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Warranted and warrantless search and seizure in South African income tax law : the development, operation, constitutionality and remedies of a taxpayerBovijn, Silke 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MComm)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 74D of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 (the Act) grants the power of
search and seizure to the South African Revenue Service, the basic underlying
principle being that the Commissioner has to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to
a search and seizure operation. The previous section 74(3) of the Act provided that
the Commissioner was allowed himself to authorise and conduct a search and
seizure operation without the requirement of a warrant. Section 74D of the Act was
recently reviewed and the Tax Administration Bill (the TAB) contains the new
provisions on search and seizure that will replace section 74D of the Act.
In this assignment, the concept of search and seizure was examined by considering
the cases, academic writing and other material on the topic. The objectives were to
analyse the development of search and seizure in South African income tax law, to
provide a basic understanding of the warranted and warrantless search and seizure
provisions of the Act and the TAB, to determine their constitutionality and to
determine the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a search
and seizure.
It was found that search and seizure has developed from warrantless under the
previous section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant under section
74D of the Act into a combination of both under the TAB.
The concept of an ex parte application was analysed, which was shown to be
permissible in certain circumstances under section 74D of the Act, while it is now
compulsory in terms of the TAB. It was shown that the TAB closed the lacuna in the
Act relating to the validity period of a warrant before it has been executed. It was,
however, concluded, regarding whether a warrant expires when exercised or whether the same warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and
seizure, that the position is not quite certain in terms of the Act and the TAB. It was
found that there is no defined meaning of the reasonable grounds criterion, which is
often required to be met in terms of the Act and the TAB, but that anyone that has
to comply with the criterion must be satisfied that the grounds in fact exist
objectively.
The new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB were analysed. It was
established that warrantless search and seizure provisions are not uncommon in
other statutes, but that the content thereof often differs. The new warrantless
provisions were compared to the warrantless search and seizure provisions of, inter
alia, the Competition Act No 89 of 1998 (the Competition Act), and it was found that
the warrantless TAB provisions are not in all respects as circumscribed as those of
the Competition Act and recommendations for counterbalances were made.
It was concluded that the warranted search and seizure provisions of the Act and the
TAB should be constitutionally valid but that the constitutionality of the new
warrantless provisions of the TAB is not beyond doubt.
It was furthermore found that the remedies at the disposal of a taxpayer who has
been subject to a search and seizure should indeed be sufficient, but that there are
no remedies available to a taxpayer to prevent injustice or harm. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 74D van die Inkomstebelastingwet No 58 van 1962, (die Wet) verleen aan die
Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens die mag van deursoeking en beslaglegging, die
grondliggende beginsel synde dat die Kommissaris ’n lasbrief van ’n regter moet
verkry voor die deursoeking en beslaglegging kan plaasvind. Die vorige artikel 74(3)
van die Wet het bepaal dat die Kommissaris self ’n deursoeking en beslaglegging kon
magtig en uitvoer sonder die vereiste van ’n lasbrief. Artikel 74D van die Wet is
onlangs hersien en die nuwe Belastingadministrasie-wetsontwerp (BAW) bevat die
nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging wat artikel 74D van die Wet sal
vervang.
In hierdie werkstuk is die konsep van deursoeking en beslaglegging ondersoek deur
oorweging van die hofsake, akademiese skrywe en ander materiaal oor die
onderwerp. Die doelstellings was om die ontwikkeling van deursoeking en
beslaglegging in die Suid-Afrikaanse inkomstebelastingreg te ontleed, om ’n basiese
begrip van die bepalings in die Wet en die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging
met en sonder ’n lasbrief te verskaf, om die grondwetlikheid daarvan te bepaal en
om die remedies te bepaal wat beskikbaar is vir ’n belastingpligtige wat onderworpe
was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging.
Daar is bevind dat deursoeking en beslaglegging ontwikkel het vanaf sonder ’n
lasbrief ingevolge die vorige artikel 74(3) van die Wet tot die vereiste van ’n lasbrief
ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet tot die kombinasie van albei ingevolge die BAW.
