yes / The Afghan conflict changed significantly after the Soviet withdrawal and especially after the collapse of the communist regime in April 1992. External support, which at some point had been running to the tune of $3 billion a year to all sides, rapidly faded and the military commanders increasingly faced the problem of how to fund their armies in the face of a declining propensity of the civilian population to contribute to the war effort. The hold of the parties based in Pakistan and Iran over the field commanders rapidly weakened, even if some of the political leaders had been forward looking enough to accumulate financial resources through the hoarding of military supplies, which were then sold on the black market. The partial financial autonomy of some political leaders of the jihadi movement was not enough to stem the tide towards weaker and weaker links between parties and commanders, not least because the parties were reluctant to spend whatever resources they had accumulated, lest they lose their leverage in the future.

This is an integrative paper aiming to encapsulate the themes of my previously published work upon which this PhD is being assessed. This work; encompassing several papers and various chapters of my book are attached behind this essay. The research question, examines the effect of Western support to warlords on political legitimacy in the post 9/11 Afghan war. I contextualise the research question in terms of my critical engagement with the literature of strategists in Afghanistan during this time. Subsequently, I draw out themes in relation to the available literature on warlords, politics and security in Afghanistan. I highlight the value of thinking about these questions conceptually in terms of legitimacy. I then introduce the published work, summarising the focus of each paper or book chapter. Later, a ‘findings’ section addresses how the policy of supporting warlords has affected legitimacy through its impact on security and stability, the political settlement and ultimately whether Afghans choose to accept the Western-backed project in Afghanistan, or not. I argue that this issue is important as it has security implications not just in the immediate region, but increasingly, throughout the Middle East and possibly further.

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux luttes d'influence entre deux groupes élitaires au Libéria post-conflit (2003-2018): les Warlords, dont le pouvoir repose sur la mobilisation d'acteurs violents et les technopols, dont l'infuence repose sur leur possession de diplômes reconnus internationalement et leurs contacts avec certains acteurs internationaux (FMI, BM, USAID, la Citi bank,etc.). Nous soutiendrons dans cette thèse que les technopols libériens ont réussi à exclure les warlords des institutions étatiques en se réappropriant les moyens et les discours de certains acteurs internationaux, mais ont continué à collaborer avec certains warlords pour exercer un contrôle relatif sur des régions en marge de l’influence de l’État.

This thesis examines approaches taken towards warlords and militias during the current U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan and that of the Soviet/Najibullah period analysing their impact on key state formation dynamics and state-building efforts. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, the study finds that while the current intervention has seen its warlord and militia strategies produce generally negative results, the past Soviet intervention can arguably claim some partial successes. Though these partial successes provided an “exit strategy”, they did not aid in the state-building efforts or regime stabilization goals that had been Moscow’s initial and primary goals. The study also point to the problematic omission of actors and social groupings, such as warlords and militias, in state-building theory, and shows how security goals as typically addressed in state-building need not be synonymous or conducive to the primitive accumulation of force that spurred dependency relationships in past state formation.

Abstract The aim of this essay was to examine the complicated process of state-building in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. This was done by using a theory-consuming case study and utilizing Charles T. Call theory on state-building and his three gaps: capacity, security and legitimacy. By utilizing the previously mentioned theory one can see the glaring issues that exist in all three sectors of the Afghan state. Corruption is a recurrent variable that disturbs performance and trust towards officials while the Taliban are the main military force that meddles with attempts of democratization and progress. The matter of dealing with local leaders and warlords still lacks a cohesive solution and the huge influence of opium remains a considerable source of income for not only terrorists but also a part of the poor population. With the democratic institutions being so fragile and the fear of the US leaving the state by itself, the near future is going to be critical in determining the path Afghanistan will walk in.

