Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>. One disagreement is over whether the first <i>Critique</i> contains a sufficient proof of the doctrine of <i>transcendental idealism</i>. Another disagreement revolves around the question of whether Kants doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with <i>direct realism</i> a view that Kant also appears to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: <i>Kants Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense</I> (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for transcendental idealism given in the first <i>Critique</i>. The inter-theoretical relation between transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.

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Durante o ano de 1781 Kant lança a obra Crítica da razão pura, a qual é exclusivamente voltada para o problema do conhecimento humano, mais precisamente, sua origem, seu limite, sua organização e sua validade perante a realidade empírica. Contudo, foi a questão quanto a origem do conhecimento que se tornou o foco das atenções e discussões durante todo o período do idealismo alemão, visto que tal questão trazia a luz o conceito de coisa em si. O problema deste conceito era saber qual deveria ser seu lugar em relação ao conhecimento, isto é, se a coisa em si era ou não a causa do conhecimento empírico e quais as consequências e soluções diante a escolha de alguma destas posições. Desse modo, durante o idealismo alemão surgiram vários sistemas que ora tentavam resolver ora atacar, com argumentos céticos, o problema da coisa em si kantiana. Dentre estes sistemas, como defensor da doutrina transcendental, destaca-se o de Arthur Schopenhauer, que tanto dá uma denominação metafísica-imanente para a coisa em si, Vontade, quanto soluciona o problema da origem do conhecimento empírico sem o uso de tal conceito problemático. Sendo assim, nossa dissertação tem como objetivo discutir a solução e o significado do conceito de coisa em si encontrado por Schopenhauer em seu livro O mundo como vontade e como representação. / During all the year of 1781, Kant releases his Critique of Pure Reason, which is exclusively devoted to the problem of human knowledge, more precisely his origins, his limits, his organization and his validity face off the empirical reality. Although, the question around the knowledge origins has become the focus of lectures and discussions during all the period of German idealism because it brings out the thing-in-itself concept. That concepts problem is to know which should be his role concerning knowledge, or if thin-in-itself was the cause of empirical knowledge or not, and which consequences and solutions were implicated in this positions. With that, during the period of German idealism several philosophical systems began to exist, attempting to solve or to attack, using skeptical argumentations, Kantians thing-in-itself problem. Among these systems, as a defender of transcendental philosophy doctrine, Arthur Schopenhauers system gains force, as an author of the denomination metaphysical-immanent to the thing-in-itself (the Will), and both as the proposer of a solution to the problem of the empirical knowledge without the using of this problematical concept. Therefore, our master thesis has, as her goal, to discuss solution and signification of thing-in-itself inner concept, founded by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation.

Durante o ano de 1781 Kant lança a obra Crítica da razão pura, a qual é exclusivamente voltada para o problema do conhecimento humano, mais precisamente, sua origem, seu limite, sua organização e sua validade perante a realidade empírica. Contudo, foi a questão quanto a origem do conhecimento que se tornou o foco das atenções e discussões durante todo o período do idealismo alemão, visto que tal questão trazia a luz o conceito de coisa em si. O problema deste conceito era saber qual deveria ser seu lugar em relação ao conhecimento, isto é, se a coisa em si era ou não a causa do conhecimento empírico e quais as consequências e soluções diante a escolha de alguma destas posições. Desse modo, durante o idealismo alemão surgiram vários sistemas que ora tentavam resolver ora atacar, com argumentos céticos, o problema da coisa em si kantiana. Dentre estes sistemas, como defensor da doutrina transcendental, destaca-se o de Arthur Schopenhauer, que tanto dá uma denominação metafísica-imanente para a coisa em si, Vontade, quanto soluciona o problema da origem do conhecimento empírico sem o uso de tal conceito problemático. Sendo assim, nossa dissertação tem como objetivo discutir a solução e o significado do conceito de coisa em si encontrado por Schopenhauer em seu livro O mundo como vontade e como representação. / During all the year of 1781, Kant releases his Critique of Pure Reason, which is exclusively devoted to the problem of human knowledge, more precisely his origins, his limits, his organization and his validity face off the empirical reality. Although, the question around the knowledge origins has become the focus of lectures and discussions during all the period of German idealism because it brings out the thing-in-itself concept. That concepts problem is to know which should be his role concerning knowledge, or if thin-in-itself was the cause of empirical knowledge or not, and which consequences and solutions were implicated in this positions. With that, during the period of German idealism several philosophical systems began to exist, attempting to solve or to attack, using skeptical argumentations, Kantians thing-in-itself problem. Among these systems, as a defender of transcendental philosophy doctrine, Arthur Schopenhauers system gains force, as an author of the denomination metaphysical-immanent to the thing-in-itself (the Will), and both as the proposer of a solution to the problem of the empirical knowledge without the using of this problematical concept. Therefore, our master thesis has, as her goal, to discuss solution and signification of thing-in-itself inner concept, founded by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation.

