and changes in the approach to them on the side of central state institutions. The thesis offers a presentation of a complex historic case study of post-war migration of a particular local group of Roms from south- eastern Slovakia to the city of Brno (Moravia), based on a synthetic research method combining both oral history and written sources of mostly regional provenience. The author has applied the method in two different contexts: while reconstructing the developments in the situation of the group of Roms and their relations with the majority society in Slovakia during 1920' to 1970's, and while mapping the post-war migration of part of these people in relation to two localities in the Czech Lands, with one representing a transit locality of their early post-war migration and the other their final destination where this group of Roms lives still today. The author places the case study...

On April 9, 1940, Germany invaded Denmark. Instantly, the fate and status of Greenland, a Danish colony, was thrust into limbo. During the war, Greenland’s vital mineral resources and location made it significant for the warring parties on both sides of the Atlantic. However, conflicting international corporate and political interests made any act to defend the island on the part of the Allies, or the officially neutral Americans, problematic. Within a year of the Danish occupation, the American government had signed an agreement for the defense of Greenland, extending the protection of both the Monroe Doctrine and the American military to the island. This action was an important step in the formal expansion of American influence in the Western Hemisphere that occurred during the Second World War. This thesis argues that global economic, political, and technological changes led to Greenland’s increased geopolitical significance and set the stage for a shift in the balance of power within the North Atlantic Triangle. It demonstrates how decisions relating to the security of the island came to be made and how conflicting interests within and between governments affected the genesis of the occupation. It explores how Winston Churchill’s decision to mine the North Sea led to the American occupation of Greenland and examines the ways in which the effects of Churchill’s actions raised concerns in Canada about the possibility of a British defeat, which in turn led Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, to align his foreign policy closer to that of the United States’ President Roosevelt. This thesis also asserts that Roosevelt successfully used the potential foreign occupation of Greenland to demonstrate to the American public the dangers of foreign conflicts to the United States and to further his hemispheric security objectives both domestically and abroad. These events had a profound and lasting impact on the relationships within the North Atlantic Triangle and on political identity in Greenland, and signalled an important shift in the foreign policy of the United States toward greater American involvement in world affairs.

This study examines the Allied notion of victory and how it was expressed in the depth of Allied strategic planning in 1918 for a campaign in 1919. Using the Supreme War Council (SWC) as a lens this study's arguments are threefold. The first is that, with the creation of the SWC, the Allies pursued a notion of victory that was focused on a decisive military defeat of the German army. Their timeline to victory over the enemy was affected by their perception of the enemy’s strength, their assessment of the difficulties inherent in overcoming the military advantage offered by the Central Powers' interior lines, their appraisal of the European members' morale to continue the war, and their ability to gather the necessary superiority in material and manpower resources. The second argument is that, through the SWC, the Allies were able to successfully coordinate strategy and resources. This study analyses the workings of the SWC as an international body and an early example of modern alliance warfare, comparing the perspectives of the British, French, American and Italian representatives in their willingness and unwillingness to coordinate national needs with alliance ones, arguing that the coalition did form a unified policy and strategy for the campaign in 1919. The abrupt ending of the war has obscured historians' understanding of coalition warfare in the First World War, as they have not sufficiently considered the serious planning that took place for 1919. Third, it argues that at the SWC level, the coalition members recognized the interdependent nature of the theatres, and thus the importance of all them for the conduct of the war.

Before 1891, it was commonly accepted that the most important source for the rule of the Four Hundred in Athens in 411 BCE was Thucydides' description. The situation changed thanks to the publication of the Aristotelian treatise On the Athenian Constitution, whose version of events differed markedly from Thucydides' one. There followed many attempts at determining which of the two versions was most reliable, or at combining the two versions. These controversies are the focal point of this thesis, but its ambitions are not limited to them: its ambition is also to reconstruct the chronology of the rule of the Four Hundred as precisely as is possible in context of the Peloponnesian war; and to formulate the limitations that are imposed on us by the character of sources at our disposal. Continuity of the coup with earlier developments and its impact on subsequent events are dealt with more briefly.

