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South African attitudes towards participation in the Second World War and the immediate reaction to the decisionGates, Rosemary F 22 November 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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Wartime propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939 - 1945Monama, Fankie Lucas 04 1900 (has links)
Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, where whole
populations, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential
power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to
manipulate public opinion. Alongside politico-diplomatic, economic and military
manoeuvres, governments needed to mobilise the minds of their population to secure support,
to mobilise them behind the war policy and to avoid discontent and dissension. This was
particularly crucial to South Africa during the Second World War (1939-1945), especially as
the country was threatened by deeply ingrained political tensions and internal divisions. The
wartime Union, under General Jan Smuts, experienced an escalation of political extremism
and militancy from radical sections of white Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the
government’s war policy. Furthermore, some elements within even the Union Defence Force
(UDF) displayed disloyal tendencies which threatened the morale of the armed forces. Thus,
in response, the government waged a massive propaganda campaign during the war aimed at
stimulating recruitment, at preserving national morale, at combating anti-war resistance and
at minimising disruptions to the implementation of its war policy. To this end, the authorities exploited information avenues such as radio broadcasts, the press,
films, mobile recruiting tours and military demonstrations for publicity and propaganda
purposes. As propaganda delivery channels, radio, the press and films were potentially
powerful. However, the strategy pursued by the authorities failed to maximise their full
impact. The government also did not enjoy a media monopoly for the conduct of its war
propaganda. The SABC continued operating independently and its airtime was not handed
over to the authorities. Similarly, while the government relied on the support of sympathetic
newspaper editors for its propaganda campaign, newspapers themselves sometimes ignored
censorship regulations and published material which was unhelpful to the national war effort.
Meanwhile, the opposition press also contested the propaganda terrain by waging anti-war
campaigns. Films were the weakest link due to limited government control, production
obstacles and an English language dominance which alienated the majority of white
Afrikaans speakers. Another problem was persistent rivalry among various official and semiofficial
propaganda agencies and a lack of clarity over a common propaganda policy. When it came to recruitment, government propaganda achieved particularly limited success.
Despite patriotic appeals for volunteer enlistment, the shortage of manpower remained a
persistent problem throughout the war. Alongside this, social and economic problems such as
food and housing shortages also had a negative impact on public morale. The positive reach
of propaganda efforts within the military, especially education, information and social
welfare services, was also limited in that they were unable to dispel dissatisfaction resulting
from poor service conditions, military policies, and the growing influence of war weariness.
Towards the end of hostilities, there was a perceptible decline in troop discipline and morale.
In general, therefore, the Union government’s overall war publicity and propaganda effort
failed to produce a solid sense of national war cohesion or war unity. Although the country
remained stable and was able to sustain war participation, it could not be said that South
Africa’s leadership was able to persuade inhabitants – whether white or black - to participate
in the Second World War as a war to be embraced as a people’s war. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914-1918), die eerste “totale oorlog” in kontemporêre geskiedenis
waartydens nie net militêre magte nie, maar hele gemeenskappe by die oorlogspoging betrek
is, het die potensiaal van propaganda om die openbare mening met behulp van die
massamedia te manipuleer, tuisgebring. Naas polities-diplomatiese, ekonomiese en militêre
maneuvrering, moes regerings ook die gesindheid van die bevolking beïnvloed om hulle agter
die oorlogspoging te skaar en twis en tweedrag te vermy. Gesindheidsbeïnvloeding was vir
die Unieregering van kardinale belang gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-1945),
aangesien Suid-Afrika onder diepgaande politieke verdeeldheid en interne spanning oor die
oorlogskwessie gebuk gegaan het. Die Smuts-bewind het hewige politieke druk en militante
weerstand ervaar van Afrikanernasionaliste wat teen die regering se oorlogsbeleid gekant
was. Ontevrede elemente in die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) het insgelyks dislojale
neigings openbaar, wat die moraal van die gewapende magte ondermyn het. Die regering het
gevolglik gedurende die oorlog ’n omvattende propagandaveldtog van stapel gestuur om
weerstand teen sy oorlogspoging te beveg, ontwrigting in die implementering van die
oorlogsbeleid tot ’n minimum te beperk, die werwing van soldate te bevorder en die
nasionale moraal hoog te hou. Die Smuts-regering het ’n verskeidenheid van instrumente, waaronder radio-uitsendings, die
gedrukte media, rolprente, mobiele werwingsveldtogte en miltêre demonstrasies, vir hul
reklame- en propagandaveldtogte ingespan. Die regering se propagandastrategieë het egter
nie dié kragtige instrumente optimaal uitgebuit om maksimum trefkrag te verseker nie.
