Thesis (MComm)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 74D of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 (the Act) grants the power of search and seizure to the South African Revenue Service, the basic underlying principle being that the Commissioner has to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to a search and seizure operation. The previous section 74(3) of the Act provided that the Commissioner was allowed himself to authorise and conduct a search and seizure operation without the requirement of a warrant. Section 74D of the Act was recently reviewed and the Tax Administration Bill (the TAB) contains the new provisions on search and seizure that will replace section 74D of the Act. In this assignment, the concept of search and seizure was examined by considering the cases, academic writing and other material on the topic. The objectives were to analyse the development of search and seizure in South African income tax law, to provide a basic understanding of the warranted and warrantless search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB, to determine their constitutionality and to determine the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a search and seizure. It was found that search and seizure has developed from warrantless under the previous section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant under section 74D of the Act into a combination of both under the TAB. The concept of an ex parte application was analysed, which was shown to be permissible in certain circumstances under section 74D of the Act, while it is now compulsory in terms of the TAB. It was shown that the TAB closed the lacuna in the Act relating to the validity period of a warrant before it has been executed. It was, however, concluded, regarding whether a warrant expires when exercised or whether the same warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and seizure, that the position is not quite certain in terms of the Act and the TAB. It was found that there is no defined meaning of the reasonable grounds criterion, which is often required to be met in terms of the Act and the TAB, but that anyone that has to comply with the criterion must be satisfied that the grounds in fact exist objectively. The new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB were analysed. It was established that warrantless search and seizure provisions are not uncommon in other statutes, but that the content thereof often differs. The new warrantless provisions were compared to the warrantless search and seizure provisions of, inter alia, the Competition Act No 89 of 1998 (the Competition Act), and it was found that the warrantless TAB provisions are not in all respects as circumscribed as those of the Competition Act and recommendations for counterbalances were made. It was concluded that the warranted search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB should be constitutionally valid but that the constitutionality of the new warrantless provisions of the TAB is not beyond doubt. It was furthermore found that the remedies at the disposal of a taxpayer who has been subject to a search and seizure should indeed be sufficient, but that there are no remedies available to a taxpayer to prevent injustice or harm. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 74D van die Inkomstebelastingwet No 58 van 1962, (die Wet) verleen aan die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens die mag van deursoeking en beslaglegging, die grondliggende beginsel synde dat die Kommissaris ’n lasbrief van ’n regter moet verkry voor die deursoeking en beslaglegging kan plaasvind. Die vorige artikel 74(3) van die Wet het bepaal dat die Kommissaris self ’n deursoeking en beslaglegging kon magtig en uitvoer sonder die vereiste van ’n lasbrief. Artikel 74D van die Wet is onlangs hersien en die nuwe Belastingadministrasie-wetsontwerp (BAW) bevat die nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging wat artikel 74D van die Wet sal vervang. In hierdie werkstuk is die konsep van deursoeking en beslaglegging ondersoek deur oorweging van die hofsake, akademiese skrywe en ander materiaal oor die onderwerp. Die doelstellings was om die ontwikkeling van deursoeking en beslaglegging in die Suid-Afrikaanse inkomstebelastingreg te ontleed, om ’n basiese begrip van die bepalings in die Wet en die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging met en sonder ’n lasbrief te verskaf, om die grondwetlikheid daarvan te bepaal en om die remedies te bepaal wat beskikbaar is vir ’n belastingpligtige wat onderworpe was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging. Daar is bevind dat deursoeking en beslaglegging ontwikkel het vanaf sonder ’n lasbrief ingevolge die vorige artikel 74(3) van die Wet tot die vereiste van ’n lasbrief ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet tot die kombinasie van albei ingevolge die BAW. Die konsep van ’n ex parte-aansoek is ontleed, en dit blyk in sekere omstandighede ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet toelaatbaar te wees, terwyl dit nou ingevolge die BAW verpligtend is. Daar is aangedui dat die BAW die lacuna in die Wet oor die geldigheidsperiode van ’n lasbrief voordat dit uitgevoer is, verwyder het. Daar is egter bevind, rakende die vraag of ’n lasbrief verval wanneer dit uitgevoer word en of dieselfde lasbrief weer gebruik kan word om ’n tweede deursoeking en beslaglegging uit te voer, dat daar nie sekerheid ingevolge die Wet of die BAW bestaan nie. Daar is bevind dat daar geen