The central contention of this dissertation is that political scientists have largely ignored the importance of ideational frameworks for resolving problems of policy-making in times of significant upheaval. In order to illustrate the genesis and contribution of these frameworks, the three papers in my dissertation focus on a diachronic comparison of two moments in Russian history that encapsulate maximal uncertainty, covering the aftermath of the imperial collapses in 1917 and 1991. The first paper focuses on state- and nation-building in the North Caucasus, arguing that the debates between the Bolsheviks and other members of the Second International, particularly Otto Bauer, provided the Bolsheviks with a coherent platform that could largely stem the fissiparous tendencies of the region in a way that Boris Yeltsin and his teams were unable to do in the early 1990s. The second paper examines economic policy and finds the reverse to be true: the economic debates of the Second International largely ignored the problem of the peasantry and the exiled status of many of the leading Bolsheviks meant they were unable to articulate a sufficiently detailed policy to apply to the Russian case. The post-communists under the leadership of Yegor Gaidar, were able to draw on decades of economic research, particularly the Chicago and Virginia Schools, that provided the intellectual rationale for dismembering the Communist command-system, but equally important was the years that Gaidar and his team spent developing an alternative in the twilight years of communism. The final paper considers the legacy of ideational frameworks by considering the rule of Stalin and Putin, arguing that the tasks left unfulfilled provide a basis for regime consolidation by subsequent rulers. / Government

This thesis analyses Russia's military, economic and diplomatic policies towards the newly independent states, particularly towards the members of the CIS, during Boris Yeltsin's first term as President of an independent Russia (December 1991 to July 1996). The objective is to determine whether after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new Russian state tried to restore a sphere of influence or informal empire over the former Soviet republics - as the French did in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonisation - or whether instead Russia's policies reflected a genuine desire to establish normal state-to-state relations with the new states. Chapter one analyses the underlying principles of Russia's foreign policy towards the former Soviet states and examines the debate on Russian foreign policy priorities which took place during the first years of Russia's independence. This section also overviews Russia's policies towards the Russian minorities that inhabit the Baltic states, in order to determine whether Russia attempted to use this diplomatic tool to further its own interests in the area. Chapter two analyses the peculiar structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the extent to which Russia used this political framework to achieve hegemony over the former Soviet republics. Chapter three looks at Russia's participation in the wars in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Tajikistan, and Chapter four analyses Russia's energy trade with Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caspian states. The thesis reaches the conclusion that during 1992- mid 1996 Russia's policies only partially reflected an attempt to reassert the country's influence over the republics of the former Soviet Union and create an informal empire in the post-Soviet space. Russia's behaviour was particularly assertive in the military field as well as in its attempts to build a Russian dominated CIS military infrastructure. However, Russia's policies were less aggressive in the economic sphere, except probably as far as energy policy is concerned, and regarding the fate of Russians living beyond the new borders. More often than not, though, Russia's policies followed an ambivalent and incoherent pattern, a result of the weak and fragmented character of the Russian state.

This work is an analysis of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decision-making process in the context of both foreign and domestic policy crises. The timeframe selected encompasses July 1998, as the Russian economy faltered and headed to eventual currency devaluation through June 1999, when NATO's air campaign in Kosovo ended through mediation proposed by Yeltsin and negotiated in part by his former prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. The framework of this study is centered on Robert D. Putnam's "two-level game" model, and the focus on Yeltsin as leader and decision maker follows work in International Relations theory by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Valerie Hudson, James D. Fearon, and Margaret Hermann among others. Yeltsin's personality, as well as the particulars of his biography, specifically involving the status of his health, contribute to the atmosphere in which Yeltsin made decisions, and therefore are important elements of the study. The Russian-U.S. relationship, which forms a foundational base to the crises and their resolution during this timeframe, also displays a high degree of personalization and figures prominently in the work. In describing the crisis situations in which Yeltsin's decisions evolved, this study also provides insight into Yeltsin's perceptions (or misperceptions) of the environment in which he operated. This includes his focus on the revanchist element in the parliament and his evaluation of the importance of the interpersonal relationships he had developed over the years with other state leaders. Yeltsin's view of the Russian state, as well as his goals for Russia, both domestically, in the form of the transition to a market economy, and in foreign policy, in the form of greater acceptance and cooperation with western states, also constitutes an integral part of this study.