Daarby het die regering ook nie ’n monopolie oor alle mediaplatvorms vir geniet om hul
propagandaveldtogte te bedryf nie. Die SAUK het onafhanklik gefunksioneer en min lugtyd
aan die regering afgestaan om radio-uitsendings vir publisiteit en propagande te benut. Die
regering het voorts sterk op koerantredakteurs gesteun om hul propagandaveldtog te
bevorder, maar redakteurs het soms sensuurregulasies geïgnoreer en artikels geplaas wat
regeringsbeleid ondermyn het. Die opposisiepers het uiteraard ook die regeringspropaganda
met anti-oorlogpropaganda beveg. Rolprente was die swakste skakel in die regering se
reklame- en propagandastelsels vanweë hul swak beheer daaroor, ’n gebrek aan tegniese
vaardigheid, die hoë koste van rolprentproduksies, asook die oorheersing van die bedryf deur
die Engelse taal, wat die meerderheid Afrikaanssprekendes die harnas ingejaag het. ’n Verdere probleem was die voortdurende wedywering tussen die verskillende amptelike en
halfamptelike propaganda-agentskappe. Dit was veral die gebrek aan ’n duidelike
propaganda-beleid wat tot oorvleueling en mededinging gelei het.
Wat werwingspropaganda betref, het die regering beperkte sukses behaal. Naas ’n beroep op
pligsbesef, eer en glorie, het die regering oor geen hefkrag beskik om werwing te bevorder
nie. ’n Gebrek aan mannekrag het derhalwe die UVM dwarsdeur die oorlog gekortwiek in
weerwil van die regering se omvattende reklame- en propagandaprogramme. Teen 1945 het
slegs sowat 330 000 uit die Unie se bevolking van nagenoeg tien miljoen vir vrywillige
krygsdiens aangemeld. Sosio-ekonomiese uitdagings soos ’n gebrek aan voedselvoorrade en
behuising het ook negatief op die openbare en burgerlike moraal ingewerk. Interne
propaganda in die UVM, veral deur middel van die opvoedings-, informasie- en
welsynsdienste, het ook beperkte sukses behaal as gevolg van ontevredenheid met militêre
beleid, swak diensvoorwaardes en oorlogsmoegheid. Dié ontevredenheid het moraal en
dissipline ondermyn en teen die einde van die oorlog tot uitdagende gedrag en oproer onder
die troepe gelei.
Oor die algemeen genome, was die Unie-regering se totale reklame- en propagandapoging
dus oneffektief. Alhoewel die hele die stelsel nie in duie gestort het nie en Unie se
oorlogspoging sonder groot ontwrigting voortgegaan het, het oorlogsmoegheid, oneffektiewe
beleide en die invloed van sosio-ekonomiese probleme uiteindelik tot openbare en militêre
ontnugtering gelei.
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Armoured warfare : the South African experience in East Africa 1940-1941Kleynhans, Evert Philippus 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union
Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern
armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state
of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in
muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive
potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence
planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in
September 1939.
The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable
armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established
in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African
defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland
was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South
Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war.
The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a
situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the
South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned
that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period,
was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to
East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and
employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the
Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the
tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes
paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing
Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of
operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the
campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the
SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF
gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African
armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Na Suid-Afrika se toetrede tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog op 6 September 1939, het die
Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) verander vanaf ‘n verouderde vredestydse weermag na ‘n
moderne mag met offensiewe projeksievermoëns. Gedurende die tussenoorlogperiode het
‘n gevoel van swaarmoedigheid in terme van militêre inovasie in die UVM geheers. Die
resultaat hiervan was verwarde denke ten opsigte van pantseroorlogvoering en
meganisasie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeplanners het nie die offensiewe potensiaal
van pantsermagte verstaan nie. Die gevolg was dat die UVM in September 1939 slegs oor
‘n simboliese pantsermag beskik het.
Die Suid-Afrikaanse toetrede tot die oorlog het die stukrag vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n
lewensvatbare pantsermag binne die UVM verleen. Gevolglik is die Suid-Afrikaanse
Tenkkorps (SATK) in Mei 1940 gestig. Veranderinge in beide die aard en organisatoriese
struktuur van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsinstellings het gevolg. Die Italiaanse
teenwoordigheid in Abessinië en Italiaans-Somaliland is as ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die
aangrensende Britse Oos-Afrika gebiede gesien. In Junie 1940, kort na die Italiaanse
oorlogsverklaring, is Suid-Afrikaanse magte na Kenia ontplooi.
