In der Diskussion über Freiheit und Verantwortung vertritt die Hirnforschung die These, dass wir determiniert sind und unser Gehirn es ist, das denkt und entscheidet. Aus diesem Grunde könne uns für unsere Entscheidungen und Handlungen auch keine Verantwortung zugewiesen werden. Die Philosophie versucht in dieser Diskussion zu klären, ob wir trotz Determiniertheit für unsere Entscheidungen und Urteile verantwortlich sind oder ob Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Determinismus grundsätzlich nicht möglich ist. Diese Fragen stellt diese Untersuchung über Freiheit und Verantwortung nicht. In dieser Untersuchung wird ein gewisses Maß an Freiheit vorausgesetzt, weil diese Annahme der erste Schritt für unsere Freiheit ist. In dieser Arbeit geht es um die Verbindung von Freiheit und Verantwortung und was diese Verbindung in unserem Menschsein und Miteinander bedeutet. Ziel ist es, zu zeigen, dass wir uns zusätzliche Freiheit aneignen können, dass Bildung für unsere Freiheit nötig und dass Freiheit ohne Verantwortung nicht möglich ist. Die Untersuchung schließt sich Peter Bieris Thesen an, dass Aneignung von Freiheit und Bildung, die weder als Schul- noch als Ausbildung zu verstehen ist, möglich und nötig sind, um verantwortlich entscheiden und handeln zu können, lehnt jedoch Peter Bieris These ab, dass bedingte Freiheit Voraussetzung für unsere Freiheit ist. Zudem geht diese Arbeit über Peter Bieri hinaus, indem sie eine Lösungsmöglichkeit für unsere Freiheit und der damit verbundenen Verantwortlichkeit anbietet. Als Lösung wird eine Bildung vorgeschlagen, die uns die Verbundenheit mit den anderen und die Abhängigkeit von den anderen zeigt und die die Rechte und Bedürfnisse der anderen ebenso anerkennen lässt wie unsere eigenen. Es ist eine Bildung, die nicht nur Wissen, sondern auch bestimmte rationale und emotionale Kompetenzen beinhaltet. Es ist eine Bildung, die als lern- und lehrbar angesehen wird. Um diese Bildung als eine Notwendigkeit für unsere Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit uns und den anderen gegenüber vermitteln zu können, ist es wichtig, uns in unserem Wesen verstehen. Deshalb werden in dieser Arbeit Faktoren dargestellt, die auf uns wirken und die uns als Menschen ausmachen. Es sind Faktoren, die auf unsere Freiheit und Verantwortung Einfluss nehmen, indem sie unsere Entscheidungen, unser Urteilsvermögen und in diesem Sinne auch unsere Handlungen ermöglichen oder einschränken. Durch die Darstellung dieser Faktoren werden wir auf unsere Möglichkeiten hingewiesen, die uns unser Leben in Selbstverantwortung und in Verantwortlichkeit den anderen gegenüber gestalten lassen. In dieser Untersuchung wird gezeigt, dass Freiheit ohne Verantwortung nicht möglich ist und es wird gezeigt, dass wir, wenn wir unsere Verantwortung abgeben, unsere Freiheit verlieren. / In the discussion on free will and responsibility, brain research supports the belief that humans are determined and that deliberation and decision-making take place in the brain. We can therefore not be held responsible for our decisions and actions. The role of philosophy in this discussion is to determine if we are responsible for our decisions and judgments in spite of being determined or if free will and determinism principally exclude each other. However, these are not the questions asked in this paper on free will and responsibility. It is based on the assumption that a certain degree of freedom exists because this assumption constitutes the first step towards freedom. This paper is about the connection between free will and responsibility and what it means for us as individuals and as members of a community of people. The goal is to show that we are able to acquire additional freedom, that freedom needs education and cannot exist without responsibility. The study supports Peter Bieri´s hypothesis that it is possible and necessary to develop freedom and education – not in the sense of schooling or formation – for making responsible decisions and taking responsible actions; however, it rejects Bieri´s hypothesis that conditional freedom is a prerequisite for free will. In addition, this work goes beyond the approach taken by Peter Bieri by offering a possible solution for our freedom and the related issue of responsibility. The suggested solution lies in an education that lets us understand our mutual connectedness and interdependence and leads us to acknowledge the rights and needs of others in the same way as our own. It is a type of education which is not just knowledge-driven but also includes certain rational and emotional skills. It is an education considered as learnable and teachable. To be able to impart this education as a necessary prerequisite for our freedom and responsibility towards ourselves and others, it is important that we understand our true being. The study therefore presents factors affecting us and shaping us as human beings. These factors influence our free will and responsibility by supporting or limiting our decisions, our judgment and, hence, our actions. The presentation of these factors outlines our options to design a self-responsible life in which we are responsible to others. The paper shows that freedom is impossible without responsibility and that, by abdicating our responsibility, we are loosing our freedom.

No description available.