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy (Political Management) at Stellenbosch University / Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Inflicting a financial loss of over $US16 billion to international shipping, the occurrence of maritime piracy in areas such as the Strait of Malacca and the west coast of Africa, has significantly affected the long-term stability of global maritime trade. Since the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990’s, international watch groups have expressed their concern as to the rise of piracy off the Somali coast and the waterways of the Gulf of Aden. However, 2008 marked an unprecedented increase in pirate attacks in Somali waters. These attacks did not only increase in number but also became more sophisticated. As more than 85% of world trade relies on maritime transport, the world was forced to take notice of the magnitude of Somali piracy. Considering the relative novel nature of Somali piracy, this field presents a vast potential for further and in-depth academic inquiry. This descriptive and explanatory study set out to explore the evasive nature of the what and why (and who) of Somali piracy and relied on inductive reasoning in order (a) to explore and define the contributing causes to the Somali conflict; (b) to indicate how the conflict and the resulting consequences in particularly the Puntland region contributed to the rise of maritime piracy; (c) to determine whether the pirate groups are fishermen protecting their resources by acting like vigilantes and self-defence units, or if they were bandits, warlords, Islamists or a combination of aforementioned; and to (d) establish the role which resource scarcity and state collapse played in rendering Somalia vulnerable to maritime piracy. In pursuing the above mentioned goals, this study relied on an analysis of authoritative and contemporary sources. Media reporting was used for updating the fast moving information. This study attributed the Somali conflict to historic and ethnic clan rivalries and the legacy of colonial rule that led to the arbitrary partitioning of Somalia by colonial superpowers. Military rule, oppression, wars with neighbours (Ethiopia), superpower intervention, famine and the rise of warlords made for state failure in Somalia. In Puntland, such factors were further aggravated by severe environmental hardship and natural disasters. Food became one of the scarcest resources in Somalia. People migrated to cities and to the coast where foreign fishing vessels also exploited the absence of coast guards in plundering fish. Some Somali fishermen reacted and in retrieving fish, apprehended ships, resulting in armed robbery at sea. But many went further, hijacking merchant vessels, and demanding huge ransoms. Initially prompted by grievance towards the exploitation of the Somali coastal resources, the vast financial rewards of piracy rapidly transformed this impetus to personal gain and greed. In doing so, these groups assumed characteristic similar to criminal bandits and warlords. Or were they Islamists fundraising for al-Qaeda? But unlike warlords, pirates normally never kill. The links with either Islamists or terrorism have also not been established either. The alleged link with criminal networks is much more plausible. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Maritieme seerowery in areas soos die Straat van Malacca en aan die weskus van Afrika, het tot op datum, na raming, finansiële verliese van meer as $US16 biljoen aan internasionale skeepshandel berokken en het ‘n beduidende negatiewe effek op die langtermyn stabiliteit van globale maritieme handel. Sedert die verval van die Somaliese staat in 1991, het internasionale waarnemingsgroepe hul besorgdheid uitgespreek oor die toename van seerowery aan die Somaliese kus en die aangrensende Golf van Aden. Vanaf 2008 was daar egter ‘n ongekende toename in seerower aanvalle in Somaliese kuswaters. Nie alleen was daar ‘n toename in die aantal insidente nie, maar die aanvalle is gekenmerk deur meer gesofistikeerde metodes. Aangesien meer as 85% van wêreldhandel afhanklik is van seevervoer, was die wêreld genoodsaak om kennis te neem van die omvang van die verskynsel. Gegewe die feit dat Somaliese seerowery ‘n relatiewe onlangse verwikkeling is, bied hierdie veld groot potensiaal vir verdere en diepgaande studie. Die beskrywende en verduidelikende studie het ten doel om die ontwykende vraagstuk oor die wat, hoekom en wie van Somaliese seerowery te verken en by wyse van induktiewe beredenering die volgende vas te stel: (a) om die bydraende oorsake tot die Somaliese konflik te ondersoek en te definieer, (b) om aan te dui hoe die konflik en die gevolge daarvan, spesifiek in die Puntland streek, bygedra het tot die ontstaan van plaaslike seerowery (c) om vas te stel of die seerower-groepe vissers is wat hul bronne beskerm deur vigilante of selfverdedigings-eenhede te stig en of hulle oorlogsbaronne, radikale Islamiste of ‘n kombinasie van voorafgenoemde is, en (d) om die rol te beskryf wat