gedefinieerde betekenis vir die kriterium van redelike gronde is nie, waaraan dikwels ingevolge die Wet en die BAW voldoen moet word, maar dat enigiemand wat aan die kriterium moet voldoen tevrede moet wees dat die gronde inderwaarheid objektief bestaan. Die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief is ondersoek. Daar is vasgestel dat bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief nie ongewoon is in ander wette nie, maar dat die inhoud daarvan dikwels verskil. Die nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief is vergelyk met die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief van, inter alia, die Mededingingswet No 89 van 1998 (die Mededingingswet), en daar is bevind dat die BAW-bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief nie in alle opsigte so afgebaken is soos dié van die Mededingingswet nie en voorstelle vir teenwigte is gemaak. Die gevolgtrekking is gemaak dat die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging met ’n lasbrief van die Wet en die BAW grondwetlik geldig behoort te wees, maar dat die grondwetlikheid van die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief nie onweerlegbaar is nie. Daar is verder bevind dat die remedies tot die beskikking van ’n belastingpligtige wat onderworpe was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging inderdaad genoegsaam behoort te wees, maar dat daar geen remedies aan ’n belastingpligtige beskikbaar is om ongeregtigheid of skade te voorkom nie.

Before 1994 criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and the untrammelled law enforcement powers of the executive which resulted in the authoritarian and oppressive criminal justice system of the apartheid era. The Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 has since created a democratic state based on the values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The basic principles of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights protects the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact with organs of the state which includes the police. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 authorises the police to search for and to seize articles, and has long provided the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize articles and for performing such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally the standard for these measures and actions taken under their purview has been one of reasonableness. Since the birth of the Constitution there has been additional constraints on search and seizure powers. Not only are there now constitutionalised standards by which such legal powers are to be measured, but there is also the possibility of excluding evidence obtained in course of a violation of a constitutional right. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are now qualified by the Constitution. Where feasible a system of prior judicial authorisation in the form of a valid search warrant obtained on sworn information establishing reasonable grounds is a precondition for a valid search or seizure. Search and seizure without a warrant is permitted only in exceptional circumstances such as an immediate threat to person or property. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures the Constitution places important limits on police efforts to detect and investigate crime. The Constitution appreciates the need for legitimate law enforcement activity. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

Before 1994 criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of Parliament and the untrammelled law enforcement powers of the executive which resulted in the authoritarian and oppressive criminal justice system of the apartheid era. The Constitution, Act 108 of 1996 has since created a democratic state based on the values of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. The basic principles of criminal procedure are now constitutionalised in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights protects the fundamental rights of individuals when they come into contact with organs of the state which includes the police. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 authorises the police to search for and to seize articles, and has long provided the only legal basis for obtaining warrants to search for and to seize articles and for performing such actions without a warrant in certain circumstances. Generally the standard for these measures and actions taken under their purview has been one of reasonableness. Since the birth of the Constitution there has been additional constraints on search and seizure powers. Not only are there now constitutionalised standards by which such legal powers are to be measured, but there is also the possibility of excluding evidence obtained in course of a violation of a constitutional right. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are now qualified by the Constitution. Where feasible a system of prior judicial authorisation in the form of a valid search warrant obtained on sworn information establishing reasonable grounds is a precondition for a valid search or seizure. Search and seizure without a warrant is permitted only in exceptional circumstances such as an immediate threat to person or property. By prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures the Constitution places important limits on police efforts to detect and investigate crime. The Constitution appreciates the need for legitimate law enforcement activity. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.