Thesis (doctoral)--Lund Theology School, 1921. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 267-272).

Dissertation--München--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 281-296.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from file title page. George W. Rainbolt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Steve Jacobson, committee members. Electronic text (43 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).

University, Diss., 2002--Mannheim.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fach Philosophie--Universität Trier, 1995. / Contient des résumés en allemand, anglais et italien. Bibliogr. p. 248-261. Index.

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This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings.

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Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-06-30T17:31:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_GREGORY_GABOARDI_COMPLETO.pdf: 628604 bytes, checksum: dfda77846a29ea3ba02da64527684be9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-30T17:31:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_GREGORY_GABOARDI_COMPLETO.pdf: 628604 bytes, checksum: dfda77846a29ea3ba02da64527684be9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-10 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / In this work we will consider whether rationalism is compatible with there being a priori knowledge of contingent truths and if in fact there can be such knowledge. In order to do so we will evaluate a series of arguments that composed the discussion of this subject in the last decades ? such as the arguments from Kripke (2012), Hawthorne (2002) and Turri (2011). We will conclude that rationalism is compatible with the existence of a priori knowledge of contingent truths and that such knowledge can indeed exist. / Neste trabalho consideraremos se o racionalismo ? compat?vel com a exist?ncia do conhecimento a priori de verdades contingentes e se de fato pode haver tal conhecimento. Para tanto avaliaremos uma s?rie de argumentos que compuseram a discuss?o desse tema nas ?ltimas d?cadas ? como os argumentos de Kripke (2012), Hawthorne (2002) e Turri (2011). Concluiremos que o racionalismo ? compat?vel com a exist?ncia do conhecimento a priori de verdades contingentes e que de fato pode haver tal conhecimento.