hulpbron-skaarste en staatkundige verval gespeel het om die risiko van seerowery in Somalie te verhoog. In navolging van voorafgenoemde doelwitte het die ondersoek staatgemaak op ‘n deeglike ontleding van gesaghebbende en kontemporêre bronne. Hierdie teoretiese grondslag is verder aangevul deur media-verslaggewing oor die onderwerp. Die studie het bevind dat die Somaliese konflik toegeskryf kan word aan historiese en klanverskille en die nalatenskap van koloniale heerskappy wat mettertyd gelei het tot die arbitrere verdeling van Somalië deur koloniale moondhede, militêre onderdrukking, geskille met buurstate (Ethiopië), inmenging van supermoonthede, hongersnood en die opkoms van oorlogsbaronne. Hierdie faktore het bygedra tot die staatkundige verval van Somalië. In Puntland in besonder, is hierdie bydraende faktore vererger deur omgewingsontbering en natuurlike rampe. Gevolglik het voedsel een van die skaarste hulpbronne geword in Somalië. Hierdie omstandighede het die bevolking na die kus gedryf, waar buitelandse visserbote onwettig die mariene-bronne geplunder het. In reaksie hierop het die bevolking self die wapen opgeneem om sulke skepe te konfronteer wat gelei het tot gewapende roof ter see. Sekere vissermanne het egter verder oortree en bote gekaap en aangehou in ruil vir omkoopgeld. Dit was egter lank nie meer gekaapte vissersbote nie, maar handelsskepe met ander duursame vragte. Terwyl hul optrede aanvanklik gemotiveer is deur ontevredenheid met die onwettige ontginning van mariene bronne, het die aansienlike finansiele voordele van seerowery hierdie dryfveer mettertyd gewysig tot een van persoonlike gewin en hebsug. In hierdie proses het die groeperinge eienskappe ontwikkel soortgelyk aan kriminele rowers en oorlogsbaronne van die oopsee en radikale Islamiste. Anders as oorlogsbaronne het hierdie groepe egter nie die lewe van hul slagoffers geneem nie. Die verband tussen hierdie seerowergroepe en radikale Islamiste of terroriste groepe kan ook nie verseker vasgestel word nie. Daar is dus ‘n meer geloofwaardige verband tussen sulke groepe en georganiseerde kriminele netwerke.

Il coordinamento dell’aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo, evocato negli ultimi anni da più parti come la soluzione alla deludente efficacia degli aiuti è in realtà un argomento che nasce quasi contemporaneamente alle prime organizzazioni internazionali dedicate allo sviluppo . La funzione ambivalente delle Nazioni Unite, agente di mediazione diplomatica da un lato (mediazione tra stati e tra gruppi di potere all’interno dello stesso stato), e agente di sviluppo dall’altro, garantisce all’organizzazione un ruolo preminente nel coordinamento degli aiuti nei contesti di guerra e di post-conflitto. E’ questa stessa ambivalenza che impone all’organizzazione un rapporto ufficiale con i territori sottosviluppati, incardinato nella relazione con i governi centrali degli stati. La critica radicale all’aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo individua tutte le distorsioni politiche ed economiche legate all’afflusso dei fondi, sottolineandone le aggravanti possibili laddove esista una discrasia tra gli obiettivi di sviluppo delle Nazioni Unite e quelli dell’élite che occupa le posizioni apicali dello stato. Questa ricerca attraverso un’analisi storica del contesto, mette in luce l’interazione tra il sistema degli aiuti e il sistema-paese in Tajikistan dall’ingresso delle organizzazioni ai giorni nostri. L’analisi dimostra infine che la struttura politico-economica radicata sul territorio, pur conservando i tratti di uno “stato predatorio” (tratti non alleviati bensì aggravati dalle distorsioni legate all’afflusso dei fondi per lo sviluppo), sfugge in realtà alla definizione stessa di “Stato”. Questo dato rivela una debolezza insita nell’approccio metodologico del sistema degli aiuti che si fonda proprio sull’archetipo dello “Stato”. / The Official Development Assistance (ODA) coordination has been recently launched as a genuine mean to increase aid effectiveness. Actually, the “aid coordination” paradigm was born almost contemporaneously to the first international organizations dedicated to “development”. The ambivalent function of the United Nation that acts both as an agent of diplomatic mediation (among states and among different lobbies within the borders of the same state), and as a development agent, guarantees to United Nations a preeminent role in the field of aid coordination in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It’s this real ambivalence that compels the United Nations to deal with development countries through official relations with the central governments. The radical critique to development aid shows different political and economic distortions related to the incidence of foreign funds. At the same time, it underlines that wherever the goals of the official governments diverge from the development goals of the aid community these distortions might be even more burdensome for the country. This research, through an historical analysis, draws attention on the interaction among the development industry and the country-system in Tajikistan from the arrival of the international organizations to our days. The analysis demonstrates that the political and economic structure of the country, while maintaining the features of a “predatory state” (features which are not alleviated but worsened by the distortions brought about by the aid industry), simply do not comply with the definition of a “State”. This result highlights an innate weakness of the aid industry methodological approach that is in fact, fully based on the political archetype of the “State”.