Since 1945 a number of historical controversies have arisen over the German leadership in the Second World War. Hitler has been described both as an astute opportunist and as a fanatic relentlessly following a preconceived plan. Thus his decision to turn east in 1941 has been regarded as the result of frustration in the West and also as the ultimate step in a great plan for eastern conquest which he followed throughput his career. Most of the German military leaders have supported the idea that Hitler had no "war plan." They have depicted themselves as subordinates hopelessly attempting to avert the worst effects of Hitler's irresponsible opportunism and amateurish interference in military strategy. Thus they have attributed most of the blame for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East to Hitler’s errors. This study re-examines these controversies in the light of the planning for the invasion of Russia. It shows that Hitler consistently followed a broad plan for the conquest of Lebensraum. Thus in 1940 his decision to attack Russia even if the war was still unfinished in the West was the result of his determination to fulfill his plan while Germany still held the initiative in Europe. Most of Hitler's military leaders shared his anti-Bolshevism and favoured a policy which would revive the situation created by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1918. These attitudes made them willing to attack Russia. However, the optimism fostered by their defeat of France and their serious underestimation of Russia's strength caused them to omit careful consideration of the logistic and operational difficulties in the East. While accepting Hitler's more cautious plan they neglected to make the necessary preparations to implement it and instead attempted to adhere to their own simpler plan for a battle of destruction near the frontier followed by a thrust on Moscow. By the time it had become clear that the initial battles had failed to yield a decisive victory it was too late to revive Hitler's plan and the campaign deteriorated into a series of improvised operations. These served only to show that the Wehrmacht lacked the range and striking power to defeat the Soviet Union by military force alone. Hitler might have compensated for this deficiency by developing a coalition grand strategy capable of exerting further pressure on Russia from the Far East or the South. But instead, he failed to win the trust and cooperation of the Japanese by concealing his intention of attacking Russia and by directing them and the Italians towards the war against Britain. Furthermore, the Nazi terror and exploitation in Russia precluded the development of a positive policy which might have caused an internal collapse of Stalin's regime. The basic flaws of Hitler's Lebensraumpolitik as presented in Mein Kampf, his misjudgement of the British and his contempt for the Russians, were major political and grand strategic causes of his ultimate defeat. But on the military strategic level the German generals bear a far greater share of the responsibility for the failure of the Blitzkrieg in the East than has previously been recognised. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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Thesis (M.S.)--Oregon State University, 2007. / Printout. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-60). Also available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Jonathan A. Grant, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary Program in Russian and East European Studies. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thèse--Geneva. / Bibliography: p. [233]-240.

Thesis (M. Arch.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes special report study entitled: Memory, emotion and space. Includes bibliographical references.

About twelve miles to the south of Newfoundland's Burin Peninsula, there are two small islands, called St. Pierre and Miquelon which have belonged to France for nearly four centuries. In June of 1940 when France succumbed to the onslaught of the Nazis, the territory, like all other French holdings in the New World, fell under the control of the Vichy French government. But on December 24th, 1941, the Islands were seized by a Free French Naval task force acting under the direction of Charles de Gaulle, who had ordered this action not only in direct contradiction to the expressed wishes of the Allies, but also after having specifically assured them that he would not attempt to undertake such a move. The result was a serious diplomatic crisis, the ramifications of which far outweighed any importance the Islands themselves may have had. For by seizing this territory de Gaulle had brought himself into direct conflict with U.S. policy regarding the Western Hemisphere and, in addition, created great difficulties between the Allies over the issue of U.S. recognition of Vichy, versus British support for de Gaulle. / This thesis, then, will examine the events which led up to this crisis, and will attempt to ascertain what significance, if any, it had on the conduct of the war as a whole.

In spite of the crucial importance of the Russian front in the outcome of the Second World War, this aspect of the conflict has been studied relatively little in the West since 1945. This omission can be attributed to several factors including linguistic complexity, the difficulty of access to Soviet archives, and the political constraints caused by the ideological climate of the Cold War. Since the time of glasnost' and the collapse of the Soviet block, however, a new era has begun for historians thanks to the release of many documents which had been secret and to the improved ideological climate. / The present work aims to summarise the current situation of the debate in this rapidly expanding field of historiography. Some of the most controversial military, political, and strategic questions are examined, most frequently from a Soviet perspective. These include the Soviet preparations for war and their shortcomings; the German campaign of 1941 and the reasons for its failure; the turning of the tide in 1942-1943, especially the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad; the Yalta conference and the "division of the world"; the role of Stalin and his regime in the "Great Patriotic War"; the human and material losses of the Soviet Union during the conflict; and finally the importance of the Soviet contribution to the victory of the Allies.