Between 1914 and 1945 the Australian air services, the Australian Flying Corps (AFC ??? 1914 to 1919), the Australian Air Corps (AAC ??? 1920 to 1921) and their successor, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF ??? 1921 to 1945), developed from a marginally effective air arm into a major air force with a continental strike capability. The interwar period saw a series of pioneering flights which not only laid the foundations for the air defence of Australia but also assisted in national development. Essential to the development of the AFC and the RAAF was the practice of air navigation. While much has been written on World War II RAAF operations, almost nothing has been published on the policy, training and practice of air navigation in support of wartime operations or the interwar period. This omission is addressed by the examination of air navigation in the AFC and the RAAF from the rudiments of World War I to the emergence of air navigation as a critical specialist function which culminated in its practice in World War II tactical and strategic air operations. It was the wartime development of Australian air power between 1939 and 1945, and the parallel practice of advanced navigation techniques, that underscored Australia???s contribution to the allied air offensive.

Between 1914 and 1945 the Australian air services, the Australian Flying Corps (AFC ??? 1914 to 1919), the Australian Air Corps (AAC ??? 1920 to 1921) and their successor, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF ??? 1921 to 1945), developed from a marginally effective air arm into a major air force with a continental strike capability. The interwar period saw a series of pioneering flights which not only laid the foundations for the air defence of Australia but also assisted in national development. Essential to the development of the AFC and the RAAF was the practice of air navigation. While much has been written on World War II RAAF operations, almost nothing has been published on the policy, training and practice of air navigation in support of wartime operations or the interwar period. This omission is addressed by the examination of air navigation in the AFC and the RAAF from the rudiments of World War I to the emergence of air navigation as a critical specialist function which culminated in its practice in World War II tactical and strategic air operations. It was the wartime development of Australian air power between 1939 and 1945, and the parallel practice of advanced navigation techniques, that underscored Australia???s contribution to the allied air offensive.

The aim of this paper is to outline the share of airmen from the Czech lands in the formation, organizational and personnel construction, technical development and operational deployment of the Austro-Hungarian Air Force in the pre-war period and especially during World War 1. Simultaneously, this work will also try to determine their percentage share in the entire Austro-Hungarian Army and Naval Air Forces. The national (or provincial) origin of the personel of the Austro-Hungarian Air Force has not yet been the subject of historical research in any of the successor states. The reason was the fact that this young weapon was not statistically monitored - unlike other weapons. For Austrian historiography, the ethnic composition of the Austro-Hungarian aviation was not a subject of adequate attention. In Czech and Czechoslovakian historiography, for a long time, it was stated that number of the Czech airmen in the Austro-Hungarian Air Force was "insignificant". However, this age-old thesis, which has never been credibly proven, is subject to criticism in this work, leading to its re-evaluation. In particular, the reconstruction and analysis of statistically relevant samples of people revealed that in fact the representation of airmen from the Czech lands was above average and the Czechs had a solid...

Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.

During World War II, the Army Air Force waged three strategic air offensives in and from China against Japan. At first, the Flying Tigers and 10th Air Force constituted the whole of American aid to China, but the effort soon expanded. Supported by Chiang Kai-shek, Claire Chennault and his 14th Air Force waged an anti-shipping campaign, to which the Japanese Imperial Army responded with Operation Ichigo and against which Joseph Stilwell accurately warned. 20th Bomber Command used B-29s to wage Operation Matterhorn, failed, and later conducted PACAID missions. 14th Air Force then waged a counterproductive transportation campaign as The Pacific War, also known as the Greater East Asian War, ended. Events in the China-Burma-India and China Theaters provide lessons in logistics, targeting, training, and air-ground cooperation that are applicable in the post-Cold War era.

This thesis describes and evaluates the successes and failures of the use of strategic bombers through the abilities of one heavy bombardment group, the 389th. It examines the different missions that determined the effectiveness of the Group. When employed in a strategic bombing role, the 389th contributed significantly to the destruction of the German war industries and transportation system. When used as a tactical bomber, a mission for which it had neither proper training nor equipment, the 389th was generally a failure.

Rapidly initiated at the national, regional, and local levels, the American glider pilot training program came about due to a perceived need after successful German operations at the outset of World War II. Although the national program successfully produced the required number of pilots to facilitate combat operations, numerous changes and improvisation came to characterize the program. Like other American military initiatives in the twentieth century, the War Department applied massive amounts of effort, dollars, and time to a program that proved to be short-lived in duration because it was quickly discarded when new technologies appeared. At the local level, the real loser was Lamesa, Texas. Bearing the brunt of these changes by military decision makers, the citizens of Lamesa saw their hard-fought efforts to secure an airfield fall quickly by the wayside in the wake of changing national defense priorities. As generations continue to pass and memories gradually fade, it is important to document and understand the relationship between this military platform that saw limited action and a small Texas town that had a similarly short period of significance to train the pilots who flew the aircraft.

Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.