Disertacija yra teorinis kantiškosios patyrimo sampratos tyrimas, kuriame nagrinėjamas Kanto epistemologinis apriorizmas, grindžiamas skirtimi tarp juslinės medžiagos ir konceptualinės pažinimo formos bei Kanto pažinimo teorijos metafizinė dalis. Tam tikrus metafizinius aspektus išreiškia kita svarbi kantiškoji skirtis tarp „daikto savaime“ ir „reiškinio“. Pastaroji skirtis yra integrali Kanto patyrimo teorijos dalis ir ji yra artimai susijusi su Kanto epistemologija. Disertacijoje pateikiamais argumentais siekiama parodyti abiejų pagrindinių kantiškųjų skirčių svarbius aspektus ir filosofines implikacijas, ir ypač svarbą daikto savaime idėjos, kuri išreiškia tam tikrų metafizinio ir empirinio pažinimo ribų supratimą Kanto patyrimo teorijoje. Disertacijoje kritikuojami įvairūs požiūriai į Kanto patyrimo teorijos dalis, taip pat remiamasi įvairių Kanto filosofijos interpretatorių ir tyrėjų veikalais. Istorinė kantiškosios patyrimo sampratos recepcijos apžvalga leido pateikti argumentus, kurie Kanto patyrimo sampratą supriešina su metafiziniu realizmu, su filosofija, grindžiama mąstymo ir būties vienove, ir su naiviuoju epistemologiniu realizmu. Taip pat tyrimas išryškina Kanto filosofinės patyrimo teorijos metafizinį nominalizmą ir epistemologinį realizmą. / The dissertation is a theoretical inquiry into Kantian conception of experience. It includes investigation of Kant’s epistemological apriorism, which is based on the difference between sensuous mater and conceptual form of cognition and the investigation of metaphysical part of Kantian theory of cognition. Certain metaphysical aspects are introduced by another significant distinction between “thing-in-itself” and “appearance”. The last difference is integral part of Kant’s theory of experience; it is closely combined with Kant’s epistemology. Polemics of the dissertation tends to show the significant aspects and philosophical implications of both main distinctions and especially the importance of idea of the thing-in-itself, which expresses certain understanding of the limits of metaphysical and empirical cognition in Kantian theory of experience. Present work not only criticizes various views on certain parts of Kant’s theory of experience, but at the same time uses the wide variety of other significant works of interpreters and investigators of Kant’s philosophy as well. The historical review of the reception of Kantian conception of experience enabled to present arguments contrasting Kant’s theory of experience with metaphysical realism and with the philosophy grounded on the postulate of unity of thinking and being and with naïve epistemological realism. Also research highlights metaphysical nominalism and epistemological realism apparent in Kant’s philosophical theory on... [to full text]

Disertacija yra teorinis kantiškosios patyrimo sampratos tyrimas, kuriame nagrinėjamas Kanto epistemologinis apriorizmas, grindžiamas skirtimi tarp juslinės medžiagos ir konceptualinės pažinimo formos bei Kanto pažinimo teorijos metafizinė dalis. Tam tikrus metafizinius aspektus išreiškia kita svarbi kantiškoji skirtis tarp „daikto savaime“ ir „reiškinio“. Pastaroji skirtis yra integrali Kanto patyrimo teorijos dalis ir ji yra artimai susijusi su Kanto epistemologija. Disertacijoje pateikiamais argumentais siekiama parodyti abiejų pagrindinių kantiškųjų skirčių svarbius aspektus ir filosofines implikacijas, ir ypač svarbą daikto savaime idėjos, kuri išreiškia tam tikrų metafizinio ir empirinio pažinimo ribų supratimą Kanto patyrimo teorijoje. Disertacijoje kritikuojami įvairūs požiūriai į Kanto patyrimo teorijos dalis, taip pat remiamasi įvairių Kanto filosofijos interpretatorių ir tyrėjų veikalais. Istorinė kantiškosios patyrimo sampratos recepcijos apžvalga leido pateikti argumentus, kurie Kanto patyrimo sampratą supriešina su metafiziniu realizmu, su filosofija, grindžiama mąstymo ir būties vienove, ir su naiviuoju epistemologiniu realizmu. Taip pat tyrimas išryškina Kanto filosofinės patyrimo teorijos metafizinį nominalizmą ir epistemologinį realizmą. / The dissertation is a theoretical inquiry into Kantian conception of experience. It includes investigation of Kant’s epistemological apriorism, which is based on the difference between sensuous mater and conceptual form of cognition and the investigation of metaphysical part of Kantian theory of cognition. Certain metaphysical aspects are introduced by another significant distinction between “thing-in-itself” and “appearance”. The last difference is integral part of Kant’s theory of experience; it is closely combined with Kant’s epistemology. Polemics of the dissertation tends to show the significant aspects and philosophical implications of both main distinctions and especially the importance of idea of the thing-in-itself, which expresses certain understanding of the limits of metaphysical and empirical cognition in Kantian theory of experience. Present work not only criticizes various views on certain parts of Kant’s theory of experience, but at the same time uses the wide variety of other significant works of interpreters and investigators of Kant’s philosophy as well. The historical review of the reception of Kantian conception of experience enabled to present arguments contrasting Kant’s theory of experience with metaphysical realism and with the philosophy grounded on the postulate of unity of thinking and being and with naïve epistemological realism. Also research highlights metaphysical nominalism and epistemological realism apparent in Kant’s philosophical theory on... [to full text]

