According to the requirements stated within their charters, the IMF and the IBRD are prohibited from including non-economic criteria in their decisions to lend to members. Despite this restriction, political criteria such as regime type and foreign policy orientation with respect to the East-West conflict have entered into Bank and Fund lending behavior. Political criteria do not, however, dominate decisions to lend in either organization; rather, the appearance of political criteria depends on circumstances in the environment of both the Bank and Fund and the particular relationship of a member to that environment. Using the Communist members of the Bank and the Fund as examples, it appears that foreign policy orientation is the most frequent political input into decisions to lend by the IMF and the IBRD. Due to the pro-capitalist bias of both organizations, only five Communist states have ventured to join the Bank and the Fund, and by 1980 that number had dwindled to two, Yugoslavia and Romania. Mutual suspicion and hostility, coupled with the reluctance of the Bank and Fund to accommodate the special needs of their Communist members, eventually led to the withdrawal of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Cuba from the organizations. Conversely, Yugoslavia and Romania have received levels of IMF and IBRD funding which exceed the average level of members which are non-Communist, developing nations. The uneasy relationship of Yugoslavia and Romania with the Soviet Union and the need of the Bank and Fund to achieve the goal of universal membership in order to control the increasingly volatile nature of the international economy explains this seemingly preferential treatment.

Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, 1929 limits the liability of the air carrier in the event of death or wounding of a passenger to 125,000 Francs-Poincare based on a defined gold value. In 1955, the limitation has been raised to 250,000 Francs-Poincare. / As gold has lost its special position in the monetary system the value of the limitation of liability has decreased and some plaintiffs have argued that the limitation of liability is unconstitutional. / The Warsaw System is presented, the grounds for a limitation of liability, and Article 22 are analyzed. The relationship between municipal law and international law is described. The constitutionality of Article 22 is examined for the jurisdictions of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. Those lines of argumentation that could be used to challenge Article 22 in all constitutional systems similar to those of the abovementioned States are presented.

This paper constructs a graphical and mathematical model of dyadic interstate security competition. It does so by integrating arms racing and war initiation in to a single rational choice framework. The model is constructed from rigorously-defined concepts and all assumptions are made explicit. Equilibrium values for security-based arms racing are derived under the model and compared to conquest-seeking arms races. Comparative static results are provided for several shocks to the basic system. The model is informally extended in to probabilistic war scenarios. Finally, a number of testable predictions generated by the model are presented. / Ce mémoire présente un modèle graphique et mathématique du conflit dyadique dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale. Le modèle permet d'interpréter la course aux armements et le déclenchement des guerres dans un cadre formel. Le modèle est construit a partir de concepts rigoureusement définies et nos postulats ont été présenté de manières explicites. Les valeurs d'équilibre pour une course aux armements voulant assurer la sécurité nationale sont prédits à partir du modèle et comparé aux valeurs produites pour une course aux armements avec des objectifs de conquête. Différents résultats d'analyse statique sont comparés pour différentes perturbations du modèle de base. Le modèle est étendu intuitivement pour présenter des scénarios probabilistes de guerre. Finalement, de nombreuses propositions réfutables sont dérivées du modèle.