<p>The term organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) was first explored by Bateman and Organ (1983) to refer to particular behaviours that may benefit an organisation and gestures that cannot be enforced by means of formal role obligations nor be elicited by contractual guarantee of recompense. Organ (1988) proposes that OCB may have a positive impact on employees and organisational performance. Incumbents who are experiencing satisfaction from performing their jobs are likely to be better ambassadors for the organisation and be committed to their organization (Buitendach, 2005). Silverthorne (2005, p. 171) considers job satisfaction to be important for effective organisations and defines job satisfaction as &ldquo / ... a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one&rsquo / s job&rdquo / . Previous research indicates that individuals are most likely to go beyond their formal job requirements when they are satisfied with their jobs or committed to their organisations, when they are given intrinsically satisfying tasks to complete, and/or when they have supportive or inspirational leaders. Research into Organisational Citizenship behaviour (OCB) has primarily focused on the effects of OCB on individual and organisational performance. Several empirical studies report that OCB produces various tangible benefits for employees, co-workers, supervisors and organisations in a variety of industries (Ackfeldt &amp / Leonard, 2005). It essentially refers to prosocial organisational behaviour that goes beyond what is expected in role descriptions. Bolino, Turnley and Niehoff (2004) claim that three basic assumptions have characterised OCB research. Firstly, they argue that OCB research stemmed from non-self-serving motives such as organisational commitment and job satisfaction. Moreover, they maintain that OCB has led to a more effective functioning of organisations and finally that OCB benefited employees by making organisations more attractive to work in. Murphy, Athansou and King (2002) reported positive relationships between OCB and job satisfaction. Chiu and Chen (2005) investigated the relationship between job characteristics and OCB and recommend that managers enhance employees&rsquo / intrinsic job satisfaction to promote the display of OCB. Most research studies have investigated OCB as an outcome variable with job satisfaction as one of its antecedents. Although the majority of researchers contend that OCB is an outcome of job satisfaction, some research indicates that the two variables can function as antecedents or consequences or there may well be a reciprocal relationship between the two variables. This study endeavours to elucidate the factors that are postulated to produce job satisfaction and organisational citizenship behaviour, based on a sample of 133 employees in a retail organisation in the Western Cape. The results indicate that there are significant relationships between biographical characteristics and job satisfaction, between the dimensions of OCB and job satisfaction and between the job satisfaction dimensions and OCB.</p>

This thesis is a critical survey of selected feminist writings on topics of interest to Christian, feminist thinkers. Specifically, this thesis has examined inter-feminist debates, highlighting those themes related narrowly to the virtues of self-sacrifice, care and peace, and broadly to how these relate to wider themes in Christian theology. This survey indicates directions and tendencies within works on virtues connected to women's work and gendered ideological assumptions about public and private spheres. / A summary of the contribution and themes of this thesis includes using critical social theory to uncover ideological distortions such as those perpetuated by patriarchy. The thesis highlights how a feminist critique contributes to the debate on values and virtues, pointing out biases which previously hid the contributions of women. An important theme uncovered using these critical tools is the dualist division between the public and the private spheres which reinforce gendered social and moral roles. The discussion is structured around three virtues with an emphasis on praxis, that is, since values arise out of shared practices, these values are inherently teachable and able to contribute to an evolving understanding of moral principles which break from and/or enhance traditional liberal understandings of these principles. Finally, connections are made with the gospel and utopian values grounded in a Christian vision of the kingdom of God.

Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) develop a model of reciprocity, „Revealed Altruism‟, which posits that a „more generous than‟ (MGT) offer elicits a „more altruistic than‟ (MAT) response. A MGT ordering is defined by two conditions. Condition a) states that MGT is ordered by the maximum potential increase in income of the recipient, or that the more you stand to receive from an offer, the more generous it is to you. Condition b) states that the increase in maximum potential income of the recipient cannot be less than the maximum potential increase in income of the proposers. In other words, Condition b) states that an offer cannot be self-serving, but it is not specified in Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) precisely how b) affects the MGT ordering. I propose that a violation of b) is considered self-serving and is less MGT than when b) is not violated. I then experimentally study the empirical relevance of b) using two designs that hold a) constant, comparing MGT differences implied by responses. The first design is a variant of the Lost Wallet Game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000) with a negative outside option, and the second design is a modified Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) with elements of the Dictator Game implemented by Andreoni and Miller (2002). I find no empirical support that b) affects the MGT ordering.

The goal of this thesis is to argue that science is not value free on the grounds of a community based account of ethics. It is the peculiar feature of this model that ethics is a limitation on individual&#039 / s freedom of action, and moral norms of a community reflect the structure of the community. I endeavour to resolve the problem, on an assumption that science is an activity of scientific community, that science ethics can be derived from the internal structure of scientific community. Therefore, this thesis attempts to show the relationship between scientific community and science ethics.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number: AAT 3295533."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Biological Sciences, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Diss. Göteborg : Göteborgs universitet, 2010. / Härtill 6 uppsatser.

Thesis (doctoral)--La Salle University, 2002. / ProQuest dissertations and theses ; AAT 3108289. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-78).