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Teilw. zugl.: Augsburg, Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2003.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on the History of Culture, March 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in

Orientador: Antonio Miguel / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T00:11:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FerreiradeSantana_DianaPatricia_D.pdf: 61557598 bytes, checksum: d70e3e9305614149df56a017a6270c4c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é fazer uma leitura das idéias de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre a linguagem, tendo o silêncio como fio condutor das nossas considerações. Temos uma dupla finalidade: a primeira é identificar as formas de silêncio na vida e obra do filósofo austríaco como uma tentativa de compreender o autor e seu estilo idiossincrático, marcado por uma escrita assistemática e aforística; a segunda é identificar as formas de silêncio expressos na aprendizagem da matemática escolar a partir da afirmação feita por Michael Peters de que há um potencial pedagógico na forma como o filósofo empreende sua crítica. Procuramos, através de uma perspectiva não convencional "mostrada" por Wittgenstein, identificar o não-dito, mostrá-lo e desvelar o feitiço por meio da linguagem que ainda prevalece na aprendizagem da matemática escolar / Abstract: The aim of this work is to make a reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein¿s ideas onlanguage taking the silence as thread of our considerations. We have a dual purpose: the first is to identify the forms of silence in the life and work of Austrian philosopher as an attempt to understand the author and his idiosyncratic style marked by an unsystematic and aphoristic writing; the second is to identify the forms of silence expressed in the learning of school mathematics from the assertion made by Michael Peters that there are pedagogical potential in how the philosopher makes his criticism. We seek, through unconventional perspective "shown" by Wittgenstein, identify the unspoken, show it and unveil the bewitchment by language that still prevails in the learning of school mathematics / Doutorado / Ensino e Práticas Culturais / Doutora em Educação

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

This thesis investigates the continuity of Wittgenstein’s approach to, and conception of, philosophy. Part One examines the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks can only be read as interesting and coherent if we see him, as urged by prominent commentators, resisting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. There is real difficulty, however, in ascertaining what the resulting Wittgensteinian position is: whether it is position structurally analogous with Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, or whether philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant to dissolve any drive towards such idealism. I argue that both of these readings of Wittgenstein are found in the work of McDowell. Part Two argues that related issues arise in respect to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the question of realism. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. Again, I argue, it is unclear whether Wittgenstein embraces a form of transcendental idealism or, on the contrary, ultimately reveals the idealist position to be empty. Part Three connects ‘sideways-on’ glances with the threat of idealism by introducing a philosophical ‘measure’. I argue that the measure is a useful tool in assessment of the Tractatus, and shows that Wittgenstein was no idealist, but is less useful as an assessment of the Investigations. It yields the result that Wittgenstein succumbed to idealism, but in doing so may overlook the ‘therapeutic’ nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

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