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Målet med denne bacheloroppgåva var å studere to bøker av Tomas Espedal og Kristian Lundberg for å sjå kva deira språklege grep kunne seie oss om synet på språk og røyndom i bøkene. Eg studerte bøkene imot kunsten og imot naturen av Espedal og Yarden og Och allt skall vara kärlek av Lundberg med vekt på dei språklege verkemidla dei har brukt. Alle bøkene går innunder omgrepet sjølvframstillande litteratur og eg har jamstilt formen med dei andre språklege verkemidla for å sjå kva også sjangeren dei har skrive i har hatt å seie for å kunne utrykkje eit syn på forholdet mellom språk og verd i bøkene. Eg tok utgangspunkt i teorien rundt språkfilosofi og underleggjering i litteraturen og brukte dette som grunnlag for min komparative analyse. Det eg til slutt kom fram til er at både formen og dei andre språklege verkemidla utrykkjer eit syn på språket som utilstrekkeleg og røyndommen som noko subjektivt som heile tida er i forandring. Ein konstruerer si eiga verd gjennom ein individuell bruk av språket. Dei litterære grepa utrykkjer dette på ulikt sett, som til dømes komposisjonen som vitnar om ei uoversikteleg verd og eit minne ein ikkje kan stole på. Prosainnslaga viser til ei verd utan klare grenser og med eit behov for eit språk som kan vise til noko meir enn dei språklege bileta vi allereie kjenner. Sjølvframstillinga i seg sjølv viser til ei subjektiv røynd, med eit subjektiv språk der grensene mellom fakta og fiksjon er utflytande. Dermed kan ein forstå desse fire bøkene som eit forsøk på å seie noko meir enn det språket kan utrykkje og som eit lite klapp på skuldra som fortel deg at det finst ei sanning så lenge du godtek at den er subjektiv og konstruert i språket.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(教育学) / 乙第13298号 / 論教博第169号 / 新制||教||190(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院教育学研究科臨床教育学専攻 / (主査)准教授 齋藤 直子, 教授 西平 直, 准教授 Jeremy Rappleye / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Philosophy (Education) / Kyoto University / DGAM

Ce mémoire vise à explorer le lien étroit unissant le scepticisme philosophique, le dispositif cinématographique et la tétralogie de Gus Van Sant : Gerry, Elephant, Last days et Paranoid Park. À partir de la philosophie de Stanley Cavell, il sera d’abord question de développer le scepticisme comme condition d’existence et non plus comme doctrine philosophique. Stanley Cavell fait bifurquer le problème sceptique de la cognition vers l’éthique et nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en proposant un cinéma du désoeuvrement et de la mélancolie où l’individu est en rupture avec le monde, rejoint cette dimension éthique du scepticisme par le cinéma. Ensuite, il s’agira de voir comment le dispositif cinématographique est l’expression même du scepticisme cavellien et comment il permet de tendre vers le perfectionnisme moral en imposant la reconnaissance de son existence à travers la décision morale. Enfin, nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en réinventant le plan-séquence et le ralenti, répond singulièrement au problème posé par le scepticisme en réintégrant l’individu dans le monde à force de manipulations formelles qui sont autant de réponses au désoeuvrement contemporain comme condition existentielle. Ces réponses trouvées par Gus Van Sant ne sont pas des solutions, mais une exploration des dimensions d’un problème qu’il renouvèle : le scepticisme. / This thesis aims to explore the close ties between philosophical skepticism, the cinematic apparatus and Gus Van Sant's tetralogy of films: Gerry, Elephant, Last Days and Paranoid Park. From Stanley Cavell’s philosophical perspective, we will first address the question of skepticism as a condition of existence rather than a philosophical doctrine. Stanley Cavell redirects the skepticism problem of cognition towards ethics and we will look at how Gus Van Sant meets the ethical dimension of skepticism by offering a cinema of idleness and melancholia in which individuals are at odds with the world. Furthermore, we will study how the cinematic apparatus is the very expression of Cavellian skepticism and how it moves toward moral perfectionism by forcing the recognition of our existence through moral decision-making. Finally, we will look at how Gus Van Sant, in a singular manner, addresses the problem raised by skepticism by reinventing the sequence shot and the slow motion, and therefore reinstates the individual to the world through formal manipulations that respond to modern idleness as an existential condition. The answers Gus Van Sant has found are not solutions, but rather the exploration of the dimensions of a problem he is restating: skepticism.