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-08-10T13:45:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquvo total.pdf: 1248500 bytes, checksum: de65e47cb8e64bca94a8b03e6af603bc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T13:45:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquvo total.pdf: 1248500 bytes, checksum: de65e47cb8e64bca94a8b03e6af603bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / We analyze the sensible forms, namely, space and time, and their possible relationships with knowledge. We credit, as well, the following interrogative: as the fundamentals of sensibility, space and time, organize our knowledge since, only we can only consider the object of knowledge that which is intuited spatially and temporally? The issue raised by Immanuel Kant leads us immediately to another intriguing overlapping issue, that is, we can only have access to the phenomenon, but not the thing itself. By the facts, here our discussion. / Analisamos as formas sensíveis, a saber: espaço e tempo, e seus possíveis relacionamentos perante o conhecimento. Creditamos, pois bem, a seguinte interrogativa: como os fundamentos da sensibilidade, espaço e tempo, organizam nosso conhecimento já que, unicamente, só podemos considerar objeto de conhecimento aquilo que é intuído espacialmente e temporalmente? A problemática levantada por Immanuel Kant leva-nos, de imediato, a outra intrigante questão sobreposta, isto é, só podemos ter acesso ao fenômeno, mas nunca a coisa em si. Mediante os fatos, eis aqui nossa discussão.

Epistemology in its contemporary post-modern ethos is generally believed to be inseparably hinged upon language. This of course ensures a major paradigm shift in the disciplined human conceptions of reality. It has been stated and is widely acknowledged that the Kantian Noumenal barrier has, in this recent shift, been proved to be looming far closer than it was ever previously considered. This new barrier to the world of ‘objective absolutes’ comprises a barrier of semantics and syntax, and calls for a radical restructuring of all the human sciences. There is surely no discipline in the humanities that can claim immunity to this colossal shift in epistemology, and theology (particularly of the Evangelical variety) is no exception to the rule. The impact of post-modern epistemological assumption upon contemporary Evangelicalism presents to those who adhere to this school’s position, a profound challenge. Conservative Christians, who hold to the propositional universality and the objectivity of biblical truth, find in the post-modern ethos little sympathy and no rational justification granted for their ‘metaphysical objectivity’. A major challenge therefore to Evangelical Christianity at the present time is this: Is there, in the light of the challenge of post-modern epistemology, any reasonable justification for continuing to adhere to the evangelical claim that God has spoken in unchanging propositional terms that are universally valid and binding? It would seem that in this regard many evangelicals are feeling pressured. Evidence of the pressure of this challenge can readily be found either in the growing contemporary evangelical tendency towards advocating a more cooperative attitude to the post-modern ethos, or in the reactionary theology of schools of thought like the Spiritual Warfare Movement. The writings of Clive Staples Lewis (1898 – 1963) have been proven effective in the countering of negative challenges to Christian faith for the past sixty years. Lewis, as an apologist, in the opinion of many intellectual searchers, positively and convincingly countered modernistic objections to faith in his own time. Modernistic assumptions prevailed in the Western world in Lewis’ day that tended to discredit a rational belief in the supernatural. Lewis was widely held to be an effective apostle to counter this modernistic scepticism. It is the conviction of the present writer that C. S. Lewis apologetics can be just as effectively utilised today in addressing post-modern challenges, as it was fifty years ago used to answer the questions raised by modernism. Lewis in all of his Christian writings, reveals an underlying epistemology that I believe (because it is based firmly upon Christian orthodoxy), has stood the test of time. The apologetics of C. S. Lewis may serve to answer post-modern challenges just as rationally as it did modernism. In this thesis, Lewis’ underlying epistemology will be examined. This will comprise the first part of my work. The second part of the thesis deals with the post-modern epistemological challenge to Evangelicalism as a world-view. The final part of this thesis consists of a dialogue between the most common post-modern challenges to evangelical thinking, and rationally compelling answers thereto that are found in Lewis’ writings. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / Unrestricted

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