Die UVM ontplooiing na Oos-Afrika was die eerste in ‘n gereelde oorlogsituasie
sedert die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Ten spyte van die doktrine wat die Suid-Afrikaanse
ontplooiing van pantsermagte na Oos-Afrika ondersteun het, het die SATK-eenhede gou
geleer dat die aanvaarde doktrine, ontleen aan die Britse Ministerie van Oorlog gedurende
die tussenoorlogsjare, slegs ‘n gids was tot offensiewe aanwending. Die storie van die Suid-
Afrikaanse ontplooiing in Oos-Afrika gedurende die oorlog, word as ‘n lens gebruik waardeur
die rol en aanwending van beide die UVM se pantserkarre en ligte tenks ondersoek word.
Die geallieerde offensiewe deur Italiaans-Somaliland en suidelike Abessiniȅ gedurende 1940
– 1941 illustreer duidelik dat die taktiese en operasionele aanwending van die Suid-
Afrkaanse pantsermagte gedurende hierdie tydperk van groot belang was vir die suksesse
en mislukkings van die veldtog. Die aard van die opponerende magte in Oos-Afrika, die
voortdurend veranderende topografie en klimaat van die operasionele teater, asook die aard
van die Suid-Afrikaanse offensiewe operasies gedurende die veldtog, het gekombineer om
die unieke manier waarop die pantserkarre en tenks van die UVM van 1940 tot 1941
aangewend is, te vorm. Die operasionele ervarings wat die UVM opgedoen het gedurende
die Oos-Afrika Veldtog, het die verdere ontplooiings van Suid-Afrikaanse pantser na Noord-
Afrika, Madagaskar en Italiȅ gedurende die res van die oorlog gevorm.
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The influence of the Second World War on black labour in the Witwatersrand area, 1941-1947Mahosi, Nkadimeng Theodore 12 September 2012 (has links)
M.A. / As a way of demonstrating the truth of the argument that war is a catalyst for social change, the Second World War added impetus to the transformation of the social standing of South African Blacks, black workers in particular. Although the war was not necessarily being fought for their benefit, but because of South Africa's political allegiance to the allied forces and consequent entry into the war, black workers were all the same affected by it. The outbreak of the Second World War, placed immense pressure on the black workers, especially between 1941 and 1947. Shortage of skilled white labour, as a result of their (whites) enlistment for the War effort, created a situation of labour necessity in both mining and manufacturing. As such, hundreds of Blacks migrated from the rural areas to the cities, especially the Witwatersrand in search of better paying jobs that could offer better social conditions. The emphasis on the need for labour and the resultant abundance thereof also influenced the emphasis on the need for cheap labour, more than skill, as a precondition to getting employment. The bottom-line was availability of labour for War production. Furthermore, in order to ensure availability of labour, the pass laws were temporarily suspended. Because of the objective of expending every effort to winning the War against Germany, War-time considerations forced the state and employers to preach about the suspension of pass laws for the sake of lesser restriction of movement of Blacks into towns. As a result, War-time necessity of labour also saw black women increasingly joining the labour world from the rural areas; that is if they succeeded in acquiring work. Failure to acquire work did not necessarily force women back to the rural areas, because they usually opted for alternatives to formal labour to survive War-time inflation and poverty: in other words to at least make ends meet. The alternatives were already familiar to them, maybe this explains why they opted for them. These were domestic labour, beerbrewing and prostitution, among others. Men also chose domestic labour, hawking, the canteen business, as alternatives in the event of failing to benefit from the job opportunities availed by the War. However, the opening up of job opportunities that resulted from the outbreak of the Second World War also had an influence on the issue of wages and conditions of work. War-time economic conditions caused the wages to remain static, increased overtime work and contributed to employment reduction. As War-time inflation continued to bite, the majority of the black population suffered from adverse poverty and shortage of civilian commodities aggravated the situation. These circumstances forced black workers, although it was illegal, to adopt trade unionism as a weapon to fight for better social conditions. The "rebirth" of the black trade union movement was, however, instigated by the inherent objectives of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and the African National Congress (ANC), which took advantage of the War time social discrepancies that influenced the lives of black workers. The success in revitalizing black trade unionism, after the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) had closed shop in the 1930's, can be measured by the success in unionizing, not only manufacturing workers, but mineworkers as well, who were handicapped by being confined to the compounds, where activism was actually prohibited. The success of the trade union movement can also be measured by Wartime socio-economic grievances that were translated into a number of strikes that culminated in the mineworkers' strike of 1946. Although the strike of 1946 was not a great success in realising workers' demands, it certainly shook the government and employers from their ideological numbness, and made them aware that black workers were not to be necessarily taken for granted.
