Does authoritarian regime provide social protection to its people? What is the purpose of social welfare provision in an authoritarian regime? How is social welfare policy designed and enforced in the authoritarian and multilevel governance setting? Who gets what, when and how from the social welfare provision in an authoritarian regime? My dissertation investigates these questions through a detailed study of Chinese social health insurance from 1998 to 2010. I argue and empirically show that the Chinese social health insurance system is characterized by a nationwide stratification pattern as well as systematic regional differences in generosity and coverage of welfare benefits. I argue that the distribution of Chinese social welfare benefits is a strategic choice of the central leadership who intends to maintain particularly privileged provisions for the elites whom are considered important for social stability while pursuing broad and modest social welfare provisions for the masses. Provisions of the welfare benefits are put in practice, however, through an interaction between the central leaders who care most about regime stability and the local leaders who confront distinct constraints in local circumstances such as fiscal stringency and social risk. The dynamics of central-local interactions stands at the core of the politics of social welfare provision, and helps explain the remarkable subnational variation in social welfare under China's authoritarian yet decentralized system. This dissertation attempts to contribute to the studies of authoritarianism, decentralization and social welfare in the following aspects. First, in specifying the rationale, conditions and policy results of the interaction between Chinese central and local leaders in social welfare provision, the dissertation sheds light on how political leaders in an authoritarian regime with multilevel governance structure respond to social needs. The analysis of subnational politicians' incentive structure and policy choices in social welfare provision, which are missing in most extant studies of authoritarianism and social welfare, demonstrates an "indirect accountability" built into the Chinese social welfare provision. This "indirect accountability", evidenced by local leaders' proactive accommodation of social and local needs through social policies, may partially account for the puzzling resilience and flexibility of Chinese authoritarian regime. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that social welfare expansion, in some cases, is not a result of democracy but of resilient authoritarianism. Social welfare is one tool employed by authoritarian leaders to maintain regime stability. The political motivation for social welfare provision is different in non-democracies--it is more directly from top-down pressure of maintaining order rather than from bottom-up demands as in democracies--but this does not mean that non-democracies provide less social welfare than democracies do. Furthermore, the dissertation highlights the multidimensionality of social welfare policy and the trade-offs that politicians face in distributing welfare benefits. It suggests that politicians, no matter in democracies or non-democracies, face similar policy trade-offs (e.g. coverage versus generosity) in social welfare provision and that they make policy choices on the different dimensions of social welfare -coverage, generosity and stratification- according to the specific institutional and socioeconomic constraints they encounter. It is the combination of these different choices that constitute the variation of social welfare provision observed cross countries and within countries.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2003. / Advisor: Dr. Wendy P. Crook, Florida State University, School of Social Work. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Oct. 6, 2003). Includes bibliographical references.

This paper examines British Columbia's residency requirement on social assistance implemented by the NDP government on December 1, 1995. The policy created a three-month waiting period for newcomers to the province before they could apply for social assistance. Because it violated ;the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), the residency requirement put the BC government at risk of losing, through federal penalty, many millions of dollars more than the intended savings. To explain the BC government's decision-making, I use a rational choice nested games approach. I argue that the residency requirement policy produced two sets of interactions in two separate policy arenas. In the principal arena, the British Columbia Social Services Ministry negotiated with the federal Department of Human Resources Development (HRD). The negotiations centred on the possibility of federal concessions in- exchange for BC withdrawing the residency requirement. In the secondary arena, the federal Department of Finance was consulting with its provincial counterparts regarding the' long-term funding formula for the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) set to replace CAP on April 1, 1996. Social Services interacted with the federal Department of Finance to influence the outcome of the funding decision. I propose that the BC government risked minimal resources in the primary arena to gain substantially higher payoffs from the CHST funding formula. The government linked these two arenas through a 'trade-off strategy that allowed them to apply the political pressure and communication generated by the residency requirement and negotiations with HRD to the Finance arena. This enabled them to. increase the possibility of a favourable payoff in that arena. I find that the rational, choice approach produces an explanation that reflected the government's actual decision-making more closely than other theoretical approaches.

