A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente negativo, como a representação problemática de algo completamente indeterminado, ora em sentido positivo como fundamento ou causa dos fenômenos. Partindo de interpretações que compreendem esse conflito entre asserções sobre as coisas em si mesmas como tendo sua origem nos dois problemas que a filosofia crítica procura solucionar a possibilidade do conhecimento especulativo e a fundamentação da moral , procura-se reconstruir, num primeiro momento, o vínculo entre a crítica da razão e os diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas. Argumentamos que a diferenciação da faculdade racional em duas atividades ou espontaneidades, entendimento e razão, que são expostas pela crítica como produtoras de conceitos e legislações distintas, exige duas maneiras de formular, criticamente, o conceito de númeno. A primeira formulação é feita pelo entendimento mediante a abstração das condições sensíveis de aplicação das categorias, dada sua originariedade em relação à sensibilidade. Este conceito tem de permanecer, contudo, em um sentido estritamente negativo e problemático, visto as categorias consistirem apenas em funções de síntese de representações sensíveis e estarem limitadas, por isso, a um uso empírico. A segunda formulação é feita, em contrapartida, pelas idéias da razão, que pressupõem um prolongamento da síntese pensada nas categorias até o incondicionado. Ainda que envolva uma aparência transcendental essas idéias se fazem necessárias, principalmente, em vista do uso prático da razão. Num segundo momento, porém, voltando nossa atenção ao esforço de Kant em articular sistematicamente esses diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas no interior da filosofia crítica, procuramos mostrar como a elaboração do conceito de autonomia na passagem para o uso prático, possibilita uma maneira de operar com a aparência transcendental presente nas ideias, sem violar a limitação das categorias ao uso empírico. Nesse sentido, explicitamos como a crítica da razão em seu uso prático desvela um novo caminho para a faculdade de julgar, em que lhe é permitido aplicar legitimamente a categoria de causalidade com referência aos númenos. / The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate the apparently conflicting claims that Kant makes about the things in themselves, sometimes in a strictly negative sense, as a problematic representation of something completely undetermined, sometimes in a positive sense as the ground or the cause of the appearances. Starting with interpretations that understand this conflict between the claims about things in themselves as having its origin in two problems that the critical philosophy aims to solve the possibility of speculative knowledge and the moral foundation our first task is to reconstruct the link between the critique of reason and the different ways of representing things in themselves. We argue that the differentiation of the rational faculty in two activities or spontaneities understanding and reason which are presented by the critical view as producers of distinct concepts and laws, requires two ways to critically formulate the concept of noumenon. The first formulation is made by the understanding by abstraction of sensible conditions of application of the categories, given its originality in relation to sensibility. This concept must remain, however, in a strictly negative and problematic sense, since the categories consist only in synthetic functions of sensible representations and thus are limited to the empirical use. The second formulation, on the other hand, is made by the ideas of reason, which require an extension of the synthesis thought in the categories up to the unconditioned. Those ideas are needed especially in view of the practical use of reason, despite the fact they involve a \"transcendental appearance\". Turning our attention to Kant\'s effort to systematically articulate these different modes of representation of things in themselves within the critical philosophy, the second task of the thesis is to show how the concept of autonomy elaborated in the transition to practical use, provides a way to work with the transcendental appearance present in the ideas, without violating the limitation of the categories to empirical use. In this sense, we elucidate how the critique of reason in its practical use reveals a new path for the faculty of judgment, in which it is legitimately allowed to apply the category of causality with reference to noumena.

Dans ce mémoire, nous nous proposons de montrer que le concept kantien de chose en soi est à la fois un concept métaphysique et un concept critique. En ce sens, la chose en soi doit être comprise comme un objet transcendantal réel qui existe à titre de cause des phénomènes. Si, contrairement à ce que soutenaient F.H. Jacobi (1787) et G.E. Schulze (1791), cela ne suppose pas de sortir du criticisme, c'est qu'une telle affirmation prend la forme d'une connaissance analogique qui respecte les limites de la connaissance humaine. De fait, la connaissance analogique permet de pointer en direction de quelque chose dont la nature (Beschaffenheit) peut demeurer problématique, tout en permettant d'affirmer son existence (Dasein). Nous serons dès lors conduite à montrer que la Critique de la raison pure fournit bel et bien les outils nécessaires permettant de rendre compte de l’existence des choses en soi à titre de causes des phénomènes. / In the following thesis, we will claim that Kant’s concept of a thing-in-itself is both a metaphysical and a critical concept. Accordingly, the thing-in-itself must be understood as a real transcendental object that grounds phenomena. Thus, we maintain – contrary to F.H. Jacobi’s (1787) and G.E. Schulze’s (1791) harsh objections – that this assertion does not violate the structures of critical philosophy. Indeed, this particular claim is arrived at through analogical cognition, which does not transgress the boundaries of human knowledge: as a matter of fact, analogical cognition allows us to point towards and assert the existence (Dasein) of something the nature (Beschaffenheit) of which may remain problematic. Thus, we believe that Kant’s metaphysical commitment with regard to the existence of the thing-in-itself as ground of phenomena can be fully justified within the Critique of Pure Reason.

