Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

[pt] Kant nunca escreveu uma obra de História. Entretanto, é justamente com ele que a História torna-se um problema filosófico, ou seja, ela é revestida de uma dignidade própria e toma parte no sistema crítico. Ao questionar as aporias do conhecimento, Kant impõe novos critérios ao pensamento da ação humana em relação ao tempo, a possibilidade de conhecimento e ao sujeito. A relação entre passado-presente-futuro sofre um transtorno desde dentro, concedendo à História uma temporalidade própria em relação à religião e à política. O conhecimento sobre a História é realizado na mesma medida em que ela pode ser experimentada pelo sujeito, tornando-se seu próprio conhecimento. Em Kant, a humanidade é alçada a sujeito da História, o que reduz o campo de ação do homem e amplia sua responsabilidade. O debate acerca da natureza humana e autonomia moral conduz o sistema crítico por através dessa Idéia. Nesta dialética, Kant estabelece um horizonte formal ético que conduz a ação e o pensamento dos homens em uma tarefa infinita. Como razão crítica, é necessário que o pensamento volte-se sempre contra si próprio, tornando assim o presente o ponto de partida e chegada para a História. / [en] Kant has never written a History work. Nevertheless it is precisely with him that History becomes a philosophical problem, that is, it is covered by a selfdignity and becomes part of the critical system. At inquiring the knowledge principles, Kant imposes new criteria to the thought of human action concerned to time, to the possibility of knowing and to the subject. The relation among pastpresent- future is shaken up from the inside conceding to History a temporality of its own in relation to religion and politics. The knowledge about History is assumed as long as it can be experienced, becoming thus its own knowledge. With Kant, humanity is raised to the condition of subject of History, what, in one hand, reduces the man s action field and, in the other, extends his responsibility. The debate concerning the human nature and the moral autonomy guides the critical system and crosses throughout this Idea. On this dialectics, Kant establishes an ethical formal horizon leading men s action and thought on an endless task. As critical reason, it is necessary that the thought always work against itself making, in this manner, the present the starting and arrival point to History.

[pt] O objetivo da dissertação é caracterizar o pensamento a partir da exigência de uma consideração da estética, isto é, do mundo sensível, no contexto de esgotamento da compreensão metafísica que a opunha ao supra-sensível. Em outras palavras, trata-se de formular a questão sobre o acesso do pensamento à realidade sem recorrer aos parâmetros transcendentes tradicionais que, embora garantissem orientação, também submetiam o mundo sensível a regras prévias estranhas a ele. No contexto do pensamento moderno, essa possibilidade ganhou corpo, talvez pela primeira vez, na reflexão de Kant sobre o belo. Nela, a experiência estética tornou-se livre dos interesses cognitivos ou morais que a submetiam a um regime conceitual ou racional. Isso significou a abertura para uma maneira desinteressada de pensar, a partir da qual não mais se pergunta a verdade sobre uma coisa, mas sim a verdade da coisa. Ou seja, ao invés de subsumir um particular a uma regra universal prévia, o pensamento desinteressado precisa achar a universalidade daquele particular na sua singularidade, precisa achar a verdade que mora na coisa, e não fora dela. Sob a égide dessa questão, buscou-se detalhar a interpretação do desinteresse, o que levou não só ao exame de sua presença no pensamento de Kant, mas também no de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche, além de referências a autores contemporâneos, explícitas e implícitas, especialmente Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin e Hannah Arendt. / [en] The objective in this dissertation is to characterize thought from the requirement of a consideration of aesthetic, that is, of the sensible world, in the context of exhaustion of the Metaphysical understanding that opposed it to the non-sensible. In other words, it intends to formulate the question of the access of thought to reality without resorting to traditional transcendental parameters that, while providing orientation, also subjugated the sensible world to previous rules alien to it. In the context of modern thought, this possibility took form, perhaps for the first time, in the reflections of Kant on beauty. In it, the aesthetic experience was freeed from the cognitives or moral interests that submitted it to conceptual or rational constraints. This meant opening the way for a disinterested approach to thinking, in which one does not ask the truth about a thing, but the truth of the thing. Instead of subordinating the particular to a previous universal rule, disinterested thought seeks to find the universality of that particular in its own singularity. It needs to find the truth that dwells within the thing, and does not stand outside of it. Against the background of this question, this dissertation details the interpretation of disinterestedness, that not only led to the examination of its position in the thought of Kant, but also in that of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in addition to the references, explicit and implicit, to contemporary authors, especially Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de cibler l’un des rapports possibles entre psychologie et philosophie, à travers la lecture que fait Carl Gustav Jung des textes d’Emmanuel Kant. La théorie de la connaissance de Kant, telle que présentée dans sa Critique de la raison pure, apparaît comme étant l’un des piliers philosophiques à la base des développements conceptuels jungiens. Le psychiatre l’a affirmé à plusieurs reprises, notamment dans son ouvrage autobiographique (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). Il sera question, d’une part, d’évaluer la position scientifique de Jung en tant que construite à partir de celle proposée par Kant. Entre idéalisme et empirisme, Jung semble vouloir se frayer une place dans la science à la manière de l’idéalisme allemand. D’autre part, ce sera l’occasion d’étudier les structures élaborées par Jung, notamment l’inconscient collectif et les archétypes, qui selon lui, sont analogues à certains concepts de Kant tel que la chose en soi et les catégories a priori. Enfin, c’est à travers l’individuation, processus central de la recherche jungienne, que nous tenterons de comprendre de quelle façon les structures se dynamisent et peuvent faire écho à la dialectique de la Raison pure tel que présentée par Kant. Il sera dès lors possible de situer la psychologie analytique de Jung entre esthétique et éthique, telle une théorie éthique s’élaborant à même le développement du Soi. / This dissertation aims to target one of the possible relationships between psychology and philosophy, through Carl Gustav Jung's reading of Immanuel Kant's texts. Kant's theory of knowledge as presented in his Critique of Pure Reason appears to be one of the philosophical pillars at the basis of Jungian conceptual developments. The psychiatrist affirmed this on several occasions, notably in his autobiographical work (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). To do so, on the one hand, we will evaluate Jung's scientific position as constructed from the one proposed by Kant. Between idealism and empiricism, Jung seems to want to make his own way in science like the manner of German idealism. On the other hand, it will be the occasion to study the structures elaborated by Jung, in particular the collective unconscious and the archetypes, which, according to him, are analogous to certain Kant’s concepts such as the thing in itself and the a priori categories. Finally, it is through individuation, the central process of Jungian research, that we will try to understand how structures are dynamized and can echo the dialectic of Pure Reason as presented by Kant. It will then be possible to situate Jung's analytical psychology between aesthetics and ethics, as an ethical theory formulated within the development of the Self.