Die konsep van ’n ex parte-aansoek is ontleed, en dit blyk in sekere omstandighede
ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet toelaatbaar te wees, terwyl dit nou ingevolge die
BAW verpligtend is. Daar is aangedui dat die BAW die lacuna in die Wet oor die geldigheidsperiode van ’n lasbrief voordat dit uitgevoer is, verwyder het. Daar is
egter bevind, rakende die vraag of ’n lasbrief verval wanneer dit uitgevoer word en
of dieselfde lasbrief weer gebruik kan word om ’n tweede deursoeking en
beslaglegging uit te voer, dat daar nie sekerheid ingevolge die Wet of die BAW
bestaan nie. Daar is bevind dat daar geen gedefinieerde betekenis vir die kriterium
van redelike gronde is nie, waaraan dikwels ingevolge die Wet en die BAW voldoen
moet word, maar dat enigiemand wat aan die kriterium moet voldoen tevrede moet
wees dat die gronde inderwaarheid objektief bestaan.
Die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief
is ondersoek. Daar is vasgestel dat bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging
sonder ’n lasbrief nie ongewoon is in ander wette nie, maar dat die inhoud daarvan
dikwels verskil. Die nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n
lasbrief is vergelyk met die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n
lasbrief van, inter alia, die Mededingingswet No 89 van 1998 (die Mededingingswet),
en daar is bevind dat die BAW-bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n
lasbrief nie in alle opsigte so afgebaken is soos dié van die Mededingingswet nie en
voorstelle vir teenwigte is gemaak.
Die gevolgtrekking is gemaak dat die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging met
’n lasbrief van die Wet en die BAW grondwetlik geldig behoort te wees, maar dat die
grondwetlikheid van die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en
beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief nie onweerlegbaar is nie.
Daar is verder bevind dat die remedies tot die beskikking van ’n belastingpligtige wat
onderworpe was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging inderdaad genoegsaam behoort
te wees, maar dat daar geen remedies aan ’n belastingpligtige beskikbaar is om
ongeregtigheid of skade te voorkom nie.
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A constitutional perspective of police powers of search and seizure in the criminal justice systemBasdeo, Vinesh 11 1900 (has links)
Before 1994 criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and the
untrammelled law enforcement powers of the executive which resulted in the
authoritarian and oppressive criminal justice system of the apartheid era. The
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 has since created a democratic state based on the
values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The basic principles
of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of
Rights protects the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact
with organs of the state which includes the police. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 authorises the police to search for and to seize articles, and has long provided
the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize articles and for
performing such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally the
standard for these measures and actions taken under their purview has been one of
reasonableness. Since the birth of the Constitution there has been additional
constraints on search and seizure powers. Not only are there now constitutionalised
standards by which such legal powers are to be measured, but there is also the
possibility of excluding evidence obtained in course of a violation of a constitutional
right. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are now qualified by the
Constitution. Where feasible a system of prior judicial authorisation in the form of a
valid search warrant obtained on sworn information establishing reasonable grounds
is a precondition for a valid search or seizure. Search and seizure without a warrant
is permitted only in exceptional circumstances such as an immediate threat to
person or property. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures the
Constitution places important limits on police efforts to detect and investigate crime.
The Constitution appreciates the need for legitimate law enforcement activity. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.
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A constitutional perspective of police powers of search and seizure in the criminal justice systemBasdeo, Vinesh 11 1900 (has links)
Before 1994 criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and the
untrammelled law enforcement powers of the executive which resulted in the
authoritarian and oppressive criminal justice system of the apartheid era. The
Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 has since created a democratic state based on the
values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The basic principles
of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of
Rights protects the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact
with organs of the state which includes the police. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 authorises the police to search for and to seize articles, and has long provided
the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize articles and for
performing such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally the
standard for these measures and actions taken under their purview has been one of
reasonableness. Since the birth of the Constitution there has been additional
constraints on search and seizure powers. Not only are there now constitutionalised
standards by which such legal powers are to be measured, but there is also the
possibility of excluding evidence obtained in course of a violation of a constitutional
right. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are now qualified by the
Constitution. Where feasible a system of prior judicial authorisation in the form of a
valid search warrant obtained on sworn information establishing reasonable grounds
is a precondition for a valid search or seizure. Search and seizure without a warrant
is permitted only in exceptional circumstances such as an immediate threat to
person or property. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures the
Constitution places important limits on police efforts to detect and investigate crime.
The Constitution appreciates the need for legitimate law enforcement activity. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.
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