A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente negativo, como a representação problemática de algo completamente indeterminado, ora em sentido positivo como fundamento ou causa dos fenômenos. Partindo de interpretações que compreendem esse conflito entre asserções sobre as coisas em si mesmas como tendo sua origem nos dois problemas que a filosofia crítica procura solucionar a possibilidade do conhecimento especulativo e a fundamentação da moral , procura-se reconstruir, num primeiro momento, o vínculo entre a crítica da razão e os diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas. Argumentamos que a diferenciação da faculdade racional em duas atividades ou espontaneidades, entendimento e razão, que são expostas pela crítica como produtoras de conceitos e legislações distintas, exige duas maneiras de formular, criticamente, o conceito de númeno. A primeira formulação é feita pelo entendimento mediante a abstração das condições sensíveis de aplicação das categorias, dada sua originariedade em relação à sensibilidade. Este conceito tem de permanecer, contudo, em um sentido estritamente negativo e problemático, visto as categorias consistirem apenas em funções de síntese de representações sensíveis e estarem limitadas, por isso, a um uso empírico. A segunda formulação é feita, em contrapartida, pelas idéias da razão, que pressupõem um prolongamento da síntese pensada nas categorias até o incondicionado. Ainda que envolva uma aparência transcendental essas idéias se fazem necessárias, principalmente, em vista do uso prático da razão. Num segundo momento, porém, voltando nossa atenção ao esforço de Kant em articular sistematicamente esses diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas no interior da filosofia crítica, procuramos mostrar como a elaboração do conceito de autonomia na passagem para o uso prático, possibilita uma maneira de operar com a aparência transcendental presente nas ideias, sem violar a limitação das categorias ao uso empírico. Nesse sentido, explicitamos como a crítica da razão em seu uso prático desvela um novo caminho para a faculdade de julgar, em que lhe é permitido aplicar legitimamente a categoria de causalidade com referência aos númenos. / The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate the apparently conflicting claims that Kant makes about the things in themselves, sometimes in a strictly negative sense, as a problematic representation of something completely undetermined, sometimes in a positive sense as the ground or the cause of the appearances. Starting with interpretations that understand this conflict between the claims about things in themselves as having its origin in two problems that the critical philosophy aims to solve the possibility of speculative knowledge and the moral foundation our first task is to reconstruct the link between the critique of reason and the different ways of representing things in themselves. We argue that the differentiation of the rational faculty in two activities or spontaneities understanding and reason which are presented by the critical view as producers of distinct concepts and laws, requires two ways to critically formulate the concept of noumenon. The first formulation is made by the understanding by abstraction of sensible conditions of application of the categories, given its originality in relation to sensibility. This concept must remain, however, in a strictly negative and problematic sense, since the categories consist only in synthetic functions of sensible representations and thus are limited to the empirical use. The second formulation, on the other hand, is made by the ideas of reason, which require an extension of the synthesis thought in the categories up to the unconditioned. Those ideas are needed especially in view of the practical use of reason, despite the fact they involve a \"transcendental appearance\". Turning our attention to Kant\'s effort to systematically articulate these different modes of representation of things in themselves within the critical philosophy, the second task of the thesis is to show how the concept of autonomy elaborated in the transition to practical use, provides a way to work with the transcendental appearance present in the ideas, without violating the limitation of the categories to empirical use. In this sense, we elucidate how the critique of reason in its practical use reveals a new path for the faculty of judgment, in which it is legitimately allowed to apply the category of causality with reference to noumena.