La notion de « dramatisation » a été formulée par Gilles Deleuze en 1967 dans Différence et répétition pour être délaissée ensuite. Cette recherche tâche de clarifier le sens de ce concept en distinguant une acception « dramatique » d’une acception « scénique ». Deleuze n’ayant cependant pas énoncé explicitement de théorie de la scène, une partie de l’entreprise vise à déduire, des textes de Deleuze et des auteurs qui lui servent de référence, l’hypothèse de cette définition. La formulation de cette hypothèse s’inscrit dans un environnement problématique déterminé par les ouvrages de Denis Guénoun et Esa Kirkkopelto. La notion prend son sens dans le cadre d’une critique de « la représentation », dont seraient captifs Platon, Aristote, Kant et Hegel, et d’une élaboration du concept de répétition à partir de Kierkegaard et Nietzsche. Une interprétation de la méthode de division platonicienne, de la méthode transcendantale kantienne et de l’éternel retour nietzschéen contribue ainsi à énoncer l’agencement conceptuel du drame, de la scène et de la répétition / The notion of “dramatisation” was formulated by Gilles Deleuze in his 1967 text Difference and Repetition, only later to be abandoned. This piece of research sets out to clarify the meaning of this concept by distinguishing its “dramatic” acceptance from its “scenic” one. Since Deleuze never explicitly expressed his theory of the stage this thesis project intends to determine from Deleuze’s texts, as well as from the authors to whom he himself referred, the hypothesis at work within the philosopher’s definition of this term. The statement of this hypothesis takes place in a problematic conceptual environment, as described in the works of Denis Guénoun and Esa Kirkkopelto. The notion of “dramatisation” derives its meaning through a critique of a particular understanding of “representation” within which Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel are held captive, as well as through a certain construal of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s concept of repetition. Interpretations of Plato’s method of dichotomous division, Kant’s transcendental method and Nietzsche’s eternal return contribute in this thesis to articulating the way in which drama, the stage and repetition combine.

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Dans ce mémoire, nous nous proposons de montrer que le concept kantien de chose en soi est à la fois un concept métaphysique et un concept critique. En ce sens, la chose en soi doit être comprise comme un objet transcendantal réel qui existe à titre de cause des phénomènes. Si, contrairement à ce que soutenaient F.H. Jacobi (1787) et G.E. Schulze (1791), cela ne suppose pas de sortir du criticisme, c'est qu'une telle affirmation prend la forme d'une connaissance analogique qui respecte les limites de la connaissance humaine. De fait, la connaissance analogique permet de pointer en direction de quelque chose dont la nature (Beschaffenheit) peut demeurer problématique, tout en permettant d'affirmer son existence (Dasein). Nous serons dès lors conduite à montrer que la Critique de la raison pure fournit bel et bien les outils nécessaires permettant de rendre compte de l’existence des choses en soi à titre de causes des phénomènes. / In the following thesis, we will claim that Kant’s concept of a thing-in-itself is both a metaphysical and a critical concept. Accordingly, the thing-in-itself must be understood as a real transcendental object that grounds phenomena. Thus, we maintain – contrary to F.H. Jacobi’s (1787) and G.E. Schulze’s (1791) harsh objections – that this assertion does not violate the structures of critical philosophy. Indeed, this particular claim is arrived at through analogical cognition, which does not transgress the boundaries of human knowledge: as a matter of fact, analogical cognition allows us to point towards and assert the existence (Dasein) of something the nature (Beschaffenheit) of which may remain problematic. Thus, we believe that Kant’s metaphysical commitment with regard to the existence of the thing-in-itself as ground of phenomena can be fully justified within the Critique of Pure Reason.

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