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Much of the extant literature from the kte Second Temple and early Christian periods (200BCE 100CE) contains material about angels. This dissertation is an investigation into the understanding during this period of the relationship between angels and humans. It serves two purposes: (1) it contributes to our understanding of ideas about angels in this period by surveying all of the available evidence and considering evidence that has not previously been studied in detail, and (2) it concludes, contrary to recent studies by Fletcher- Louis and Gieschen, that a clear distinction was maintained between angels and humans, despite occasions when this gap is bridged and humans do become angels. The first chapter introduces the subject, surveys previous research showing the need for the present study and sets out the historical context of the literature to be examined. After these preliminary considerations, the evidence for the distinction between angels and humans is examined in two parts: Part one consists of two chapters that investigate the issue of the similarity of appearance between humans and angels. Chapter two examines the evidence for the portrayal of angels as human beings; conversely, chapter three examines the evidence for the portrayal of humans being as angels. Part two consists of three chapters that investigate the portrayal of close contact between humans and angels. Chapter four examines texts that describe humans and angels living together in communities. Chapter five considers texts that portray angels as recipients of human hospitality, including the issue of whether or not angels ate food. Chapter six considers the human-angel hybrid offspring of Genesis 6 and its interpretations. The final chapter summarises the conclusions that are drawn from the evidence and outlines their implications for current scholarship.

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This dissertation explores the `sign' of visible face make-up and examines how women consume appearance in everyday life in contemporary Australia. Using a semiotic framework, it presents a novel new method for interpreting and gaining increased meaning into an everyday consumption phenomenon. The purpose of the study is to gain insights into why women wear make-up. It seeks to provide understanding of what this medium signifies to women and what the `sign' of make-up symbolises to the female individual. It explores how visible face make-up affects the way women consume appearance in everyday life, how they feel about themselves, and the role make-up plays in defining their own self-identity. The study utilises an interpretivist approach and uses a qualitative methodology in the form of phenomenology. The theoretical framework used to underpin this research is semiotics and this study examines the sign of make-up using two different semiotic perspectives previously not used together. The significance of this process is that by combining these perspectives a richer and more in-depth understanding is derived.

Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

Thesis (M.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2009. / Document formatted into pages; contains xi, 122 p. Includes bibliographical references.