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In dieser Arbeit schlage ich eine phänomenalistische Interpretation von Kants Idealismus vor, die sich jedoch in einigen Punkten von Standard-phänomenalistischen Interpretationen unterscheidet. Erscheinungen sind in meiner Lesart der Inhalt von Vorstellungen, aber nicht das eigentliche Objekt der Erkenntnis. Denn Erscheinungen sind von den erscheinenden Objekten verschieden. Diese sind vielmehr die Dinge an sich, welche wir zum transzendentalen Gegenstand der Erkenntnis machen. Allerdings erkennen wir sie lediglich, wie sie erscheinen, und nicht, wie sie sind. Somit bleibt die Unerkennbarkeit der Dinge, wie sie an sich sind, gewahrt. Im Verlauf meiner Argumentation diskutiere ich zahlreiche Aspekte von Kants Philosophie. Darunter sind die Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinungen und Dingen an sich, Kants Verhältnis zur Cartesischen Epistemologie, die Widerlegung des Idealismus, sowie nicht zuletzt seine Theorie der Synthesis zu nennen. Mein Ziel ist dabei nicht nur zu zeigen, dass Kant ein Phänomenalist ist, sondern auch die Art seines Phänomenalismus zu charakterisieren. / This publication defends a phenomenalist interpretation of Kant’s idealism, which, however, deviates from usual phenomenalist interpretations in several respects. According to my reading, appearances are the content of representations, but not the true object of cognition. The object to which our cognition refers is rather the thing itself as the transcendental object. Nonetheless, we only cognize them as they appear and not as they are in themselves. Thus the unknowability of things as they are in themselves is retained. In the course of my presentation, I discuss a number of aspects of Kant’s philosophy, among which are the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, Kant’s relationship to Cartesian epistemology, the refutation of idealism, and not least his theory of synthesis. My aim is not only to show that Kant is a phenomenalist, but also to characterize the kind of his phenomenalism.

[pt] Guiada pelo duplo propósito de esclarecer o significado dos conceitos de númeno, objeto transcendental e coisa em si mesma e de encontrar uma interpretação satisfatória para o problema da afecção transcendental, esta tese se desdobra em três partes. A primeira investiga a origem do conceito de númeno na Dissertação inaugural e analisa seus desdobramentos nas duas edições da Crítica da razão pura. Observaremos que o númeno pensado em seu sentido positivo passa a ser descrito como um conceito problemático, enquanto pensado em seu sentido negativo se revela imprescindível para a doutrina da sensibilidade. A segunda parte trata da definição kantiana de objeto transcendental e de suas relações com a coisa em si mesma e com a apercepção transcendental. Veremos que apesar de Kant associar o conceito de objeto transcendental à apercepção transcendental, ele não identifica o objeto em si mesmo com a apercepção. A terceira parte examina extensivamente o papel da coisa em si mesma em momentos cruciais da Crítica. A partir dessa perspectiva mais abrangente, notaremos que a noção de coisa em si mesma se relaciona com a razão e com entendimento de modos específicos, orientando e delimitando o conhecimento. A chave da interpretação erguida ao longo desse percurso é encontrada na conclusão da tese. Poderemos então finalmente mostrar que os conceitos de númeno, objeto transcendental e coisa em si mesma têm, cada um, uma função crítica sob a perspectiva da reflexão transcendental e, além disso, que a afecção pode ser considerada, assim como os objetos, tanto do ponto de vista empírico como do transcendental. / [en] Guided by the dual purpose of clarifying the meanings of the concepts of noumenon, transcendental object and the thing in itself and finding a satisfactory interpretation of the problem of transcendental affection, this thesis unfolds itself in three parts. The first researches the origin of the concept of noumenon in the Inaugural Dissertation and analyzes its development in both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason. We shall observe that noumenon thought in its positive sense turns out to be described as a problematic concept, while thought in its negative sense reveals to be essential to the doctrine of sensibility. The second part deals with the Kantian definition of the transcendental object and its connections with the thing in itself and with transcendental apperception. We shall see that although Kant associates the concept of the transcendental object with the transcendental apperception, he does not identify the object in itself with the apperception. The third part examines thoroughly the role of the thing in itself in crucial moments of the Critique. From this broader perspective, we shall notice that the notion of thing in itself relates to reason and understanding in specific ways, guiding and delimiting knowledge. The key to the interpretation built throughout this course is found in the conclusion of the thesis. We shall finally be able to show that the concepts of noumenon, transcendental object and thing in itself have, each, a critical function from the perspective of the transcendental reflection and, furthermore, that the affection can be considered, as well as the objects, either from the empirical or from the transcendental point of view.

