Trois pays d’Amérique latine – la Bolivie, l’Équateur et le Venezuela – ont dénoncé la Convention pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements entre États et ressortissants d’autres États. Cette « vague » de dénonciations témoigne d’un rejet du système d’arbitrage, créé par la Convention de Washington, considéré comme déséquilibré, antidémocratique, onéreux et discriminatoire. Aux yeux de l’Amérique latine, l’arbitrage CIRDI serait conçu pour bénéficier exclusivement aux investisseurs au détriment des États hôtes des investissements. Dans ce travail de recherche, l’approche de l’Amérique latine relative à la Convention de Washington sera présentée en deux étapes. D’abord, les évolutions liées au cadre économique et juridique latino-américain, des prémices de la Convention en 1964, jusqu’á son adoption définitive dans les années 90, seront analysées. Puis seront abordées les principales critiques émises actuellement contre le système d’arbitrage CIRDI. Quels sont les facteurs déterminants du changement dans les politiques en matière d’investissements étrangers en Amérique latine ? Les pays, qui ont dénoncé la Convention de Washington, ont-ils des raisons suffisamment valables de rejeter l’arbitrage transnational en matière d’investissements ? Le CIRDI a-t-il failli dans l’accomplissement de ses fonctions ? Ce travail de recherche vise à répondre à ces questions en analysant la Convention de Washington sous un angle latino-américain. / Three countries in Latin America - Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela - have denounced the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States. This "wave" of denunciations reflects a negative perception of the arbitration system created by the ICSID Convention, which is described as unbalanced, undemocratic, expensive and discriminatory. In Latin America’s view, ICSID arbitration was created to benefit only to investors at the expense of investments’ host states. This research focuses on the Latin America’s approach on the Washington Convention addressing it in two stages. First, the Latin American economic and legal framework in the early discussions on the draft of the Convention in 1964 and its subsequent adoption in the 1990s will be addressed. Secondly, the subjects that currently arouse the main criticisms to the ICSID arbitration system will be detailed. What are the reasons of change in foreign investment policies in Latin America? Do the countries that denounced the Washington Convention have acceptable reasons for rejecting investments’ transnational arbitration? Did ICSID failed in the performance of its duties? This research aims to answer these questions by analyzing the Washington Convention from the Latin American perspective.

This thesis addresses the problem concerning the contribution of foreign investments to the economic development of the host State as a jurisdictional requirement under the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”). The ICSID Convention governs the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes for the institution of arbitral proceedings between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States. While the institution of arbitral proceedings under the ICSID Convention is contingent upon the consent of the disputing parties, the jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to disputes that fulfill certain requirements. One of the core requirements of the jurisdiction of the Centre is that the dispute must arise out of an investment. Although the ICSID Convention lacks a definition of investment, most arbitral tribunals that had to define the function and content of the investment requirement concluded that the ICSID Convention contains a notion of investment that may not be waived by the consent of the disputing parties. The majority of these decisions considered that the contribution to the economic development of the host State would be one of the elements of such notion of investment. According to these decisions, the economic development requirement, as an element of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention, could be inferred from the wording of the first recital of the Preamble of the ICSID Convention, which states that the ICSID Convention was concluded considering the role of private international investments in the economic development. It is submitted in this thesis, however, that these decisions were based on a misapplication of the general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the existing customary international law rule of treaty interpretation, given that they ignore the ordinary meaning of the term “investment” as employed in the ICSID Convention. The general rule of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention establishes a method by which each source of the intention of the parties to the treaty plays a relevant role. Above all, treaty interpretation must be based on the text of the treaty, which must be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms. The use of the object and purpose of a treaty is a second step and may not be relied on in order to contradict the ordinary meaning of the terms employed in the treaty and to confer a special meaning on them.