Judicial preview acts as a tool to assure that no laws to be enacted conflicts with the constitution. For that reason, it is of importance that the authorities set to perform the judicial preview are independent towards the ruling power. The aim of this essay is to do a comparison between how judicial preview is done by the Council on Legislation in Sweden and by the Constitutional Council in France. The essay examines how this preview acts as a tool to guarantee the supremacy of the constitution and to insure a none confrontational legal system. This is done with the help of the method of comparative law and the legal dogmatic method. The result of the analysis shows that judicial preview plays an increasingly important role of guaranteeing the supremacy of constitutions in legal systems of increased complexity and in societies that are experiencing political tensions. The result also shows that the constitutions in both Sweden and France is increasing in importance to protect the ways of government, democracy and basic rights for the citizens. Based on the analysis the forms of judicial preview should be reviewed and stronger safeguards for the constitution may be of interest in the future.

The scope of this thesis in public law discussed the abstract judicial review in Sweden and Germany, which is practiced by a specified organ. In Sweden, the abstract judicial review is practiced by the Council on Legislation, and in Germany by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This study focuses on how the Swedish Council on Legislation and the German Constitutional Court differ in the practice of the abstract norm control. Moreover, a theoretical discussion is applied to regarding whether the Swedish justice system is in need of setting up a constitutional court or whether the Swedish Council on Legislation should be in a stronger position. Throughout this study, we concluded that the Swedish legal system is not in need to establish a Constitutional Court or another organ for the maintenance of an adequate standard norm control in Sweden. To this end, we suggest that the abstract norm control in Sweden by the law's compatibility with the constitution should be strong, but that there may be reason to further strengthen the review of the Council on Legislation. For instance, enhancing the investigation could be done by creating a legal secretariat and subsequently emphasizing the council’s independence from the parliament and government. By reinforcing the council with legal expertise, such as linking draftsmen to the council, can thus make the council’s opinion legally binding.