This dissertation studies a group of contemporary Anglo-American novelists who contribute to the development of a new humanism after the postmodern critique of Euro-American culture. As such, these writers respond to positions in twentieth-century philosophy that converge in a call for silence which has an ontological as well as ethical valence: as a way of rigorously thinking the ‘outside’ to language, it avoids charges of metaphysical inauthenticity; as an ethical stance in the wake of the Shoah, it eschews a complicity with the reifications of modern culture. How to reconcile this post-metaphysical promise with the politico-aesthetic inadequacy of speechlessness is the central question for this nexus of novelists—David Markson, Bret Easton Ellis, David Foster Wallace, and Zadie Smith—at the center of which the study locates Wallace as a key figure of contemporary literature. By reconstructing the conversation among these authors, this dissertation argues that the nexus writers turn to indirect means of representation that do justice to the demand for silence in matters of metaphysics, but also gesture past it in the development of a neo-romantic aesthetics that invites the humanist category of the self back onto the scene after its dismissal by late postmodernism. The key to such indirection lies in an aporetic method that inspires explorations of metaphysical assumptions by seducing readers to an ambiguous site of aesthetic wonder; in conversation with a range of contemporary philosophers, the dissertation defines this affective site as a place of proximity, rather than absorption or detachment, which balances out the need for metaphysical distance with the productive desire for a fullness of experience. Such proximate aesthetic experiences continue the work of ‘doing metaphysics’ in post-metaphysical times by engaging our habitual responsiveness to the categories involved. Hence the novels discussed here stage limit cases of reason such as the unknowable world, the unreachable other, the absence of the self, and the unstable hierarchy between irony and sincerity: Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress imagines skepticism as literal abandonment and reminds us of our metaphysical indebtedness to a desired object/world; Ellis’s American Psycho shows the breakdown of communication due to a similarly skeptical vision of human interaction and presents a violence that tries to force a response from the desired subject/person; Wallace’s Infinite Jest creates a large canvas on which episodes of metaphysical and literal ‘stuckness’ afford possibilities for becoming human; Smith’s The Autograph Man, finally, pays attention to gestural language at the breaking point of materialism and theology, nature and culture, tragedy and comedy. / Graduate / 2020-08-01

Ce mémoire vise à explorer le lien étroit unissant le scepticisme philosophique, le dispositif cinématographique et la tétralogie de Gus Van Sant : Gerry, Elephant, Last days et Paranoid Park. À partir de la philosophie de Stanley Cavell, il sera d’abord question de développer le scepticisme comme condition d’existence et non plus comme doctrine philosophique. Stanley Cavell fait bifurquer le problème sceptique de la cognition vers l’éthique et nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en proposant un cinéma du désoeuvrement et de la mélancolie où l’individu est en rupture avec le monde, rejoint cette dimension éthique du scepticisme par le cinéma. Ensuite, il s’agira de voir comment le dispositif cinématographique est l’expression même du scepticisme cavellien et comment il permet de tendre vers le perfectionnisme moral en imposant la reconnaissance de son existence à travers la décision morale. Enfin, nous verrons comment Gus Van Sant, en réinventant le plan-séquence et le ralenti, répond singulièrement au problème posé par le scepticisme en réintégrant l’individu dans le monde à force de manipulations formelles qui sont autant de réponses au désoeuvrement contemporain comme condition existentielle. Ces réponses trouvées par Gus Van Sant ne sont pas des solutions, mais une exploration des dimensions d’un problème qu’il renouvèle : le scepticisme. / This thesis aims to explore the close ties between philosophical skepticism, the cinematic apparatus and Gus Van Sant's tetralogy of films: Gerry, Elephant, Last Days and Paranoid Park. From Stanley Cavell’s philosophical perspective, we will first address the question of skepticism as a condition of existence rather than a philosophical doctrine. Stanley Cavell redirects the skepticism problem of cognition towards ethics and we will look at how Gus Van Sant meets the ethical dimension of skepticism by offering a cinema of idleness and melancholia in which individuals are at odds with the world. Furthermore, we will study how the cinematic apparatus is the very expression of Cavellian skepticism and how it moves toward moral perfectionism by forcing the recognition of our existence through moral decision-making. Finally, we will look at how Gus Van Sant, in a singular manner, addresses the problem raised by skepticism by reinventing the sequence shot and the slow motion, and therefore reinstates the individual to the world through formal manipulations that respond to modern idleness as an existential condition. The answers Gus Van Sant has found are not solutions, but rather the exploration of the dimensions of a problem he is restating: skepticism.

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Zürich, 2006.

This dissertation is an attempt and, if you will, a temptation to engage with the ‘disturbing’ prospect of the truth of skepticism. All of Stanley Cavell’s works refer to the truth of skepticism, and yet the discourse surrounding this concept is sparse and often engaged minimally. The truth of skepticism is that “the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to the world as such, is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing” (The Claim of Reason, p.241). In order to make sense of what he means by what “we think of as knowing” Cavell provides a philosophical framework in which to understand skepticism and what it threatens: through his notion of “criteria” taken from Ludwig Wittgenstein; the concept of the “ordinary” derived from the works of J.L. Austin; and the “search for community” as a problem of “acknowledgement” or “avoidance” as opposed to a problem of knowledge. I argue that the “standard” (Stephen Mulhall’s) reading of Cavell fails to fully account for the truth of skepticism and I propose reading Cavell as a Nietzschean Versucher – one who attempts and searches endlessly, never fully embracing any particular view. By reading Cavell in this way, I explore how to do genuine philosophy and consider how to address the role of traditional epistemological problems in the face of Cavell’s framework. Beyond the traditional philosophical questions of skepticism, I address how the theoretical musings of the first half of the dissertation can be used in practice – or one could say how they reflect on the ordinary. Following Cavell, I connect philosophy and art as sister disciplines concerned with similar problems such as epistemological skepticism itself. To show these connections I analyze two plays and three films: Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale and Othello, alongside The Philadelphia Story (1940), Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004), and Her (2013). By engaging these pieces with Cavell’s philosophical framework in mind, I show how sexual jealousy is a form of living one’s skepticism in a real context that cannot be so easily dismissed by philosophers who claim that skepticism is somehow empty, confused, or nonsense. By showing how the threat of skepticism is a part of our ordinary lives, I conclude by considering how we might recover from our skepticism. Skepticism is not the end, it is the beginning.