Ekonomistų siūlomi įvairūs ekonominės gerovės vertinimo variantai. Tačiau nei vienas jų neparodo visaverčio ekonominės gerovės vaizdo. Todėl darbo tikslas – išanalizuoti ekonominės gerovės matavimo per makroekonominius rodiklius galimybes. Problemai ištirti darbe išskiriamos trys dalys. Pirmoje dalyje numatoma išanalizuoti ekonomikos teoriją (istorinės ekonomikos mokyklų idėjos, gerovės ekonomikos vieno pradininkų A.C.Pigou idėjos, matematinės krypties atstovų idėjos). Antroje dalyje per statistinių duomenų analizę (Europos Sąjungos pavyzdžiu) bandoma suvokti ir apibrėžti galimų rodiklių pritaikomumą ekonominės gerovės matavime. Taip padaromas pagrindas trečiajai daliai. Šioje darbo dalyje bandoma išvesti vieningą ekonominės gerovės matavimo indeksą, apibendrinantį visus jau nagrinėtus tinkamus makroekonominius rodiklius. Padaryta teorinė analizė ir empirinis tyrimas leido darbo autoriui sukurti ir aprašyti sistemą (ekonominės gerovės indeksą), kuris apima pagrindinius makroekonominius rodiklius bei leidžia įvertinti abi ekonominės gerovės sudedamąsias dalis: turtingumą bei pasiskirstymą. Sistemos išbandymas realiais statistiniais duomenimis leido iš esmės ją subalansuoti. / Although economists offer different variants for welfare measuring, none of this variants can disclose the fool situation of economic wellbeing. That is why the main goal of this thesis is to analyze possibilities of economic welfare measuring by macroeconomics indicators. The thesis includes three parts. The first one is for theoretical analyses (ideas of historical economic schools, thoughts by A.C.Pigou – one of the welfare economics beginners, mathematic direction of economics). In the second part usefulness of possible indicators for measuring of economical welfare is being tried to discover through analysis of statistics data (using European Union statistics). That is how basis for the third part was made. In the last part unified index of economic welfare, which summarizes all mentioned macroeconomics indicators, is tried to be obtained. Theoretical analysis and empirical research allowed to make and describe the system (index of economic welfare) for the author by himself. This system includes main macroeconomical indicators and allows to unite both parts of economic welfare wealth and distribution. After some test with statistical data index of economic welfare was mainly balanced.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 176-180). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 114-117). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Washington, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-126).

Black women formed the first welfare rights organization in Atlanta composed of recipients and continued anti-poverty organizing for decades. Their strategy adapted to the political climate, including the ebb and flow of social movements. This thesis explores how and why that strategy changed as well as how the experiences of the women involved altered ideas of activism and movements.

This paper examines British Columbia's residency requirement on social assistance implemented by the NDP government on December 1, 1995. The policy created a three-month waiting period for newcomers to the province before they could apply for social assistance. Because it violated ;the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), the residency requirement put the BC government at risk of losing, through federal penalty, many millions of dollars more than the intended savings. To explain the BC government's decision-making, I use a rational choice nested games approach. I argue that the residency requirement policy produced two sets of interactions in two separate policy arenas. In the principal arena, the British Columbia Social Services Ministry negotiated with the federal Department of Human Resources Development (HRD). The negotiations centred on the possibility of federal concessions in- exchange for BC withdrawing the residency requirement. In the secondary arena, the federal Department of Finance was consulting with its provincial counterparts regarding the' long-term funding formula for the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) set to replace CAP on April 1, 1996. Social Services interacted with the federal Department of Finance to influence the outcome of the funding decision. I propose that the BC government risked minimal resources in the primary arena to gain substantially higher payoffs from the CHST funding formula. The government linked these two arenas through a 'trade-off strategy that allowed them to apply the political pressure and communication generated by the residency requirement and negotiations with HRD to the Finance arena. This enabled them to. increase the possibility of a favourable payoff in that arena. I find that the rational, choice approach produces an explanation that reflected the government's actual decision-making more closely than other theoretical approaches. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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