Concept éminemment polysémique, le sens commun a été déprécié par un vaste pan de la philosophie occidentale, qui y a vu au mieux l’expression de croyances infondées, au pire la manifestation de croyances erronées et naïves. Là où bon nombre de commentateurs ont repéré dans les pensées mêmes d’Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell et Gilles Deleuze, trois grandes figures de la philosophie du cinéma, des critiques adressées au sens commun, nous nous efforçons ici de tirer au clair la conception positive qu’ils développent de cette notion, en dépit des soupçons occasionnels qu’ils font peser sur elle. Plus précisément, nous tâchons d’expliquer jusqu’à quel point certaines acceptions du sens commun permettent de satisfaire l’ambition de connaître le réel lui-même. En premier lieu, nous passons en revue l’argumentation élaborée par certains réalistes spéculatifs (en particulier Quentin Meillassoux et Graham Harman) afin de clarifier d’une part des réflexions qui feront l’objet de discussions et de répliques dans les chapitres subséquents et, d’autre part, de montrer que la dépréciation philosophique du sens commun se prolonge jusque dans les débats les plus actuels sur l’objectivité. Nous faisons ressortir par la suite les angles sous lesquels le sens commun est susceptible de nous rapprocher du réel d’après Bergson, Cavell et Deleuze. En second lieu, nous entrons de plain-pied dans le domaine du cinéma et examinons en quoi différentes œuvres du renouveau du cinéma québécois (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, le collectif Épopée, Mathieu Denis et Simon Lavoie) viennent à leur manière compléter, radicaliser ou critiquer les réflexions développées dans la première partie autour du sens commun et du réel. À l’encontre de ceux qui qualifient ces œuvres de « mimétiques », « peu songées » et « esthétisantes », nous mettons donc en évidence la façon dont ces films, attentifs à la profondeur de l’expérience ordinaire et à l’exigence de trouver un certain équilibre entre le devenir incessant et la stabilité constante, parviennent à nuancer et à raffiner la philosophie. / The eminently polysemic concept of common sense was depreciated by a vast segment of Western philosophy, which saw at best in it the expression of unwarranted beliefs, at worst the manifestation of erroneous and naïve beliefs. Where many commentators have pinpointed critiques of common sense in the thoughts of Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, three prominent figures of the philosophy of cinema, we strive here to bring out the positive conception they develop of that concept, notwithstanding the occasional suspicion they may cast on it. To put it in more precise terms, we seek to explain to what extent certain meanings of common sense are apt to satisfy the ambition of knowing reality itself. In the first place, we review the argument elaborated by certain speculative realists (specifically Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman) in order to clarify, on the one hand, reflections which will be the object of discussions and replies in the subsequent chapters, and, on the other hand, to show that the philosophical depreciation of common sense goes on even in the most contemporary debates on objectivity. We then bring out the angles under which, according to Bergson, Cavell and Deleuze, common sense is apt to bring us closer to reality itself. In the second place, we enter fully into the field of cinema and examine in what way different works associated with the revival of Quebec cinema (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, the collective Épopée, Mathieu Denis and Simon Lavoie) end up completing, radicalizing or criticizing in their way the reflections developed in the first part around common sense and the real. In opposition to those who characterize those works as « mimetic », « thoughtless » and « aestheticizing », we thus bring to the fore the way in which those films, paying attention to the depth of ordinary experience and to the requirement of finding a certain balance between incessant becoming and constant stability, do succeed in nuancing and refining philosophy.

How might ‘the digital’ be conceived of in an ‘expanded field’ of art practice, where ontology is flattened such that it is not defined by a particular media? This text, together with an installation of art work at the Exhibition Research Lab, Liverpool John Moores University (13-24 March), constitutes the thesis submission as a whole, such that in the practice of ‘reading’ the thesis, each element remains differentiated from the other and makes no attempt to ‘represent’ the other. In negating representation, such practices present a ‘radical’ rethinking of the digital as a differentiated in-itself, one that is not defined solely by entrenched computational narratives derived from set theory. Rather, following Nelson Goodman’s nominalistic rejection of class constructs, ‘the digital’ is thus understood in onto-epistemic terms as being syntactically and semantically differentiated (Languages of Art 161). In the context of New Zealand Post-object Art practices of the late 1960s, as read through Jack Burnham’s systems thinking, such a digitally differentiated ontology is conceived of in terms of the how of practice, rather than what of objects (“Systems Aesthetics”). After Heidegger, such a practice is seen as an event of becoming realised by the method of formal indication, such that what is concealed is brought forth as a thing-in-itself (The Event; Phenomenological Interpretations 26). As articulated through the researcher’s own sculptural practice – itself indebted to Post-object Art – indication is developed as an intersubjective method applicable to both artists and audience. However, the constraints imposed on the thing-in-itself by the Husserlian phenomenological tradition are also taken as imposing correlational limitations on the ‘digital’, such that it is inherently an in-itself for-us and thus not differentiated in-itself. To resolve such Kantian dialectics, the thesis draws on metaphysical arguments put forward by contemporary speculative ontologies – in particular the work of Quentin Meillassoux and Tristan Garcia (After Finitude; Form and Object). Where these contemporary continental philosophies provide a means of releasing events from the contingency of human ‘reason’, the thesis argues for a practice of ‘un-reason’ in which indication is recognized as being contingent on speculation. Practice, it is argued, was never reason’s alone to determine. Instead, through the ‘radical’ method of speculative indication, practice is asserted as the event through which the differentiated digital is revealed as a thing-in-itself of itself and not for us.