La présente étude porte sur l'expression de la mémoire féminine dans les fictions traitant de la guerre civile espagnole (1936-1939) et du franquisme. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux œuvres publiées depuis la fin de la dictature (1975) jusqu’en 2010, en français (Agustin Gomez-Arcos et Mercedes Deambrosis) et en espagnol (Dulce Chacón, Carme Riera, Josefina Aldecoa, Jesús Ferrero, Marifé Santiago Bolaños et Ángeles Caso). <p>Nous nous attachons d’abord à l’étude globale des représentations des expériences féminines de la guerre et de la répression. Dans l’écriture des violences subies comme dans celle des luttes et résistances, la double dimension politique et de genre émerge. L’analyse se resserre ensuite sur les représentations du traumatisme, entre manifestations pathologiques et tentatives de ritualisation. Nous montrons à cet égard comment le récit peut assumer une fonction rituelle.<p>La « poétique du traumatisme » mise au jour dans le corpus d’étude qualifie des réalisations formelles diverses, rassemblées en trois ensembles, correspondant à autant de lieux possibles d’ancrage du traumatisme :le rapport générationnel, le corps et la voix. Une attention spéciale est accordée à la figure de la victime. Des phénomènes tels que la répétition et la délinéarisation, apparaissant à divers niveaux du récit, éclairent le rapport que les fictions entretiennent avec le passé ainsi que leurs positions éthiques et politiques dans le présent de la démocratie. <p><p>The current study explores the expression of women’s memory in literary works dealing with the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and Francoism. It focuses on the fictional narratives published between the end of the dictatorship (1975) and 2010, in French (Agustin Gomez-Arcos and Mercedes Deambrosis) and Spanish (Dulce Chacón Carme Riera, Josefina Aldecoa, Jesús Ferrero, Marifé Santiago Bolaños and Ángeles Caso).<p>The thesis first conducts a global analysis on the representations of women’s experiences of war and repression. In the writing of violence, struggle and resistance, the double political and gendered dimension emerges. The research focuses subsequently on the trauma representations, between pathological manifestations and ritual attempts, and shows how narrative can assume a ritual function.<p>The « poetics of trauma » characterises various formal realisations, divided into three groups. Each of them embodies a possible space for the inscription of trauma :the generational link, the body and the voice. Special attention is given to the figure of the victim. Phenomena such as repetition and delinearisation, that appear at various levels, clarify the relationship that fictional narratives build with the past as well as their ethical and political positions in the democracy. / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation studies the history of the German Red Cross of the German Democratic Republic and the German Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany. The dissertation begins with Germany’s defeat and capitulation in the Second World War into the occupation period, situating the pre-1945 German Red Cross in the chaos of the war’s end and its dissolution and ban by the Allied Powers. It investigates the aid work of new regional Red Cross societies in the Western occupation zones and the political debate about the Red Cross’s place in a socialist East Germany. The dissertation also analyzes the new national Red Crosses’ formation in 1952 and their domestic activities. These are two parallel histories of states with many similarities, while existing separately from one another and with differing ideological visions for the future. The German Red Crosses remained linked by their pasts and the circumstances of the present. This reality is reflected in their efforts to join the International Red Cross from 1952 to 1956, and in their collaboration to reunify families separated by the inter-German border. The dissertation argues that the histories of the German Red Crosses and humanitarianism contributes to our understanding of the fundamental predicaments faced by divided Germany in the early-Cold War. The Red Crosses shaped the responses to the challenges facing the region, whether they be the immediate suffering and long-lasting aftereffects wrought by total war, new anxieties about a nuclear future, or the need for modern disaster response and public health infrastructures. And humanitarianism was never purely altruistic. It was a useful political tool for East and West Germany and their peoples, who sought stability and peace and the successful completion of their ideological projects: creating socialism in the East and a liberal capitalist order in the West. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / On September 19, 1945, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany disbanded the German Red Cross and labelled it a Nazi organization, and the American, British, and French occupation governments followed suit. By 1952, two new national Red Cross organizations formed in divided Germany, the German Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Red Cross of the German Democratic Republic. This dissertation explores the history of the German Red Cross in West and East Germany from 1945 to 1965 and asks fundamental questions about the role of humanitarianism in Germany’s postwar recovery and reconstruction, in the daily life of two distinct but connected societies, and in the international relations of the Cold War. The dissertation argues that humanitarianism and humanitarian organizations are not immune to politics; indeed, humanitarianism was a useful tool for those on both sides of the ideological divide. It helped legitimize and sustain communism in East Germany, and it did the same for liberal capitalism in West Germany. In the first postwar decades, the German Red Crosses faced head on the manifest problems of East and West Germany, as both societies recovered from the influence of Nazism, the perpetration of genocide, and the destruction of war and set out to find security and peace under the weight of the Cold War. The two organizations were uniquely positioned to face those problems as their leaders were well connected and their aid workers were both humanitarian subject and humanitarian.

No description available.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.