The thesis focuses on the privatisation process held in Russia in the 1990s and its consequences. It examines historical background of the reforms on the example of attempts to introduce elements of private property to the Russian or more precisely Soviet economy since 1950s. The thesis concentrates on the process of privatisation with an emphasis on comparison of different projects of privatisation and the influence of the most significant agents on the Russian political scene on the implementation of these projects. Special focus is given to the influence the privatisation had on the Russian economy, standard of living of the population, society, as well as situation on the Russian political scene.

A comparative content analysis was conducted to determine whether the Russian (ITAR-TASS) and the American (UPI) wire service coverage of President Boris Yeltsin in the April 25, 1993, referendum was balanced and unbiased. Also, the amount of space dedicated to this topic was measured. Study results indicate that ITAR-TASS was more critical of Yeltsin prior to the referendum than UPI, and that there was no statistically important difference between the two wire services in their post referendum coverage. UPI articles were almost 30% longer than the ITAR-TASS articles. Each UPI article was on an average more than 220 words longer than were the ITAR-TASS articles.

This thesis examines the historical progression of social and political transitions in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, seeking to establish the development of Putinism in an historical context and assert a definition of Putinism as a governing philosophy which exploits the rhetoric of democracy and civil society to conceal authoritarian practices. Analysis begins with Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘moral position’ as the basis of the Gorbachev reforms and the conceptual introduction of democratic and market mechanics, followed by the rejection of the Soviet system and the mixed legacy of shock therapy under Boris Yeltsin, culminating in the ultimate ascendancy of Vladimir Putin as a response to the perceived loss of national status and social dislocation resulting from the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. Ultimately, it is asserted that Putinism is ideologically grounded in Chekism, fundamentally anti-democratic and inherently kleptocratic, seeking to maintain power and perpetuate a sistema centered on the Kremlin. Through vertical centralization of the state, the development of alternative mechanisms of governance, domination of political discourse, development of a personality cult, state sponsored redefinition of Russian identity and the encouragement of exceptionalist and neo-imperialist policies.

This thesis investigates the two major problems of poverty and corruption in post-Soviet Russia, by comparing Boris Yeltsin&rsquo / s and Vladimir Putin&rsquo / s terms of office. In order to do that, political and economic circumstances during these two presidents&rsquo / eras, the reasons of these two problems, and the consequences of certain policies adapted by these two presidents are focused on. The main argument of the thesis is to analyze interactively the certain conditions of poverty and corruption in the Russian Federation under the presidencies of both Yeltsin and Putin.

The thesis seeks to chart the foundation and transformation of NATO-Russia relations from Yeltsin to Putin and Medvedev. It attempts to potray the continuity and change in the Russian Foreign Policy towards NATO in the light of the main international developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Bosnian war and the Kosovo conflict / as well as the internal transformation of the Alliance marked by the extension of the traditional NATO roles and the expansion policy. The thesis tries to depict the new initiatives in the Russian Foreign policy aimed at undermining NATO and US&rsquo / roles in Europe by attempting to establish an alternative European architecture to a NATO-centric one. It is argued that while Yeltsin promoted multilateralism based on the world led by the USA and the Russian Federation on a par, Putin and Medvedev&rsquo / s multilateralism was to undermine the American world hegemony and consolidate relations with Europe.

This thesis explored the role of the six wealthy Russian businessmen, the oligarchs, in 1996 reelection of President Boris Yeltsin. This research was qualitative and descriptive. The goal was to collect the information from various sources and summarize it, demonstrating how the interference of the oligarchs reflected on the process of the election, as well as on the careers of their own.The research concluded that the oligarchs' role was, first of all, in the organization and financing a highly effective election campaign team; consolidating the business elite and big capital around Yeltsin, using the media that they controlled as a tool of pro-Yeltsin propaganda; and influencing some key decision taken by Yeltsin. The result was Yeltsin's victory, and the increase of the oligarchs' wealth and political power.This ability of the oligarchs to manipulate politics completely cemented the interrelation between business and politics in Russia, which contributed to Russia's reputation as a country of corruption and lawlessness. / Department of Political Science

This thesis aims to examine the evolution of the discourse of Eurasianism and its impact on the formulation and implementation of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. The thesis argues that both of Russia&rsquo / s post-Soviet leaders: Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have used the discourse of neo-Eurasianism pragmatically whenever it suited Russia&rsquo / s interests. Moscow ignored this discourse when its foreign policy interests contradicted with the main tenets of this ideology. The thesis has five chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter explores the evolution of Eurasianism as a discourse and its main variants in post-Soviet era. The third chapter examines the relationship between the Eurasianist discourse and Russian foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin. The fourth chapter discusses the same relationship under Vladimir Putin. The concluding chapter evaluates the main findings of this thesis.