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South African Prisoner-Of-War experience during and after World War II : 1939-c.1950Horn, Karen 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis narrates and analyses the experiences of a sample of South Africans who were
captured during the Second World War. The research is based on oral testimony, memoirs,
archival evidence and to a lesser degree on secondary sources. The former prisoners-of-war
(POW) who participated in the research and those whose memoirs were studied were all
captured at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in November 1941 or during the fall of Tobruk in June
1942.
The aim of the research is to present oral and written POW testimony in order to augment the
dearth of knowledge regarding South African POW historical experience. The scope of the
research includes the decision to volunteer for the Union Defence Force, the experiences in
North Africa, capture and initial experiences in the so-called ‘hell camps of North Africa’, the
transportation to Italy and life in the Italian prison camps, events surrounding the Italian
Armistice and the consequent escape attempts thereafter. For those POWs who did not
escape, the experience of captivity continued with transport to Germany, experiences in
German camps, including working in labour camps and the Allied bombing campaign.
Lastly, the end of the war and the experience of liberation, which in most cases included
forced marches, are dealt with before the focus turns once again towards South Africa and the
experience of homecoming and demobilisation. The affective and intellectual experiences of
the POWs are also investigated as their personal experience and emotions are presented and
examined. These include the experience of guilt and shame during capture, the acceptance or
non-acceptance of captivity, blame, attitudes towards the enemy and towards each other, as
well as the experience of fear and hope, which was especially relevant during the bombing
campaign and during periods when they were being transported between countries and
camps. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the POW experience which looks at aspects
relating to identity among South African POWs.
The final conclusion is drawn that the POW identity took precedence over national identity.
As a result of the strong POW identity and their desire for complete freedom and desire to
claim individuality, the POWs did not, on the whole, display great interest in becoming
involved in South African politics after the war even though many of them strongly disagreed
with the Nationalist segregationist ideologies that claimed increasing support between 1945
and 1948. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis beskryf en ontleed die ervarings van dié Suid-Afrikaners wat tydens die Tweede
Wêreldoorlog gevange geneem is. Die navorsing is gebaseer op mondelinge getuienis,
memoires, argivale bewysmateriaal en, in ’n mindere mate, op sekondêre bronne. Die
voormalige krygsgevangenes wat aan die navorsing deelgeneem het en wie se memoires
bestudeer is, is almal in November 1941 by die Geveg van Sidi Rezegh of in Junie 1942 met
die val van Tobruk gevange geneem.
Die doel van die navorsing is om mondelinge en skriftelike getuienisse van krygsgevangenes
aan te bied ten einde die gebrekkige kennis ten opsigte van Suid-Afrikaanse krygsgevangenes
se historiese ervaring uit te brei. Die omvang van die navorsing sluit die besluit in om
vrywillig diens te doen vir die Unie-verdedigingsmag, die ervarings in Noord-Afrika,
gevangeneming en eerste ervarings in die sogenaamde “helkampe van Noord-Afrika”, die
vervoer na Italië en lewe in die Italiaanse gevangeniskampe, gebeure rondom die Italiaanse
wapenstilstand en die daaropvolgende ontsnappingspogings. Vir die krygsgevangenes wat nie
ontsnap het nie, het die ervaring van gevangenskap voortgeduur deur vervoer na Duitsland,
ervarings in Duitse kampe, waaronder strafkampe, en die bombarderings deur die
Geallieerdes.
Ten slotte word aandag gegee aan die einde van die oorlog en die ervaring van vryheid, wat
in die meeste gevalle gedwonge marse behels het, voordat die fokus terugkeer na Suid-Afrika
en die ervaring van tuiskoms en demobilisasie. Die affektiewe en intellektuele ervarings van
die krygsgevangenes word ook ontleed, aangesien hul persoonlike ervarings en emosies
ondersoek en aangebied word. Dit sluit die ervaring van skuld en skaamte tydens die
gevangeneming in, die aanvaarding of nie-aanvaarding van gevangeskap, blaam, houdings
teenoor die vyand en mekaar, sowel as die ervaring van vrees en hoop, wat veral belangrik
was gedurende die bombarderingsveldtog en vervoer tussen lande en kampe.
Die tesis sluit af met ’n ontleding van aspekte wat verband hou met identiteit onder die Suid-
Afrikaanse krygsgevangenes. Die bevinding is dat die krygsgevangene-identiteit voorrang
geniet het bo die nasionale identiteit. Verder het die sterk drang na volkome vryheid en die
begeerte om hul individualiteit terug te kry daartoe gelei dat die voormalige krygsgevangenes
na die oorlog oor die algemeen ’n ambivalensie jeens Suid-Afrikaanse politiek openbaar.
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