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Abstract: The African continent has been riddled with conflict for many years. Angola and Somalia are prime examples of countries having experienced protracted wars. During those wars, warlords have played a definite role in perpetuating the fighting. The thesis investigates warlordism in Africa. Specifically, it is a comparative analysis of Jonas Savimbi of Angola and Farah Aideed of Somalia. The thesis investigates the concept of warlords and uses the examples of Aideed and Savimbi to illustrate the impact of warlords on the respective countries. The examples of Aideed and Savimbi are further used to show that there are different ways to becoming ultimately labelled as a warlord. The role of state weakness and ethnicity will be investigated in the two cases. The discussion will highlight the points that state weakness (i.e. lack of governmental functionality) and the use of ethnicity play a profound role in the rise and survival of warlords. The case studies of Aideed and Savimbi will emphasise the influence of state weakness and ethnicity in their formation as warlords. The concept of state weakness is defined and the thesis illustrates that there are different levels of state weakness. The thesis compares Angola and Somalia, and shows that Savimbi and Aideed acted under vastly different conditions as warlords. Ethnicity is defined and linked to the idea that the effects of colonialism played a profound role in creating ethnic divisions, enabling warlords such as Aideed and Savimbi to use their ethnic backgrounds to mobilise followers to wage war. The thesis investigates how Aideed and Savimbi maintained their military organisations. Their ability to do so is related to both state weakness and ethnicity. State weakness and ethnicity create conditions which are conducive to the emergence of warlords.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and origins of warlord politics. The two warlords that were focused on, and compared, were Jonas Savimbi (Angola) and Charles Taylor (Liberia and Sierra Leone). Authors like Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contributed toward the base of this study. Their work captured the issues contributing toward the warlord phenomenon and generated thought surrounding the context in which these warlords arose. John Mackinlay (2000) was used to describe and analyse the origins of warlordism and how the warlord phenomenon has changed with the onset of new wars, especially in the late 20th and 21st centuries (Kaldor, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Thomas H. Greene (1984) was used in guiding this thesis into a systematic study, focusing mainly on the leadership, following, organization, techniques and external support of both Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as examples of contemporary warlords. Through utilizing the contributions of the above authors on this topic, the similarities and differences between the two warlords were explored. The study found that while Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor emerged from different eras and contexts (Savimbi out of the Cold War and Taylor as a result of globalization), they both became typical warlords. Savimbi only became a warlord after 1992. Before, Savimbi used Maoist ideology while an insurgent against Portugal, whereafter he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war. Taylor was a warlord in diamond-rich neighbouring Sierra Leone. Both used identity politics to gather a following while Taylor used brute force and the manipulation of the youth. They both manipulated illicit criminal networking and operated internationally, smuggling diamonds. The main difference, however, is that Taylor was an insurgent in Liberia where he seized power in 1990 and became president in 1997, while a warlord in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Savimbi, on the other hand, never attained presidential power even though he participated in the 1992 Angolan elections which he lost, whereafter he ceased to be a revolutionary, and became a real warlord without the external support he previously had. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, currently standing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He stands trial for the human right atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Their legacies live on. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om die faktore te beskryf wat gely het tot die ontstaan van krygshere (“warlords“)in Angola en Sierra Leone, en om die dinamika van krygsheerpolitiek beter te verstaan. Die twee krygshere waarop gefokus en vergelyk was, is Jonas Savimbi (Angola) en Charles Taylor (Liberië en Sierra Leone). Die denke van skrywers soos Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) en Collier & Hoeffler (2004) het bygedra tot die basis van hierdie studie. Hulle werk het ingesluit die aspekte wat bygedra het tot die krygsheer fenomeen, en het besinning aangemoedig oor die agtergrondsfaktore waaruit hierdie twee krygshere ontstaan het. John Mackinlay (2000) se werk is gebruik om die oorsprong van krygsheerpolitiek te beskryf, asook hoe die krygsheerfenomeen verander het met die uitbreek van “nuwe oorloë“ (Kaldor, 2006), veral aan die einde van die 20ste en 21ste eeue. Verder is die werk van Thomas H. Greene (1984) gebruik om hierdie tesis ‘n sistematiese struktuur te gee wat gefokus is op die leierskap, volgelinge, organisasie, tegnieke en eksterne ondersteuning van Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor. Hierdie twee persone is albei voorbeelde van kontemporêre krygshere in die jongste verlede. ‘n Vergelykende studie verg dat ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee krygshere verken word deur gebruik te maak van die bydraes van bogenoemde skrywers. In die studie is bevind dat alhoewel Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor uit verskillende eras en agtergrond kom (Savimbi uit die Koue Oorlog en Taylor as gevolg van globalisasie), albei tipiese krygshere geword het. Savimbi het Maoistiese ideologie gebruik terwyl hy ’n insurgent teen Portugal was. Daarná het hy ’n rebel in die Angolese burgeroorlog geword. Hy het eers na 1992 ‘n krygsheer geword nadat hy die verkiesing verloor het en sy buitelandse steun verloor het. Taylor, aan die ander kant, was ‘n krygsheer in die diamantryke buurland, Sierra Leone. Altwee krygshere het identiteitspolitiek gebruik om volgelinge te kry, terwyl Taylor ook brutale krag en die manipulasie van die jeug gebruik het. Hulle het beide internasionale diamante gesmokkel deur kriminele netwerke te gebruik. Die groot vi verskil is egter dat terwyl Taylor ‘n krygsheer in Sierra Leone was, was hy ook ‘n insurgent in Liberië, waar hy in 1990 mag gekry het en in 1997 president geword het. Savimbi, aan die ander kant, het nooit presidensiële mag verkry nie, alhoewel hy deelgeneem het aan die 1992 Angolese verkiesing. Hy het daarna opgehou om ‘n revolusionêr en ‘n rebel te wees en het ‘n ware krygsheer geword (sonder die eksterne ondersteuning wat hy voorheen gehad het). Savimbi is in 2002 vermoor en Taylor het in 2003 abdikeer. Taylor is tans onder verhoor in Den Haag waar hy tereg staan by die Internasionale Strafhof vir oorlogsmisdade en menseregteskendings in Sierra Leone. Beide hierdie krygshere se nalatenskap leef egter voort.

The renewed interest in empire, particularly in its British and American variants, has brought into sharper relief the difficulties both metropoles faced in projecting order in the global south. Far from cohesive entities, the British and American empires tried to manage territories that defied many of the political, economic, and legal systems, as well as normative and moral understandings, that enabled their imperial ascendancy. Despite a considerable literature about how metropoles comprehended these frustrated imperial plans, limited insights can be found into the way Britain and the United States coped with the influence of war in the uneven expansion of order. This challenge is brought into focus by examining one of the most direct formulations of the relationship between war and order in US and British imperialism, namely the concept of warlord. The concept’s history, it is argued, provides a glimpse into the far-reaching influence cultural constructions of war had in how US and British policymakers, journalists, and advocates conceived of and projected order in the non-European world. Such influential understandings also inspired overstated conclusions about the degree to which both imperial powers could realise their visions of order in the global south. Drawing on discursive and historical methods, the dissertation develops a conceptual framework that distils the core features of ‘warlords’ in the US and British imperial imaginaries. This conceptual approach is used to revisit some of the most formative encounters with colonial and contemporary ‘warlords’, as captured in British and American policy debates, political commentary, and popular culture, during two highpoints in British and American imperial history, 1815-1914 and 1989-2006 respectively. These arguments bring to the forefront how instead of an ancillary part of conclusions about the inferiority of non-European cultures, as suggested in much of the post-colonial literature, notions of war conditioned many of Britain and the United States’ enduring conception of and strategies for managing the uneven development of order in the global south.