This public law study aims to analyze abstract norm review in Sweden and Azerbaijan, conducted byspecific entities – the Swedish Council on Legislation (Lagrådet) and the Constitutional Court ofAzerbaijan, respectively. The primary focus is to examine and compare the approaches of Lagrådet andthe Azerbaijani Constitutional Court in abstract norm control.In this essay, a comparison is made between abstract norm review in Sweden and Azerbaijan, revealingsimilarities in purpose but significant differences in the powers and the binding nature of decisions.Historically, Sweden has undergone a longer constitutional development, while Azerbaijan hasundergone changes following its independence from the Soviet Union, which is noticeable throughvarious historical and political contexts shaping their norm review processes.In practice, Lagrådet in Sweden plays an advisory role during the legislative process. Although itsadvice carries significant weight, the final decision to follow or deviate from these recommendationslies with the government. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan possesses direct legallybinding authority over its decisions, which affect all organs and individuals in the country.The difference in independence and legitimacy between these institutions is reflected in their impact onlegislation. Despite its active role, Lagrådet is subordinate to the government's decisions. Meanwhile,the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan has a more independent and tangible influence on legislation.

The scope of this thesis in public law discussed the abstract judicial review in Sweden and Germany, which is practiced by a specified organ. In Sweden, the abstract judicial review is practiced by the Council on Legislation, and in Germany by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This study focuses on how the Swedish Council on Legislation and the German Constitutional Court differ in the practice of the abstract norm control. Moreover, a theoretical discussion is applied to regarding whether the Swedish justice system is in need of setting up a constitutional court or whether the Swedish Council on Legislation should be in a stronger position. Throughout this study, we concluded that the Swedish legal system is not in need to establish a Constitutional Court or another organ for the maintenance of an adequate standard norm control in Sweden. To this end, we suggest that the abstract norm control in Sweden by the law's compatibility with the constitution should be strong, but that there may be reason to further strengthen the review of the Council on Legislation. For instance, enhancing the investigation could be done by creating a legal secretariat and subsequently emphasizing the council’s independence from the parliament and government. By reinforcing the council with legal expertise, such as linking draftsmen to the council, can thus make the council’s opinion legally binding.