Judicial preview acts as a tool to assure that no laws to be enacted conflicts with the constitution. For that reason, it is of importance that the authorities set to perform the judicial preview are independent towards the ruling power. The aim of this essay is to do a comparison between how judicial preview is done by the Council on Legislation in Sweden and by the Constitutional Council in France. The essay examines how this preview acts as a tool to guarantee the supremacy of the constitution and to insure a none confrontational legal system. This is done with the help of the method of comparative law and the legal dogmatic method. The result of the analysis shows that judicial preview plays an increasingly important role of guaranteeing the supremacy of constitutions in legal systems of increased complexity and in societies that are experiencing political tensions. The result also shows that the constitutions in both Sweden and France is increasing in importance to protect the ways of government, democracy and basic rights for the citizens. Based on the analysis the forms of judicial preview should be reviewed and stronger safeguards for the constitution may be of interest in the future.

This public law study aims to analyze abstract norm review in Sweden and Azerbaijan, conducted byspecific entities – the Swedish Council on Legislation (Lagrådet) and the Constitutional Court ofAzerbaijan, respectively. The primary focus is to examine and compare the approaches of Lagrådet andthe Azerbaijani Constitutional Court in abstract norm control.In this essay, a comparison is made between abstract norm review in Sweden and Azerbaijan, revealingsimilarities in purpose but significant differences in the powers and the binding nature of decisions.Historically, Sweden has undergone a longer constitutional development, while Azerbaijan hasundergone changes following its independence from the Soviet Union, which is noticeable throughvarious historical and political contexts shaping their norm review processes.In practice, Lagrådet in Sweden plays an advisory role during the legislative process. Although itsadvice carries significant weight, the final decision to follow or deviate from these recommendationslies with the government. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan possesses direct legallybinding authority over its decisions, which affect all organs and individuals in the country.The difference in independence and legitimacy between these institutions is reflected in their impact onlegislation. Despite its active role, Lagrådet is subordinate to the government's decisions. Meanwhile,the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan has a more independent and tangible influence on legislation.

The scope of this thesis in public law discussed the abstract judicial review in Sweden and Germany, which is practiced by a specified organ. In Sweden, the abstract judicial review is practiced by the Council on Legislation, and in Germany by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This study focuses on how the Swedish Council on Legislation and the German Constitutional Court differ in the practice of the abstract norm control. Moreover, a theoretical discussion is applied to regarding whether the Swedish justice system is in need of setting up a constitutional court or whether the Swedish Council on Legislation should be in a stronger position. Throughout this study, we concluded that the Swedish legal system is not in need to establish a Constitutional Court or another organ for the maintenance of an adequate standard norm control in Sweden. To this end, we suggest that the abstract norm control in Sweden by the law's compatibility with the constitution should be strong, but that there may be reason to further strengthen the review of the Council on Legislation. For instance, enhancing the investigation could be done by creating a legal secretariat and subsequently emphasizing the council’s independence from the parliament and government. By reinforcing the council with legal expertise, such as linking draftsmen to the council, can thus make the council’s opinion legally binding.

This comparative legal thesis discusses abstract judicial preview in Sweden and the Netherlands. Both countries have Councils of State in place that are tasked with advising government on legislation and governance to maintain a congruent judicial system. The aim of the analysis is to examine, describe and compare the judicial preview of law proposals carried out in Sweden and the Netherlands. By applying a legal-dogmatic method and a comparative law method the results show that abstract judicial preview of law proposals in Sweden and the Netherlands share both similarities and differences. The primary similarity infers that the judgements of the Councils of State have no binding effect for the legislator. Regarding the differences, the Swedish Council of State mainly focuses on advising the government on legislation, whilst the Dutch Council of State consists of two divisions that operate under the same name. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division is the country’s highest general administrative court and the Advisory Division, as implied by its name, advises the government and Parliament in matters regarding legislation and governance. Finally, one of the surprising conclusions show that an official from the relevant Swedish department of state recites a bill before the Council of State. This differs from the Netherlands, where the Council of State operates behind closed doors when a bill is put forward. Meaning that it does not occur that an official or any other outsider is involved in assessing bills and other requests for advice. In conclusion, abstract judicial preview in Sweden and the Netherlands plays a fundamental role in contributing to a harmonious legal order and norm hierarchy.