The aim of this thesis is to analyse the EU approach to the question of the legitimacy of criminal law. In particular, it enquires into what theoretical justifications does the EU legal order acknowledges as legitimating the resort to harmonized criminal law as a regulatory instrument. Moreover, it enquires if the selected approach is consistent with the identity the EU has set for itself, as a ‘fundamental rights sensitive’ kind of supranational organization, as established at Article 2 TEU, which includes the respect of fundamental rights as one of EU founding values. This research aims at complementing the existing literature theorising on harmonisation of substantive criminal law as a strategy for integration, which has to date primarily focused on the extent of the EU competences, and on the relation between harmonisation and other strategies of integration, such as mutual recognition. The aspect of the impact of the exercise of these EU competences on individuals and of what are the envisaged justifications for that has been to date underexplored. This thesis aims at filling this gap. In doing so it aims at contributing to the systemic understanding of EU criminal law testing its developments against a EU constitutional law benchmark. In terms of methodology, the thesis relies on a criminal legal theory framework, which distinguishes between a normative, value-based approach to the justifications for criminal law, and an instrumental, mainly enforcement-based approach. It tailors these concepts to the supranational level, by combining criminalisation theory concepts with theories on harmonisation. In terms of sources, when enquiring the EU approach to the criminal law, the thesis looks at EU primary law (principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and EU competences to harmonise substantive criminal law); EU policy documents (multi-annual programs and ad hoc EU criminalisation policy documents) and EU secondary law (especially the Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia and on the 2014 Market Abuse Directive).In terms of structure, the thesis devotes the first two chapters to the delineation of the theoretical framework, discussing criminal legal theories on the subject of of the legitimacy of criminal law, and theories on harmonisation of criminal norms. This part is aimed at identifying the analytical tools through which EU primary law, EU secondary law and EU policy documents are analysed in the following 5 chapters. A final chapter draws the relevant conclusions as to the consistency of the EU approach to the legitimacy of criminal law with the EU constitutional law framework. The findings of the thesis illustrate how the EU has not been consistent in its approach to the legitimacy of EU criminal law and it identifies a number of micro-ruptures between the approach in different historical phases; but also between different layers (EU primary and secondary law as well as policy documents) during the same period; and between different policy areas (e.g. EU criminal law was used to protect the security of EU citizens, and when to secure the achievement of EU policies). The thesis nonetheless identifies a macro-synchrony, which sees an historical progressive acknowledgement of a normative approach in a previously pre-existing instrumental context. This progress was positively evaluated as it contributed to increase the coherence of EU criminal law with EU constitutional law benchmarks. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The principle of non-regression is an novel concept in the EU rule of law area. The Court of Justice of the European Union ("Court" or "CJEU") has recently discussed it e.g., in Repubblika (Maltese Judges), Commission versus Poland (Disciplinary régime applicable to judges), Advocate General  Tanchev in his Opinion in A.K. v. KRS (Independence of the disciplinary chamber of the Supreme Court). This paper examines the non-regression principle with a focus on the rule of law and judicial independence in the EU not least because it is understudied. Its potential is underestimated for expanding the reasoning of the CJEU, and the Commission as regards their approach to addressing the sustained attacks on judicial independence in the two Central and Eastern European countris of Poland and Hungary, but also increasingly, judging from the rising number of judicial independence and rule of law cases, in Romania. Maltese Judges is the first ruling of the Court in which the principle of non-regression appeared. In this landmark judgement, acording to Leloup, Kochenov, and Dimitrovs, the Court asserted "an entirely new "non-regression" principle in EU law based on the connection between Arts. 49 and 2 TEU, (...) and addressed a well-known lacuna undermining the EU legal order". In light of that ruling, it is useful to set subsequent research questions: What is the substance and scope of the principle of non-regression in the rule of law and in relation to judicial independence in the EU, and what are the recent trends in the Court´s case law whereby this principle has been invoked to address the rule of law backsliding in the Member States? Can we discern the benchmarks, in the form of substantive standards and in terms of time, against which regression is measured? Considering that, until now, the principle of non-regression has been employed principally with regard to judicial independence, could we apply the concept with respect to other EU values such as democracy, or fundamental rights?

The theme of this thesis is the enlargement of the EU and NATO, and Russia's response to such expansion. The aim of this work is to analyze whether the expansion of these institutions after the end of the Cold War is creating a new dividing line in Europe. The analysis is embedded in a constructivist theoretical perspective. I will therefore examine the distinct identities of the West (for purposes of this work represented by the EU and NATO) and Russia. These different identities should cause that the actors perceive the EU and NATO enlargements from a different perspective. Different vision of certain reality then creates tension between the two "value blocks" and thus may resemble the Cold War.