Discretion is commonly analyzed as the scope for choice set by formal superiors. This study aims at developing an alternative theory of discretion which also takes into account the assumptions of the actors in implementing positions. The theory is constructed with the purpose of being an empirical tool for analyzing discretion on a nation-wide basis and in a central-local government context. It concerns two main questions: to what extent does discretion vary and how can this variation be explained? The theory section concludes with a number of empirically testable hypotheses. The concept of discretion is defined as the scope for choice available to actors, in formally subordinate positions, vis-à-vis their superiors. It is seen as a special case of autonomy, as it is attributed to subordinates and primarily concerns one dimension of autonomy, namely freedom of action. In the second half of the study, the theory is applied empirically to the discretion available to Swedish local government Education Committees. A questionnaire study of all Education Committee Chairpersons and Chief Education Officers and in-depth interviews of a selected sample of these have been undertaken. The empirical study clearly indicates that there is variation in discretion. In spite of the uniformity of the system of governing local education, it is found that the limits for discretion are set differently by different Education Committee representatives. The variation follows a pattern which has been, at least partly, reconstructed. Variables which appear as important in explaining variation include: the extent to which the control system is regarded as efficient; the size and population density of the local authority; and individual traits such as length of experience and gender. However, our analysis also shows that these explanations are more valid in certain contexts than in others, which points the way for further research. / digitalisering@umu

This is a study of inter-organizational relations, especially of control relations, applied to Swedish state enterprise.The growing interdependence between different parts of society as well as the dynamic environment of organizations bring forward a need for new patterns of interaction. Organizations of very dissimilar types have to cooperate in new areas. The state enterprises have an external environment that exhibit both political and economic characteristics. The control relation, to the owner, may involve both types.The study consists of three parts. Part one present an initial theoretical framework, used in an empirical study (part two). This shows the need for a further development. A revised and enlarged framework is presented in part three. In the initial framework the concept of control, within a systems approach, was the focus of investigation. The approach was traditional and pointed to the importance of structures and of characteristics of the decision process. Control of two levels was discussed — organizational control and control of specific situation. The model suggested was mainly developed for description of control of state enterprises.The empirical study was conducted as an interview study in nine state enterprises. The interviews were of a semi-structured type and the purpose was to gain new insights as to the conditions of control of organizations. The enterprises were selected according to mission, three types were identified: strictly political tasks, strictly economic tasks and a mixture of tasks. The findings were that organizational control differed according to task so that political task gives a more strict control: The differences in control of ongoing avtivity was less pronounced. The most striking finding was the relevance of expectations of control. The empirical study led to demands for a more actor-oriented approach.This was the starting point for the revised and enlarged framework. A review of studies of relations in the systems approach and within a more actor-oriented approach was made. The role of the actor in the organization is discussed. The importance of structural conditions and of process in control is also analyzed. This review and analysis forms the basis for a somewhat different approach to relations. A concept of complexity is developed. This concept involve the total variation in a situation. Complexity is a main factor in perceptions of uncertainty < Coping with uncertainty gives power, which is the prerequisite of control.These concepts are used to form a game approach to control. Control is considered as the result of a game of power. Two types of games are presented — for organizations as a whole and for situations of a deviant character. In both types actors and processes are of prime interest. / digitalisering@umu