In recent years, American foreign policy has been much more attuned to the dangers of rogue states than rising peer-competitors. Perhaps what is more puzzling is why weak states would challenge not only their regional neighborhoods but also a disproportionately powerful United States. This project addresses and explores the phenomena of weak revisionists. The question under investigation here has received comparatively little attention in the scholarly literature: why do weak states adopt expansive foreign policy aims? Existing literature affirms the importance of relative power in determining state behavior and it implies that that only the great powers are afforded the luxury of pursuing other goals beyond their immediate, territorial security. For weak powers to even contemplate goals beyond survival would be a foolhardy endeavor. The underlying motivations behind the formation of foreign policy goals for smaller powers remain unclear and understudied. I present a neoclassical realist approach, which argues that the level of threat faced by a regime and domestic strategic culture determine a state's foreign policy goals. Specifically, I argue that high levels of threat, which heighten a sense of vulnerability, create domestic opportunities for hawkish strategic subcultures to promote a forceful response to those threats. In short, unfavorable geopolitical circumstances, legacies of external and internal challenges, and historical grievances have entrenched cultures of insecurity giving motivation to weak revisionists to pursue expansive goals. Towards this end, I will examine foreign policy-making in Iran, North Korea, and Libya. / Ces dernières années, les dangers potentiels présentés par les soi-disant « états voyous » ont inquiété davantage les Etats-Unis que leurs alliés et concurrents. Un des aspects paraissant inexplicable est le fait que ces prétendus états voyous, perçus comme étant plus faibles à tous les niveaux, osent confronter à la fois leurs voisins régionaux mais aussi les Etats-Unis qui apparaissent comme infiniment plus puissants. Ce projet étudie donc la question des « faibles états révisionnistes ». La question à laquelle nous tenterons de répondre est ainsi : pourquoi se fait-il que des états dits relativement « faibles » poursuivent des objectifs politiques internationaux perçus comme agressifs ? La littérature existante affirme que la notion de pouvoir relatif est essentielle pour déterminer le comportement international d'un état, suggérant ainsi que seules les grandes puissances peuvent se permettre d'aspirer à des objectifs internationaux qui vont au-delà de leur sécurité territoriale immédiate. L'idée que des états perçus comme relativement faibles puissent poursuivre des objectifs mettant en danger leur survie paraît inconcevable. Les raisons pour de tels comportements restent à ce jour elles aussi peu étudiées. À travers ce projet, je propose une approche réaliste néo-classique qui suggère que le niveau de menace auquel un état doit faire face ainsi que la culture stratégique de l'état en question déterminent la politique extérieure de cet état. Ainsi, il est démontré qu'un niveau élevé de menace sécuritaire mène à un sentiment de vulnérabilité chez un état, créant ainsi des opportunités pour des sous-cultures stratégiques belliqueuses de promouvoir une réponse agressive à ces menaces. Concrètement, l'association de circonstances géopolitiques défavorables à la présence d'une culture nationale pour la confrontation ainsi qu'à un passé national douloureux a engendré la création de cultures nationales d'insécurité menant des états relativement faibles et révisionnistes à poursuivre des objectifs internationaux agressifs. L'analyse proposée sera complétée par une étude de cas comparée des politiques extérieures de la Libye, de la Corée du Nord, et de l'Iran.

Threats are key elements in international relations but very few studies are exclusively devoted to them. In this thesis, we present an explanation of threat perception which rests on two main factors. The first one is the level of compatibility between the current preferences of two states. The more two countries have incompatible preferences, the more they will see each other as threatening. The second factor is the historical predispositions that two states hold towards each other. Negative historical predispositions tend to exacerbate the effects of conflicting preferences whereas positive ones tend to minimize their effects. In addition, we claim that state preferences are shaped by the government's evaluation of the country's material situation and by its view of the national identity and not by the influence of domestic interest groups as some theorists claim. Concerning historical predispositions, we believe that they are influenced by the first interactions between two states following a regime change in one or both of them. Those first interactions are themselves shaped by the level of compatibility between state preferences that existed at that crucial time. We test this explanation along with rival ones derived from different International Relations theories by comparing American and British perceptions of China since 1949 and more particularly between 2006 and 2010. In the end, we are able to conclude that our explanation of threat perception is confirmed by the evidence gathered while rival ones tend to be disproved. / Les menaces sont un aspect important des relations internationales mais peu d'études leur sont entièrement dédiées. Dans ce mémoire, nous présentons une explication de la perception des menaces qui repose sur deux facteurs principaux. Le premier est le niveau de compatibilité entre les préférences actuelles de deux États. Plus les préférences de deux pays sont incompatibles, plus ils se sentiront mutuellement menacés. Les prédispositions historiques qu'un État a vis-à-vis d'un autre constituent le deuxième facteur. Des prédispositions négatives tendent à exacerber les effets des incompatibilités de préférences alors que des prédispositions positives tendent à les minimiser. De plus, nous considérons que les préférences étatiques sont façonnées par l'évaluation que fait le gouvernement de la situation matérielle du pays et par sa vision de l'identité nationale. Nous écartons donc l'explication de la formation des préférences étatiques basée sur l'influence des groupes d'intérêts avancée par certains théoriciens. En ce qui concerne les prédispositions historiques, nous croyons qu'elles sont influencées par les premières interactions entre deux États suite à un changement de régime chez au moins l'un d'entre eux. Ces premières interactions sont elles-mêmes façonnées par le niveau de compatibilité entre les préférences étatiques qui existait à ce moment crucial. Nous testons cette explication ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'explications rivales découlant de différentes théories des relations internationales en comparant les perceptions américaines et britanniques de la Chine depuis 1949 et, plus particulièrement, entre 2006 et 2010. Cela nous permet de conclure que notre explication de la perception des menaces est confirmée par les faits alors que les explications rivales semblent pour leur part infirmées.

International investment has become one of the most important issues on the Post-Uruguay Round Agenda of trade negotiations. The rapid growth of and the critical role in today's global economy played by international investment, as well as its essential link to trade flow necessitates a comprehensive study of the possibility of inserting broad investment provisions in the framework of an organization with trade liberalization objectives, the World Trade Organization. The inclusion of such rules requires: (1) an extensive examination of the existing investment-related provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreements, and the evaluation of their utility, followed by the examination of the recent practices of this Organization with respect to investment; (2) tracing the development of international negotiations on investment measures, from the Uruguay Round to the recent movement to launch a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. / This thesis attempts to assess the ground upon which a proposal for a new agreement on investment in the framework of the World trade Organization could be achieved.

Private international law stipulates that copyright is subject to the so-called principle of territoriality. Substantive conflicts of laws as well as procedural conflicts of jurisdictions regulating copyright are said to operate territorially; i.e., confined to the jurisdiction where protection is claimed. / Copyright, however, is a universally valid proprietary right acquired in the legal regime of the country of the literary or artistic work's origin. The "monopolies of exploitation" that ultimately protect copyright are territorially confined because they are the result of the territoriality of laws and statutes. / This thesis, therefore, introduces a new reading of the private international law of copyright. Copyright, like any other property right, should be understood in systems of real rights transpositions, which adapt its underlying proprietary title to the terms of the respective legal order of protection.

States have often applied their laws extraterritorially in order to force other states to comply with international interests such as human rights and environmental standards due to the absence of reliable enforcement and legislative bodies in international society. Many disputes caused by such extraterritorial application have been settled in dispute settlement procedures of the GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO). However, some argue that the WTO is not an appropriate forum to settle extraterritorial disputes since competence of the WTO is limited to "trade" issues and the legitimacy of extraterritorial measures should be assessed by applying all relevant international norms. This paper argues, by analyzing the nature of extraterritorial disputes and by comparing past approaches taken to extraterritorial disputes with the WTO procedures, that the WTO can provide effective solutions to extraterritorial disputes procedurally and substantially. This paper also argues that WTO can contribute to the development of the international legal system in the course of its resolution of extraterritorial disputes by examining state practices after the GATT/WTO dispute settlement.

In this thesis, after examining the evolution of both the economic situation over the recent past and of the various treaties and agreements that both inspired and responded to this evolution, we propose a resolutely legalistic procedure for dispute resolution to be included in a panamerican free-trade agreement that would encompass almost all countries of the American continent, in accordance with the objective announced by the heads of State who participated in the Summit of the Americas. We opt for institutional dispute resolution mechanisms that would intervene after any possibility of appealing a ruling by a lower forum has been ruled out, thus reducing the links between the political and juridical structures of the eventual treaty, recognizing that private parties may, in certain circumstances, have an inherent right to intervene in such proceedings. We favor the inclusion within the treaty itself---particularly as far as competition law is concerned---of substantive law that would be as comprehensive as possible, and suggest means for this substantive law to continue to evolve even after the treaty is concluded. Without setting aside a pragmatic approach which is always likely to help solve or avoid disputes, we have strived for the recognition by states of the inescapability of a strong legalistic approach, each element of which would be free of any suspected political meddling, if we really want the liberalization of exchange between countries of such diverse socio-economic conditions as those we find in the Americas. The objectives of a regional agreement on the opening of the economy and trade liberalization must be different from those of multinational agreements such as the WTO; otherwise, the existence of such agreements could not be justified. Each must provide for dispute resolution mechanisms adapted to its specific mission.

Lease, charter and interchange have become more and more important throughout the last decades. The International Civil Aviation Organization could not ignore that reality. In 1980 after a long preparatory work Article 83bis, an amendment to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation was adopted by the 23rd Assembly without any negative votes. Yet, in 1990, this amendment, which enables the State of Registry, which is responsible for the operation of the aircraft even if flying with an operator of another state, to transfer its functions and duties to the State of the Operator. / This thesis takes a closer look on the history of that amendment. The reasons why Article 83bis is still not in force shall also be discussed. An attempt shall further be made to analyze the provisions of Article 83bis more thoroughly and to explain why states should no longer hesitate to ratify that amendment. Article 83bis has no controversial content and is very important for the safety of international air transportation, in establishing clearly who is responsible for a leased, chartered or interchanged aircraft.